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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study examines options for the future development of the Irish 
welfare state, with a view to tackling low income and deprivation more 
effectively. It draws on existing national and cross-country evidence as well 
as providing new analyses to inform policy debate in this area. The impact 
of alternative policy choices is explored using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-
benefit model. 
Overview 
 
There are four main parts to the study. 
 
1. The structure of Ireland’s welfare state is put in international 
context, and a review of demographic developments and prospects 
helps to clarify the nature of future challenges for the system. 
2. Policy issues arising for the main “vulnerable groups” identified in 
the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion are then considered 
in depth. 
3. The way in which risks of poverty and deprivation are structured 
across regions and areas is then examined; this has important 
implications for what can and cannot be expected from area-based 
policies. 
4. Finally, the potential impacts of alternative large-scale policy reform 
packages are explored. 
 
Ireland is one of a small number of countries to have set an explicit 
target for poverty reduction The overall target in the National Action Plan for 
Social Inclusion is framed in terms of “consistent poverty”. This measure, 
designed to identify those who are suffering basic deprivation due to lack 
of resources, is currently defined as individuals falling below 60 per cent of 
median income and deprived of two or more items from a list of 11 basic 
necessities. The official target is:  
 
To reduce the number of those experiencing consistent poverty to 
between 2 per cent and 4 per cent by 2012, with the aim of 
eliminating consistent poverty by 2016. (Ireland, 2007, p. 13.) 
 
Broader measures of poverty are also of interest, particularly when 
designing policy for the longer term. The most widely used approach in 
international comparisons is to focus on the proportion of the population 
falling below certain fractions of median income. The EU has termed these 
“at risk of poverty” indicators, recognising that not all of those falling 
below such income cut-offs would be classed as “poor”. The “at risk of 
poverty” measures automatically ensure that poverty standards rise in line 
with real income growth. Adjustment of the consistent poverty yardstick 
over time involves, in addition, revision of the items included in the index 
of basic deprivation. As a result, there may be discrete changes in 
consistent poverty as the items employed to capture deprivation are 
changed. Given this, the “at risk of poverty” measures provide valuable 
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information on trends complementing what is possible with the consistent 
poverty method. 
 
In this study, we pay particular attention to the “at risk of poverty” 
measure for practical reasons. When assessing proposed policy changes it is 
possible, using a tax-benefit model, to simulate the first-round impact of 
tax and welfare policy changes on disposable incomes and on measures of 
financial work incentives. These changes in disposable income may, of 
course, have an impact on deprivation. But this indirect effect cannot be 
readily quantified, so in this study we focus mainly on the impacts on 
income and financial work incentives. Research addressing the issue of the 
impact of changes in welfare policy on consistent poverty has begun 
recently and will complement the findings of the present study. 
 
 
Context INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
We begin by examining how welfare spending in Ireland compares with 
that in other EU countries, and how Irish welfare spending has changed 
over time. Ireland is seen to have a particularly low level of social 
protection spending as a proportion of national income, with the shortfall 
compared with the EU average mostly concentrated in the area of old age 
pensions. Only a part of this gap is explained by differences in population 
structure. Overall social protection spending as a proportion of GDP was 9 
percentage points below the EU-15 average in 1990; by 2000 this had 
widened to 13 percentage points, and in 2004 it had narrowed to under 11. 
Despite this, Ireland’s relatively high income means that it is in the top half 
of the EU when ranked by social protection spending per head. Over the 
entire period 1990 to 2004, social protection expenditure more than 
doubled in real terms, faster than any other member of the EU-15. This 
brings out the complex mix that must be taken into account in seeking to 
understand and assess the evolution of social protection expenditure in 
what was a most unusual macroeconomic context, and serve as background 
to the analysis of policy options at the level of contingencies and schemes. 
  
The proportion of persons “at risk of poverty” in Ireland is among the 
highest in the EU. Simulation analyses show that differences in the age 
profile, the pattern of labour force participation, and household 
composition do not play the major role in observed cross-country variation 
in the percentage “at risk of poverty”. Differences in tax and welfare rates 
and structures are more important. Given this, there is particular interest in 
cross-country comparisons aimed at identifying potential strategies for 
reduction in poverty risk, while maintaining an efficient labour market. 
Sapir (2005) identifies the Scandinavian model as one which attains both 
efficiency (in terms of high employment rates) and equity (low risks of 
poverty). Successful anti-poverty policy requires both enhanced education 
and employment opportunities and improved income supports – neither is 
enough on its own. Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have 
sustained both high employment and a comprehensive welfare system 
ensuring that those without income from employment have an adequate 
income. Over the last decade Ireland has successfully made the transition 
to high employment and low unemployment rates. The experience of other 
EU countries suggests that it is possible to combine these achievements 
with low “at risk of poverty” rates, with a system that encourages active 
participation in the labour market, while providing a comprehensive safety 
net and higher rates of welfare payment relative to average incomes.  
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DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
Ireland has seen major changes not only in its economic fortunes but also 
in its demographic and socio-economic profile over recent years, as a result 
of dramatic developments in migration but also more subtle longer-term 
trends. Ireland is distinctive in having substantially more children and fewer 
older people in the population than many other EU countries, with the 
share of the proportion of working age close to the EU average. Ireland 
has not yet experienced the “greying” of the population seen in some other 
rich countries. However, there has been a marked decline in the share of 
the population made up by children: the share of the population aged 0-14 
years peaked in the 1960s, declined slowly until the mid-1980s, and fell 
sharply from then until 2002, with the recent Census showing it has been 
stable since then.  
 
Childbearing has become increasingly concentrated among women aged 
in their 30s, with declines for other age groups. There has also been a 
marked fall in the number of children per family and the number of 
families with three or more children – although this is still high compared 
to other countries. A rapid increase in the share of fertility occurring 
outside of marriage began in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s, 
approaching one-third of births in 2000. This has been one factor 
associated with a sharp rise in lone parenthood – a rise in marital 
breakdown also being an important factor. Ireland now has a high 
proportion of lone parent households compared with other EU countries, 
though less than the UK. 
 
Turning to older people, 11 per cent of the population was aged 65 
years or over in 2006, no higher than in the early 1960s, whereas in the EU-
15 that percentage rose from 12 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 2004. 
However, it is expected that a similar rise will take place in Ireland over the 
next 20 years or so. Given expected migration patterns, there would also be 
further increases in succeeding decades. There is a growing tendency for 
older people to live apart from their children or other relatives, in Ireland 
as in other rich countries, but the proportion who never married has fallen. 
 
Ireland’s economic boom has also had a pronounced impact on 
migration flows in and out of the country, with the net inflow of 
immigrants increasing from 8,000 a year in 1996 to 53,000 a year in 2005. 
The composition of migratory flows to Ireland has also become 
increasingly diverse, with fewer coming from the UK and the US and many 
more from the rest of the EU and the rest of the world, and with a 
relatively young age profile. 
 
 The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion identifies a number of 
vulnerable group of particular interest from the point of view of anti-
poverty policies. Six vulnerable groups (lone parents, children, older 
people, persons with a disability, unemployed people and the “working 
poor”) are examined in depth here using household survey data; some 
other groups, such as travellers and the homeless, are highly vulnerable but 
form such a small proportion of the general population that their situation 
is not well represented by general survey data such as that which forms the 
basis for this study. 
Vulnerable 
Groups 
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LONE PARENTS 
European and worldwide comparisons show that Scandinavian countries 
have the lowest risks of income poverty for lone parents. This is achieved 
by a system of activation which promotes employment for all, and supports 
for employment including a comprehensive childcare system, as well as 
education and training. The UK has reduced risks of poverty for lone 
parents substantially, but the risk facing UK lone parents still remains at 
the high end of the EU scale. The structure of income supports and 
activation for lone parents proposed in the Government’s 2006 discussion 
document is in line with best international practice, as exemplified by 
Norway and the Netherlands. Much depends, of course, on the 
implementation of the approach. The proposals note that “Introduction of 
an activation requirement is predicated on childcare supports being 
available”. This is a critical issue. While childcare structures and policy have 
been developing in recent years, they are still far from the fully developed 
systems found in Scandinavia. There must be a linkage between childcare 
provision and activation provisions, so that what is sought in terms of 
activation is in line with the possibilities afforded by the childcare 
structures. 
 
Another key decision in the design of the system is whether activation 
or a work-test is to be voluntary or compulsory. In the Scandinavian 
countries activation is typically compulsory, not just for lone parents but 
for all social assistance beneficiaries. This is in the context of an excellent 
and fully fledged childcare system, making it possible for families, including 
lone parent families, to combine work and care. This context does not (yet) 
exist in Ireland. In the UK (where the childcare system is perhaps more 
developed than in Ireland, though less so than in Scandinavia) the New 
Deal for Lone Parents operates on the basis of voluntary participation. 
Again, this contrast suggests that the extent of compulsion needs to be 
linked to the extent of childcare provision. 
CHILDREN 
There are strong links between child poverty and the overall “at risk of 
poverty” rate. Countries with the best record on the reduction of child 
poverty – the Scandinavian countries – also tend to have the lowest rates of 
overall poverty. The “best practice” approach to improving EU 
performance in this area suggests close attention should be given to the 
policies and structures of the best-performing countries. The logic of the 
approach is, therefore, that other countries should compare their 
approaches with those of the Scandinavian countries – which are the best 
performers in this regard not only in Europe but in global terms. By 
contrast, much of the debate on child poverty has focused on restructuring 
income-tested income support for families with children, with attention 
centering on recent initiatives in English-speaking countries. While some 
reductions in poverty have been achieved by these initiatives, it is clear that 
rates of child poverty in the English speaking countries remain above those 
in most European countries, and well above Scandinavian levels. 
 
This approach is associated with a tendency to view child poverty as a 
problem to be dealt with, in the main, through child income support. But 
avoidance of poverty requires that parents have adequate incomes too. 
Tackling child poverty, therefore, requires a strategy that takes a broad view 
of welfare income supports, and “activist” measures to increase 
participation in employment. Solutions lie not with welfare alone, or 
employment alone, but a combination of both. 
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OLDER PEOPLE 
The “at risk of poverty” rate for older people has varied substantially over 
time in Ireland. The risk of poverty (at 60 per cent of median income) rose 
from low levels in 1994 to over 40 per cent around the year 2000. The Irish 
rate was second highest (to Cyprus) in the EU-25 around the year 2003, 
and more than double the EU average. The lowest risk of poverty for older 
people in Western Europe was in the Netherlands, a country with a strong 
basic pension and mandatory occupational pensions. Despite the high risk 
of income poverty in Ireland, older people had lower than average risks of 
consistent poverty. Home ownership, drawing on financial assets and 
family support contribute to explaining this difference. Increases in 
payment rates for State Pensions since the turn of the century have 
contributed to a strong reduction in the risk of poverty for pensioners. 
Recent Central Statistics Office estimates, based on the Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 2006), indicate that older persons now 
have a lower “at risk of poverty” rate than the average for the whole 
population. 
 
One of the issues raised in the Green Paper on pensions is whether tax 
incentives for pension contributions should be allowed at the individual’s 
marginal rate, as at present, at the standard rate, or at a hybrid rate between 
the two. We have explored some alternatives to the current tax treatment 
of pensions, involving the limitation of tax relief on pension contributions 
and a rise in the State Pension. In our analysis, this limitation applies not 
only to private sector contributions, but also to the implicit contributions 
arising from public sector pension schemes. We find that, in a static 
framework, standardisation of tax relief on all pension contributions 
(employer and employee, public sector and private sector) offers scope for 
very substantial reductions in the risk of poverty for older people. There 
are also alternative uses of the resources, discussed later, which also allow 
for a broad reduction in risks of poverty. Further work on how these 
results are affected by likely shifts in the demographic balance is currently 
under way. 
PEOPLE WITH A DISABILITY 
People with a disability are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social 
exclusion. There are particular difficulties in identifying those with 
disabilities in recent household surveys (with questions determined at 
European level); the National Disability Survey will shortly give a more 
accurate portrait of the extent of disability, but with limited information on 
income or deprivation. However, given that welfare payment rates for 
disability related payments have trended in line with unemployment 
payments rather than the special increases in pension rates, we can use the 
Living in Ireland Survey as a guide to risks of poverty for those with a 
disability. In the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey, 22 per cent of respondents 
reported a chronic illness or disability, and almost four-fifths of these 
adults were in households “at risk of poverty”, more than twice the figure 
for other adults. Similarly, the consistent poverty rate for those reporting a 
chronic illness or disability was twice the rate for those not doing so. The 
percentage “at risk of poverty” rose sharply for long-term ill or disabled 
adults between 1995 and 2001, linked to the extent to which people with 
illness or disability and the households in which they live rely on social 
welfare payments as a source of income. The factors underpinning this 
heightened poverty risk and consistent poverty are complex, with disability 
having its effects through a variety of channels, starting with its potential 
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effects on educational attainment and its direct and indirect impact on the 
individual’s working career and perhaps also that of others in household.  
 
In analysing possible policy responses we looked first at the impact of 
an increase in the level of support provided by the most directly relevant 
social welfare schemes. We found that a 10 per cent rise in these welfare 
payment rates would reduce the risk of poverty for those who are 
hampered by a chronic illness or disability by 8-10 percentage points. The 
impact of introducing a scheme aimed at covering some of the costs 
associated with disability was also examined, specifically a scheme paying 
€20 per week to those reporting that they were severely limited by a 
chronic illness or disability and €10 per week to those reporting some 
degree of limitation. This was associated with a fall of 5 and 3 percentage 
points respectively in the risk of poverty for these groups. Finally, the 
potential impact of an increase in employment for persons with a disability 
was explored: a 10 percentage point rise in their employment rate was seen 
to be associated with a fall of about 3 percentage points in their overall risk 
of income poverty.  
UNEMPLOYED PERSONS 
The rapid fall in the Irish unemployment rate, and its positive economic 
and social effects, have been well documented. There remains, however, a 
high risk of income poverty and of consistent poverty for those who are 
unemployed. The “at risk of poverty” rate for those who are unemployed is 
towards the high end of the international spectrum, exceeded in the EU-15 
only by the UK. International best practice confirms that is possible to 
attain both low unemployment and a low risk of poverty for the 
unemployed. In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands the risk of poverty 
facing the unemployed is about half of that in Ireland and the UK, but the 
unemployment rate remains low. Strong activation policies are the key to 
achieving this combination. OECD analysis suggests that Irish activation 
policy has become very effective, and may now be able to offset the 
potential negative incentive impact of higher unemployment compensation. 
IN-WORK POVERTY AND THE WORKING POOR 
Over the decade from the mid-1990s, Ireland has seen very rapid increases 
in employment and in incomes from employment, but concern about the 
numbers of “working poor” are being voiced more frequently, both in 
Ireland and at EU level (e.g., in the Joint Report on Social Protection and 
Social Inclusion, EU (2006)). The “working poor” may be measured as 
individuals who are themselves in work and who live in a household that is 
poor or “at risk of poverty”. In the Irish case 7 per cent of adults in work are 
in households below the 60 per cent of median income threshold, a figure 
which is close to the EU-15 average. As elsewhere, the percentage below that 
threshold is very much higher for the self-employed than for employees; the 
figure is 6 per cent for employees but 16 per cent for the self-employed, 
neither being particularly high or low compared with other EU-15 countries. 
The size of the in-work population means that even with a relatively low “at 
risk of poverty” rate 17 per cent of adults below the 60 per cent threshold are 
in work. It should be noted, however, that of those falling below the 
income thresholds, only a small minority of employees, and a smaller 
proportion of the self-employed are in consistent poverty. 
 
Over the ten years from 1994, in-work poverty risk rose from 5 per cent 
to 7 per cent, while for employees the increase was significantly greater. 
This reflects the fact that households where the numbers at work rose saw 
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particularly marked income increases – with the proportion of married 
women in paid work rising very rapidly over the period – so households 
with only one earner could well fail to keep pace with the poverty 
threshold.  
 
Focusing on policy options aimed at the working poor, we simulated a 
10 per cent increase in the National Minimum Wage using the SWITCH 
tax-benefit model, and found that the overall risk of in-work poverty would 
fall from about 5½ per cent to 4 per cent, while for employees it would fall 
from 2½ per cent to 1½ per cent. Other policy options explored focused 
on assisting low-earning households with children. Universal Child Benefit 
has been very substantially increased in recent years, and simulation of the 
impact of these increases suggest that they may have had a significant 
impact in reducing poverty for households with children. The option of a 
means-tested “second tier” child income support supplement was already 
been explored, and had the potential to make a significant impact on the 
risk of poverty for children. 
 
 Analysis of Census data (2002) shows that deprivation remains a spatially 
diffuse phenomenon. Significantly greater variation occurs within rather 
than between spatial units. The Border and Western Regions tend to be the 
most deprived but the situation varies depending on the particular aspect 
of deprivation on which one focuses. Generally, spatial variations in risk of 
deprivation are counterbalanced by a more even incidence of poverty as 
high risk areas tend to have a lower share of the population. Analysis at the 
household level using EU-SILC 2005 looking at both “at risk of poverty” 
measures and at consistent poverty broadly confirms this picture. Focusing 
on areas defined in terms of population density confirms that both types of 
poverty were distributed across areas in a fairly similar manner to the 
population as a whole. Given the diffuse nature of poverty, area 
programmes cannot be justified on a targeting basis alone. 
Spatial Issues 
 
Poverty and deprivation are much more sharply differentiated by 
housing tenure. In particular, local authority tenants display distinctive 
levels of disadvantage in relation to both “at risk of poverty” rates and 
consistent poverty. This is also true of a range of deprivation dimensions. 
However, with the exception of neighbourhood problems relating to such 
matters as crime and pollution there is no evidence that urban local 
authority tenants are less favourably situated than their rural counterparts. 
Thus, there is no evidence to support the view that urban ‘underclass’ or 
vicious circle contextual effects play an important role in explaining the 
distribution of poverty and deprivation in Ireland. 
 
The fact that we have found no strong evidence of a causal role for 
spatial factors means that expectations regarding area-based policies need 
to be adjusted. If, as we have found, area-based interventions are not likely 
to be effective in targeting “people poverty”, the comparative advantage of 
such policy interventions may lie in dealing with “place poverty”. Recent 
interventions have shifted towards this focus, encompassing goals such as 
enhanced neighbourhood infrastructure, improved service delivery and 
mobilisation of community resources. It is important, however, not to 
encourage unrealistic expectations that such initiatives can provide 
solutions to problems that can be addressed only by national policies. 
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 There remains a substantial gap between risks of poverty in Ireland and 
those in the EU countries with the best performance in this area. How can 
this gap be bridged? We have examined the scope for bridging this gap 
with two simple rate- increasing welfare packages (10 per cent and 20 per 
cent) and with two packages incorporating structural changes as well as 
increased welfare payment rates. Here we focus on the package which 
seems to offer greatest scope for bridging the gap, which involves: 
Policy 
Packages 
 • a uniform welfare payment rate across all schemes of €230 per week in 
2007 terms. This is similar to the target set in the Programme for 
Government for older persons, but well above the target for general 
welfare rates (of €185.50 per week) set in the National Action Plan for 
Social Inclusion (Ireland, 2007); 
• an income-tested Child Benefit Supplement; 
• a reorientation of the State’s total expenditure on pensions away from 
tax expenditures for private pensions and towards the State Pension.  
 
The option examined would involve restricting tax relief on 
superannuation contributions to the standard rate of tax. This applies both 
to private sector contributions and to the implicit contributions within the 
public sector scheme, which would need to be made explicit. Net revenue 
from standardisation would be of the order of €1,500 million per annum. 
Standard rate taxpayers would be unaffected by the change, while tax 
liabilities would rise for top rate taxpayers. This aspect of the package can 
be seen as rebalancing State support for pensions in favour of greater 
universal support, and less support towards the higher end of the income 
distribution. Standard rate taxpayers would gain from the increased 
universal support, and would be unaffected by the standardisation of relief 
on superannuation contributions. Further work examining how the impact 
of such policy changes would be affected by the ageing of the Irish 
population is currently under way. 
 
The direct impact of this package suggests a fall in the risk of poverty 
from almost 16 per cent to between 10 and 11 per cent. The reduction in 
risk is greatest for the high risk groups (older people, people with a 
disability and unemployed persons) for whom risks fall from about 40 per 
cent to close to 20 per cent. There are significant increases in replacement 
rates, with the modal rate rising from between 50 and 60 per cent to 
between 60 and 70 per cent. The rise in high or very high replacement rates 
(defined as above 70 per cent and above 90 per cent) is, however, more 
modest. If this policy package were to attain its poverty-reduction potential 
it would need to be complemented by further measures encouraging 
activation of welfare recipients – including not only unemployed persons 
but also lone parents and people with a disability. 
 
A key message from this research is that there the balance between 
payment rates for pensions and for other welfare payments merits 
reconsideration. Recent results from the EU-SILC suggest that older 
people now have lower than average “at risk of poverty” rates, following 
increases in the State Pension in recent years. Older persons have had 
lower than average risks of consistent poverty for the past decade and 
more – partly reflecting their access to resources not included in cash 
income, such as the advantage of owning a house outright. Current policy 
includes a target of raising the State Pension to at least €300 by 2012. 
However, the target for welfare payment rates for other welfare recipients 
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is a more modest one. The goal in the National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion is to “…maintain the relative value of the lowest social welfare 
rate at least at €185.50, in 2007 terms”. Differing interpretations of this 
goal are possible. The most generous would involve indexation of the 
lowest rate in line with earnings. If earnings grew by  5 per cent per year, 
the minimum welfare rate would  rise to about €237 by 2012. The ratio 
between the minimum welfare rate and the State Pension would, in this 
case, fall from close to 90 per cent to below 80 per cent. This would be less 
effective in reducing the “at risk of poverty” rate than an alternative 
package which raised the State Pension to the target level, with other 
payment rates increased to “close the gap” between pension and non-
pension rates.  
 GLOSSARY 
“At risk of poverty” rate: The proportion of individuals living in 
households with incomes below 50, 60 or 70 per cent of median household 
disposable income (the income of the middle-ranking household) adjusted 
for family size and composition using equivalence scales (see below). 
 
“Basic” deprivation: being unable to afford basic necessities, measured 
by a set of eight non-monetary deprivation indicators including a warm 
overcoat, a second pair of shoes, or heating the house adequately in the 
winter. 
 
Child Benefit: a monthly payment, payable regardless of a person's 
income or social insurance record, to the parents or guardians of children 
under 16 years of age, or under 19 years of age if the child has a disability 
or is in full-time education or FÁS Youthreach training. The same monthly 
rate applies for the first and second child, with an increased rate applying to 
third and subsequent children.  
 
Consistent poverty: a household that is both below a relative income 
threshold and reports “basic deprivation” is considered to be consistently 
poor. 
 
Equivalence scale: a measure of household size and composition used in 
adjusting household income for the differences in “needs” associated with 
differing size and composition; for example, a value of 1 can be assigned to 
the first adult in the household, a value of 0.66 to each additional adult, and 
a value of 0.33 to each child, and these summed to give the number of 
“adult equivalents” it contains; equivalised income is then derived by 
dividing household disposable income by that number. Disposable income 
is all income received by household members from earnings, self-
employment (including farming), rent, interest, dividends, and social 
welfare transfers, after deduction of income tax and employee social 
insurance contributions. 
 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP): a longitudinal 
survey organised by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, and carried out in most of the then Member States of the 
EU-15 from 1994 to 2001. 
 
EU-SILC: EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions, a common 
framework for the systematic production of statistics on income and living 
conditions, across the Member States. In Ireland, this survey has been 
carried out by the Central Statistics Office since the second half of 2003. 
 
Family Income Supplement (FIS): a weekly tax-free payment for 
families, including one-parent families, at work on low pay. To qualify for 
this payment recipients must:  
XVI 
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• be an employee in paid employment which is expected to last for at 
least 3 months;  
• work at least 19 hours every week, or 38 hours every fortnight; 
• have at least one qualified child (any child under age 18 or aged 18 
to 22 years if in full-time education) who normally lives with them 
and/or is supported by them; 
• have an average weekly family income below the income limits set 
for their family size.  
 
If two people are married or living together as husband and wife they 
can combine their hours worked and their income will be added together 
when determining the family income limit. 
 
GDP and GNP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National 
Product (GNP) are measures of aggregate national income. GDP measures 
output produced in a country, and GNP measures output generated by the 
factors of production owned by residents of the country. For most 
countries, these measures are very similar, but for Ireland, GNP is about 15 
per cent below GDP, because the profits of the large multinational sector 
form part of output produced in Ireland, but are not part of the income of 
Irish residents. 
 
Increases For Dependants: most weekly social welfare payments are 
made up of a personal rate for the recipient and extra amounts for their 
spouse/partner or any child. These extra amounts are known as an 
Increase for a Qualified Adult (IQA) and Qualified Child Increase (QCI) 
respectively. (Terms formerly used to describe these increases in payments 
include Child Dependant Additions (CDAs), Adult Dependant Additions 
(ADAs) and Qualified Adult Additions (QAA)). 
 
If a welfare recipient has a spouse or partner who is considered a 
Qualified Adult they may receive an IQA. This may be the case if the 
spouse or partner’s sole income is from certain social welfare or Health 
Service Executive (HSE) payments, including Child Benefit and 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA). If the welfare recipient is 
divorced or separated and they support their former spouse, they may 
claim an IQA for them if they are paying them a certain amount of 
maintenance a week, if they are not living with someone as husband and 
wife, and if their income does not exceed certain limits. Where the spouse 
or partner earns over the limit but less than a specified ceiling, the welfare 
recipient continues to get an IQA but at a reduced rate. 
 
Most social welfare payments provide for an increase in respect of 
children who are ordinarily resident in the State and who satisfy the 
condition as to age. A full rate QCI is payable where the claimant has no 
spouse or partner, is separated, or is in receipt of an IQA (whether it is at 
the full rate or at the reduced rate) in respect of the spouse. A half-rate 
QCI is payable where the claimant is living with a spouse or partner who is 
not a Qualified Adult. A QCI is not payable if the child is getting a social 
welfare payment or if the recipient’s spouse or partner has a weekly income 
of €400. 
 
Living in Ireland Survey: The Irish element of the European Community 
Household Panel. 
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Mean: the arithmetic average. 
 
Median: the point which divides a distribution in two – for example, the 
income level above and below which half the recipients fall.   
 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
Relative income poverty: falling below an income threshold derived as a 
proportion (for example, 50 per cent or 60 per cent) of mean or median 
income. 
 
Rent or Mortgage Interest Supplement (RMIS): a weekly 
supplementary payment under the Supplementary Welfare Allowance 
(SWA) scheme. SWA provides a basic weekly allowance to eligible people 
who have little or no income. If someone has claimed a social welfare 
benefit or pension but it has not yet been paid and they have no other 
income, they may qualify for SWA while they are awaiting payment. 
 
People with an income, whether from the basic SWA or otherwise, that 
is too low to meet certain special needs may also qualify for a weekly 
supplement payment. One such need is rent/mortgage interest payments. 
The amount of the supplement is calculated by the HSE’s Community 
Welfare Officer and generally ensures that the recipient’s income after 
paying their rent or mortgage interest does not fall below a minimum level. 
 
Unemployment Assistance (UA) and Unemployment Benefit (UB): 
people who are aged 18 years or over and are unemployed in Ireland may 
be paid either Unemployment Assistance (UA) or Unemployment Benefit 
(UB). To qualify for either UA or UB, recipients must be unemployed (i.e. 
for at least 3 days in each period of 6 consecutive days), be under 66 years 
of age and be capable of, available for and genuinely seeking work.  
 
UB is a weekly payment made to people who were paying Pay Related 
Social Insurance (PRSI) before they lost their job. To qualify for UB 
people must have lost at least one day’s employment including a loss of 
income. 
 
If an unemployed person does not qualify for UB because they have not 
made sufficient PRSI contributions, or if they have used up their 
entitlement to UB, they may be paid UA, which is also a weekly payment 
but is means tested.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study has a broad remit: to examine how the Irish welfare state could 
be developed to tackle low income and deprivation more effectively. It draws 
on existing national and cross-country evidence as well as providing new 
analyses to inform policy debate in this area. The impact of alternative policy 
choices is explored using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model. 
1.1  
Context 
 
The current objectives and strategy of Ireland’s welfare system are well 
documented in the NESC’s (2005) The Developmental Welfare State, and the 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2007-2016 (Government of Ireland, 
2007). Each of these studies focuses on supporting and protecting vulnerable 
groups in dealing with problems faced at different stages of the life cycle. 
While income support is a critical factor, policies aimed at tackling poverty 
include a range of services such as education, health, housing and 
employment supports. 
 
The economic background to our investigation is one in which economic 
growth over most of the past two decades has been very strong. Despite 
current short-term difficulties in the international macroeconomy and in the 
housing sector, the medium-term outlook is also quite positive, though with 
growth at somewhat lower levels. A particular feature of the period has been 
the strong performance of the labour market, with unemployment falling 
from over 15 per cent to below 5 per cent. At the same time, net migration 
flows were reversed, with the boom in the Irish labour market attracting not 
only returning Irish emigrants but workers from new member states of the 
EU and from further afield. 
 
At an early stage in this process, Ireland became one of a small number of 
countries to set an explicit target for poverty reduction. The overall target in 
the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion is framed in terms of “consistent 
poverty”. This measure, designed to identify those who are suffering basic 
deprivation due to lack of resources, is currently defined as individuals falling 
below 60 per cent of median income and deprived of two or more items from 
a list of 11 basic necessities.  The official target is:  
 
To reduce the number of those experiencing consistent poverty to 
between 2 per cent and 4 per cent by 2012, with the aim of 
eliminating consistent poverty by 2016.  (Ireland, 2007, p. 13.) 
 
Broader measures of poverty are also of interest, particularly when 
designing policy for the longer term. The most widely used approach in 
international comparisons is to focus on the proportion of the population 
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falling below certain fractions of median income.1 The EU has termed these 
“at risk of poverty” indicators, recognising that not all of those falling below 
such income cut-offs would be classed as “poor”. Most would agree that 
poverty standards of a century ago could no longer be used to define what 
constitutes poverty in present-day society: it is not enough that the poor have 
experienced real income gains over the past century (welcome though this is) 
if they have not got the resources to participate fully in contemporary society. 
A corollary of this is that poverty standards must also be adjusted over 
shorter periods of time. The “at risk of poverty” measures automatically 
ensure that poverty standards rise in line with real income growth. 
Adjustment of the consistent poverty yardstick over time involves, in 
addition, revision of the items included in the index of basic deprivation. As a 
result, there may be discrete changes in consistent poverty as the items 
employed to capture deprivation are changed. Given this, the “at risk of 
poverty” measures provide valuable information on trends complementing 
what is possible with the consistent poverty method. 
 
Latest CSO figures (from the EU Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions 2006) indicate that the extent of consistent poverty is close to 7 
per cent. As noted above, the policy target is to reduce this to between 2 and 
4 per cent by 2012, with the aim of eliminating consistent poverty by 2016. In 
terms of the “at risk of poverty” measure, latest figures (again from the CSO’s 
EU-SILC for 2006) show a fall from around 20 per cent  to 17 per cent. 
Further reductions are required if the “at risk of poverty” measure in Ireland 
is to come closer to the best performing countries in the EU, where the 
corresponding figure is around 10 to 12 per cent. 
 
How can reductions in these indicators of low income and deprivation be 
achieved? We approach this question first by looking at what may be learned 
by comparisons with the countries achieving the best results on these 
measures. Next we examine the issues affecting vulnerable or high-risk 
groups, and explore policy measures which could help to improve their 
situation. We also investigate cross-cutting issues relating to the spatial 
distribution of poverty. Finally, we take a more systemic approach to the 
welfare system, looking at the potential impact of large scale packages. In this 
context, of course, financing is also an important issue, and particular 
attention is paid to this. 
 
In this study, we pay particular attention to the “at risk of poverty” 
measure for practical reasons. When assessing proposed policy changes it is 
possible, using a tax-benefit model, to simulate the first-round impact of tax 
and welfare policy changes on disposable incomes and on measures of 
financial work incentives. These changes in disposable income may, of 
course, have an impact on deprivation. But this indirect effect cannot be 
readily quantified, so in this study we focus mainly on the impacts on income 
and financial work incentives. Research addressing the issue of the impact of 
changes in welfare policy on consistent poverty has begun recently and will 
complement the findings of the present study. 
 
1 Such measures are commonly termed relative (income) poverty rates in the academic 
literature. In the EU context they are termed “at risk of poverty” indicators, a subset of the 
Laeken indicators (named for the venue of the European Council meeting at which they were 
adopted). Ireland, like other EU countries, has agreed to the use of this measure to monitor 
progress. 
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 There are four  main parts to the study. 1.2  
Outline of 
the Study 
1. The structure of Ireland’s welfare state is put in an international 
context, and a review of demographic developments and prospects 
helps to understand the nature of future challenges for the system. 
2. Policy issues arising for the main “vulnerable groups” identified in the 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion are then considered in 
depth. 
3. The way in which risks of poverty and deprivation are structured 
across regions and areas is then examined; this has important 
implications for what can and cannot be expected from area-based 
policies. 
4. Finally, the potential impacts of alternative large-scale policy reform 
packages are explored. 
 
Three chapters set out the broad context within which options for future 
development of Ireland’s welfare state must be considered. Chapter 2 
examines Ireland’s social protection expenditures in an international and 
historical context. Chapter 3 focuses on identifying countries which have 
attained the best outcomes, in terms of social inclusion outcomes, at both EU 
and global level. The common characteristics of the welfare systems of the 
best performing systems are also considered, as indicators of “best practice” 
in this area. Chapter 4 considers demographic and socio-economic trends 
which are shaping current and future needs for social protection, and 
possibilities for future development of the welfare state in Ireland. 
 
The next set of chapters (Chapters 5 to 10) analyse the situations facing 
key vulnerable groups, identified in the National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion, and explore policy options which could improve the situation of 
these groups. These groups link in with the life-cycle approach of the Plan, 
seeking to support individuals in dealing with the problems faced at different 
stages of their lives – whether childhood, adulthood, old age or disability. 
One-parent families have been at high risk of poverty for some time, and with 
sustained growth in their numbers, and falling unemployment, they are now 
one of the largest groups “at risk of poverty”. In Chapter 5, recent policy 
proposals (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2006) are considered in 
the light of international evidence and trends on “what works” for lone 
parents. Chapter 6 re-examines the structure of child income support, 
drawing on international comparisons of “child benefit packages”. Again, we 
follow the EU’s model of examining “best practice” by reference to measured 
outcomes for children in terms of risks of income poverty. We also explore 
the design of a “second tier” child income support, along the lines indicated 
in the NESC strategy report. 
 
The situation of older people in Ireland is also examined in an 
international comparative context (Chapter 7). The balance between direct 
expenditure on the old age pension schemes, and “tax expenditures” on 
occupational pensions is examined, following special adaptation of the 
SWITCH tax-benefit model. This allows a comprehensive view of the reliefs 
associated not just with employee superannuation contributions, but also with 
contributions by employers, including the government.  
 
Chapter 8 looks at poverty risk and consistent poverty rates for people 
with a disability. Key channels through which disability seems to raise risks of 
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poverty are identified, and policy strategies for reducing risks of poverty for 
adults with a  disability are explored. 
 
Chapter 9 re-examines risks of poverty and social exclusion facing 
unemployed persons, in the light of the major fall in unemployment since the 
early 1990s. While Ireland is seen as a model country in terms of its 
achievements in reducing unemployment from very high to very low levels, 
the risk of income poverty facing the unemployed is still high when compared 
to a number of other countries. International comparisons of poverty risk 
prove useful in pointing towards policies aimed at providing adequate income 
support to those without jobs, while encouraging movement from 
unemployment into employment.  
 
While there has been rapid growth in employment over the past decade, 
there are also continuing concerns at national and EU level about the 
numbers of “working poor”. Chapter 10 looks at what in-work poverty 
means and how it is defined. Data from EU-SILC are used to assess its 
current extent and trends over time are explored using ECHP data. Policy 
options geared to deal with the situation of the working poor are then 
examined. 
 
Chapter 11 looks at cross-cutting spatial issues related to poverty, drawing 
both on Census data and on new analyses of EU 2005 data. Both sources 
suggest that poverty is a spatially diffuse phenomenon. The implications for 
what can, and cannot, be expected from area-based policies are drawn out.  
 
Chapter 12 explores four major welfare reform packages. The first two 
isolate the effect of simply increasing welfare payments, by 10 per cent or 20 
per cent respectively, while maintaining the same structure. Two further 
packages, involving substantial elements of structural reform – levelling up to 
a new uniform payment rate, adding a substantial second-tier child payment, 
and rebalancing state resourcing of social welfare pensions and private 
occupational pensions – are also considered. The SWITCH model is used to 
identify the “first-round” or “cash” impacts of these packages; and also 
provides evidence on the impact on financial incentives to work. The key role 
of activation measures in underpinning high rates of welfare payment, while 
maintaining high employment rates, is stressed. 
 
Chapter 13 summarises our findings and draws out key conclusions. 
2. IRELAND’S SOCIAL 
PROTECTION 
EXPENDITURE 
 
 Unprecedented levels of economic growth in Ireland over the past 
decade have had a substantial impact on welfare spending, particularly 
when viewed as a proportion of GDP, despite a relatively stable underlying 
structure. This chapter sets the stage for subsequent examination of policy 
options and directions in specific areas by setting out the broad picture of 
current levels and patterns of welfare spending, how these compare with 
other countries, and how they have been changing in recent years.  
2.1 
Introduction 
 
 The most common way of making comparisons of “welfare effort” 
across countries is to simply look at total social protection expenditure by 
the state, expressed as a percentage of total national income. While 
informative, there are many pitfalls in interpreting such broad aggregates. 
The first is that institutional structures across countries differ greatly, and 
what gets counted as “social protection” and what gets counted as 
expenditure “by the state” may depend on those structures. For example, if 
expenditure on income support is channelled through social insurance 
funds, these may not formally or legally be considered as state institutions. 
A considerable effort has been made at EU level (via the ESSPROS 
categorisation system – the European System of Integrated Social 
Protection Statistics) and more broadly (by the OECD and the IMF, for 
example) to construct comparative data that is harmonised in these terms, 
but the underlying difficulties in doing so need to be kept in mind.  
2.2 
Measuring 
Welfare 
Spending 
 
Another issue arises because the state may in some cases seek to ensure 
that income support is available by encouraging private provision through 
subsidies and tax incentives rather than by direct state transfers. This is 
most obvious in the pensions area, where some countries (including 
Ireland) place much of their emphasis on encouraging private provision. 
Focusing purely on spending on pensions by the state then may give a 
partial picture of overall state effort in relation to the pension system as a 
whole. The OECD in particular has put a good deal of effort in recent 
years into developing measures of “net” social spending taking expenditure 
through taxes foregone (as well as the taxes paid by recipients) into 
account, but these still only give a partial picture of the complex underlying 
reality. 
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Another point to emphasise is that it is usually expenditure by the state 
that is counted, which does not of course represent the overall effort that 
society as a whole is making to provide for the well-being of its members. 
Increasing state spending may represent a shift in the balance of 
responsibility for certain activities from the household to the state – such 
as early childcare or caring for older people and such care in the home will 
not have been assigned a monetary value in an accounting sense when 
assessing social provision. This shift is often associated with an increase in 
the proportion of women engaged in paid work, as experienced in recent 
years in Ireland, and represents a change in mode of provision rather than 
overall “effort”. The focus on state spending also means that provision via 
private financing, such as private health insurance, which is more common 
in some countries than in others, will not be included.  
 
Yet another issue relates not to what is counted as “effort” but how that 
effort is expressed. The proportion of national income going towards social 
protection spending is clearly a key indicator, but it does not tell the whole 
story. Social protection spending may increase as a share of national 
income in a recession as the numbers unemployed rise and total income 
growth slows, and fall if unemployment is declining and national income 
growing very rapidly – so the macroeconomic context is key to interpreting 
the implications of the way social protection’s share is changing. The level 
of support provided to recipients in real terms, as well as relative to the 
overall “size of the pie”, is an important element in understanding the 
implications of trends in social spending. In the same vein, the 
demographic context is critical – a growing share for social protection in a 
situation where the proportion of the population aged 65 years or over is 
growing substantially has very different implications to the same trend 
where the proportion above that age is stable or falling.  
 
These are some of the considerations that must be kept in mind as we 
turn to levels, patterns and trends in social protection spending in the 
following sections. 
 
 We start by looking at the most widely-used and commented-on 
“headline” figures, for total social protection expenditure expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. Table 2.1 shows the most up-to-date figures currently 
available produced by Eurostat for the 25 (then) member states of the EU 
relating to 2004. We see that the range is wide, from 13 per cent up to 33 
per cent of GDP. Countries at the upper end are the Scandinavian welfare 
states of Denmark and Sweden, but the developed continental welfare 
states of Belgium, Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands are nearly 
as high at around 30 per cent. At the other end of the spectrum one finds 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus – and Ireland. Ireland in 2007 
was spending 17 per cent of GDP on social protection, which is not as low 
as the 13 per cent reported for the Baltic States but is similar to Cyprus and 
Malta, which are very far below Ireland in terms of average income per 
head and have much less developed welfare states. With the EU average 
share at 27 per cent, Ireland is a full 10 percentage points below that.  
2.3  
Current 
Levels of 
Welfare 
Spending in 
Relation to 
National 
Income 
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Table 2.1: Total Social Protection Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 
EU Countries, 2004 
  
Country  % of GDP 
Belgium 29.3 
Czech Republic 19.6 
Denmark 30.7 
Germany 29.5 
Estonia 13.4 
Ireland 17.0 
Greece 26.0 
Spain 20.0 
France 31.2 
Italy 26.1 
Cyprus 17.8 
Latvia 12.6 
Lithuania 13.3 
Luxembourg 22.6 
Hungary 20.7 
Malta 18.8 
Netherlands 28.5 
Austria 29.1 
Poland 20.0 
Portugal 24.9 
Slovenia 24.3 
Slovakia 17.2 
Finland 26.7 
Sweden 32.9 
UK 26.3 
  
EU-15 average 27.6 
EU-25 average 27.3 
  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/6/2007).  
 
Countries are commonly categorised in the research literature into “welfare 
regimes”, conceptualised in terms of the constellation of socio-economic 
institutions, policies and programmes which countries have adopted to 
promote their citizens’ welfare. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential study 
distinguished between ‘social democratic’, ‘corporatist’ and ‘liberal’ welfare 
regimes, and this terminology has now become standard, with a strong case 
being made for adding a fourth, “Southern” welfare regime or sub-
protective welfare state.2 The ex-communist transition countries do not fit 
into this set of categories and may be best considered for the present as in a 
distinct group. Countries in the social democratic regime would be seen as 
having high shares of national income going on social protection, with 
those in the corporatist regime not far behind, while the “Anglo-Saxon” or 
liberal regime would be generally thought of as having a significantly lower 
share but still higher than the “Southern” regime. When we look at the 
figures in Table 2.1 through this lens, what is striking is the extent of the 
gap between the UK and Ireland; the UK is the classic example of the 
Anglo-Saxon or liberal regime country and at 26 per cent is allocating only 
marginally less than the EU average to social protection, while Ireland, 
categorised in the same “regime” and having rather similar institutional 
structures to the UK, currently spends less than two-thirds of that average.    
 
2 See for example Ferrera (1996), Gallie and Paugam (2000), Arts and Gleisen (2002). 
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One point that needs to be made about these comparisons is that GDP 
may be inappropriate in the Irish case as the measure of national income, as 
is widely recognised. GDP is particularly problematic as a measure of 
domestic income because foreign direct investment is so important, with 
profits and other revenues repatriated to the countries of origin being 
substantial as a result. These are included in GDP but not available to 
domestic residents. Alternative measures such as Gross National Product 
(GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI) are therefore more appropriate in 
thinking about shares in national income.3 In 2004, these were only about 
85 per cent of GDP in the Irish case – a much bigger difference than 
would be seen for other EU countries. If we express social protection 
spending as a percentage of GNP or GNI rather than GDP, the 2004 
figure for Ireland would be about 20 per cent. This is a sizeable difference, 
but still leaves Ireland well below the EU average – though not lower than 
Spain, it might be noted.  
 
To see what underpins this, it is worth looking first at the pattern of 
social protection spending across areas. Table 2.2 shows expenditure in 
each country as a percentage of GDP by area, distinguishing social 
protection spending in relation to sickness and health care, disability, old 
age, survivors, family and children, unemployment and housing. We see 
that Ireland spends close to the EU-25 average on sickness-related 
payments, survivors (i.e. widow(er)s and orphans), and housing, and is not 
far below average on unemployment-related spending, and is marginally 
above the average in relation to family and child-focused social protection 
spending. If one takes the sum of those five areas, Ireland’s spending (at 12 
per cent of GDP) is only slightly below the corresponding average for the 
EU-25 (13 per cent). (The EU-15 in fact gives a very similar picture in 
these terms.) Spending on disability-related transfers is relatively low in 
Ireland, at 1 per cent of GDP being only half the EU-25 average of 2 per 
cent,4 but that still only accounts for a modest proportion – 1 percentage 
point out on 10 –  of the overall gap between Ireland and the EU average. 
By far the most important contributor to that gap, accounting for 80 per 
cent of it, is spending on old age-related transfers. Ireland in 2004 spent the 
equivalent of 3 per cent of GDP on old age-related social protection, 
compared with an EU average of 11 per cent. 
  
A similar overall conclusion is warranted when we compare the Irish 
pattern of spending with our closest neighbour and fellow member of the 
“Anglo-Saxon/liberal” welfare regime, the UK. The UK spends a 
considerably lower share of GDP on unemployment-related payments than 
Ireland – which is remarkable in the light of the very low level 
unemployment has reached in Ireland – and also a lower share on family 
and child-focused payments, but these are balanced by higher spending on 
sickness and disability and on housing. The gap in overall spending is a 
reflection of the fact that the UK spends almost 11 per cent of GDP on 
 
3 GNP adds factor income received from the rest of the world to GDP, and deducts 
factor payments flowing from Ireland to abroad; however, GNI in addition adds in 
subsidies received from the EU and deducts taxes paid to the EU, and thus is a more 
comprehensive measure of income available to Irish residents (whether institutions or 
households).  
4 This may be related to the fact that the self-employed and civil servants have been 
brought within the social insurance system relatively recently, and also to the younger age 
profile of the Irish population compared with other EU member states – since disability 
and age are strongly related.  
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old age-related payments; identical to the EU-25 average, whereas as 
already highlighted Ireland spends only 3 per cent. 
Table 2.2: Total Social Protection Expenditure by Type as a Percentage of GDP, EU 
Countries, 2004 
        
Country  Sickness/ 
Health 
Disability Old Age Survivors Family/ 
Children 
Unemploy
-ment 
Housing 
 % of GDP 
Belgium 7.7 1.9 9.6 2.7 2.0 3.5 0.1 
Czech 
Republic 6.7 1.5 7.6 0.2 1.6 0.7 0.1 
Denmark 6.1 4.1 11.1 0 3.9 2.8 0.7 
Germany 7.7 2.2 12.0 0.4 3.0 2.4 0.2 
Estonia 4.2 1.2 5.7 0.1 1.7 0.2 0.0 
Ireland 6.9 0.9 3.0 0.8 2.5 1.3 0.5 
Greece 6.7 1.3 11.9 0.9 1.7 1.5 0.6 
Spain 6.0 1.5 7.9 0.6 0.7 2.5 0.2 
France 8.8 1.7 10.9 1.9 2.5 2.3 0.8 
Italy 6.5 1.5 12.9 2.5 1.1 0.5 0.0 
Cyprus 4.2 0.8 8.1 0.3 2.0 0.9 0.4 
Latvia 3.0 1.2 5.8 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.1 
Lithuania 3.8 1.3 5.8 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.0 
Luxembourg 5.5 3.0 5.8 2.3 3.8 1.0 0.2 
Hungary 6.0 2.1 7.4 1.2 2.5 0.6 0.4 
Malta 5.0 1.2 9.2 0.3 1.0 1.3 0.3 
Netherlands 8.1 2.9 9.6 1.4 1.3 1.7 0.3 
Austria 7.1 2.3 13.3 0.4 3.0 1.7 0.1 
Poland 3.8 2.3 10.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 - 
Portugal 7.1 2.4 9.3 1.6 1.2 1.3 0.0 
Slovenia 7.8 1.9 10.2 0.4 2.0 0.7 - 
Slovakia 5.0 1.6 6.5 0.1 1.8 1.0 0.0 
Finland 6.6 3.4 8.6 1.0 3.0 2.5 0.3 
Sweden 8.0 4.7 12.0 0.7 3.0 2.0 0.6 
UK 7.8 2.4 10.7 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.5 
        
EU-15 
average 7.5 2.1 10.9 1.2 2.1 1.8 0.5 
EU-25 
average 7.4 2.1 10.8 1.2 2.1 1.7 0.5 
        
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/5/2007). 
 
These differences are naturally also seen when we look at the 
composition of social protection spending by type, in terms of the share of 
total social protection expenditure (rather than GDP) going to the different 
areas. Table 2.3 shows that for the EU as a whole, 40 per cent of social 
protection spending goes on old age-related payments. The figure for the 
UK is almost identical, and for most countries (20 out of the 25) it lies in 
the range 35-45 per cent. For Ireland, though, only 17 per cent of social 
protection spending goes on old age pensions; this is by far the lowest 
share of any member state; even the next-lowest (Luxembourg at 26 per 
cent) is much higher, and every other country has at least twice the Irish 
share going to old age. 
 
Such variation is of course partly to do with differences in the age 
structure of the population and in particular in the proportion falling into 
the age groups that would receive such pensions. Ireland has a low 
proportion of its population aged 65 years or over, as Table 2.4 shows. 
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About 11 per cent were (estimated to be) of that age in 2004. This is lower 
than in any other EU-25 member, with only Cyprus and Slovakia being 
close to that figure. Seven other countries are in the 12-15 per cent range, 
ten are between 15 per cent and 17 per cent, and five are over 17 per cent. 
Nonetheless, the difference in age profile is by no means the whole story. 
This is illustrated by the fact that countries with a share of older people no 
more than about 50 per cent higher than Ireland’s have social protection 
spending on pensions (as a percentage of GDP) that is as much as three 
times as high or more. For example, France, Germany and Belgium have 
high shares in the older age ranges, with 16-18 per cent aged 65 years or 
over compared with Ireland’s 11 per cent, but they are spending 10-12 per 
cent of GDP on old age pensions compared with Ireland’s 3 per cent. If 
Ireland’s population had the same age profile as those countries, ceteris 
paribus we might expect old age pension expenditure to be 55-60 per cent 
higher, which would bring it to 4.5-5 per cent of GDP. This would be 
much higher than the actual 2004 level, but still only half the spending seen 
in Belgium, France and Germany. 
Table 2.3: Total Social Protection Expenditure by Type as a Percentage of Total Social 
Protection Expenditure, EU Countries, 2004 
        
Country  Sickness/ 
Health 
Disability Old Age Survivors Family/ 
Children 
Unemploy
-ment 
Housing 
 % of Total Social Protection 
Belgium 26.4 6.5 32.6 9.4 6.7 11.9 0.2 
Czech 
Republic 
34.0 7.7 38.7 1.0 8.1 3.8 0.5 
Denmark 20.0 13.5 36.1 0 12.7 9.2 2.3 
Germany 26.2 7.5 40.6 1.4 10.1 8.3 0.8 
Estonia 31.0 9.0 42.3 0.8 12.5 1.6 0.4 
Ireland 40.4 5.1 17.4 4.9 14.9 7.9 3.1 
Greece 25.7 4.9 45.9 3.4 6.7 5.7 2.2 
Spain 30.0 7.3 39.7 2.9 3.4 12.5 0.8 
France 28.2 5.5 34.8 6.1 8.0 7.3 2.7 
Italy 25.0 5.9 49.5 9.7 4.3 1.9 0.1 
Cyprus 23.7 4.2 45.7 1.8 11.2 4.9 2.3 
Latvia 23.9 9.5 46.2 2.4 10.2 3.3 0.6 
Lithuania 28.6 9.9 43.8 2.0 8.5 1.5 0.0 
Luxembourg 24.5 13.3 25.5 10.3 17.0 4.6 0.7 
Hungary 28.9 10.1 35.9 5.7 11.9 2.9 2.0 
Malta 26.7 6.6 48.8 1.8 5.1 6.8 1.6 
Netherlands 28.4 10.2 33.8 5.0 4.5 5.8 1.2 
Austria 24.2 8.0 45.5 1.3 10.4 5.8 0.4 
Poland 19.1 11.3 54.1 4.8 4.5 3.4 - 
Portugal 28.4 9.7 37.5 6.6 5.0 5.3 0 
Slovenia 32.0 8.0 42.1 1.6 8.4 3.0 - 
Slovakia 29 9.3 37.9 0.7 10.3 6.0 0.1 
Finland 24.7 12.8 32.2 3.6 11.1 9.5 1.1 
Sweden 24.5 14.2 36.5 2.1 9.3 6.0 1.7 
UK 29.9 9.1 40.5 3.2 6.6 2.6 5.5 
        
EU-15 average 27.2 7.8 39.8 4.3 7.5 6.3 1.9 
EU-25 average 27.2 7.7 39.6 4.4 7.5 6.4 1.9 
        
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/5/2007). 
 
The nature of the Irish pension system is very different to those 
countries, with much greater reliance in the Irish case both on means-
testing and on flat-rate rather than earnings-related pensions from the state, 
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and on encouragement of employment-related private pensions via tax 
relief and other means. (The balance between means-tested and insurance-
based payments will change in the future as the effects of integration of the 
self-employed and public service employees into the social insurance 
system work their way through to higher proportions of future retirees 
having entitlement to contributory pensions.) In addition, differences in the 
way spending is categorised by type and in whether funded occupational 
pension schemes are included (which they are not for Ireland because of 
unavailability of data) affect these comparisons (despite the best efforts of 
those compiling them). Nonetheless, Ireland still seems to be an outlier 
even when differences in age profile are taken into account. 
Table 2.4: Population Aged 65 years or Over as a Percentage of Total 
Population, EU Countries, 2004 
  
Country  % of Population 
Belgium 17.1 
Czech Republic 14.0 
Denmark 14.9 
Germany 18.0 
Estonia 16.2 
Ireland 11.1 
Greece 17.9 
Spain 16.9 
France 16.4 
Italy 19.2 
Cyprus 11.9 
Latvia 16.2 
Lithuania 15.0 
Luxembourg 14.1 
Hungary 15.5 
Malta 13.0 
Netherlands 13.8 
Austria 15.5 
Poland 13.0 
Portugal 16.8 
Slovenia 15.1 
Slovakia 11.6 
Finland 15.5 
Sweden 17.2 
UK 15.9 
  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/6/2007). 
 
Before we go on to look at social protection spending in real terms and 
over time, the key implications of the discussion to date may be noted. 
Ireland has a particularly low level of social protection spending as a 
proportion of national income at present (or at least in 2004, the latest date 
for which comparative data is available), and this remains the case when a 
more appropriate measure of national income than GDP is employed. 
However, this does not reflect a generalised shortfall compared with the 
EU average across different areas of social protection spending: instead, it 
is mostly concentrated in the area of old age pensions. This is partly a 
reflection of the population structure, but that does not account for the 
bulk of the gap between Ireland’s state spending in this area and other 
member states. While there is very wide variation in pension systems, 
Ireland’s spending by the state in this area also falls well short of the UK, 
which has a broadly similar structure. In thinking about the most useful 
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points of comparisons, it is also worth noting that the EU-25 average itself 
has to be interpreted with care when used for this purpose. Ireland has an 
average income level that is well above the average, which would generally 
be associated with an above-average level of social spending – as we bring 
out in the next section.   
 
 While welfare spending as a proportion of GDP is clearly relevant as an 
indicator of “welfare effort”, the amounts actually spent and received by 
those relying on transfers are also important and vary widely across 
countries. Table 2.5 shows first the total amount spent on social protection 
by each of the EU-25 member states, converted into a common currency 
(€). Unsurprisingly, the biggest spenders – Germany, France, Italy, the UK 
– are the member states which have both large populations and relatively 
high average incomes. Ireland’s total expenditure, while only a fraction of 
what these countries are spending, dwarfs the amounts being spent by 
countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. 
 2.4  
Levels of 
Welfare 
Spending in 
Absolute 
Terms 
Table 2.5: Total Social Protection Expenditure and Expenditure Per 
Capita, EU Countries, 2004 
    
Country  €m € Per Capita PPP Per Capita 
Belgium 84,736.5 8,131.2 7,889.8 
Czech Republic 17,064.7 1,670.4 3,130.7 
Denmark 60,533.5 11,200.5 8,469.8 
Germany 651,313.4 7,893.2 7,238.8 
Estonia 1,258.6 933.0 1,624.8 
Ireland 2,5078.2 6,164.1 5,232.2 
Greece 43,756.1 3,955.6 4,829.8 
Spain 167,997.6 3,935.1 4,437.5 
France 518,182.3 8,314.3 7,771.9 
Italy 362,461.0 6,230.5 6,257.4 
Cyprus 2,262.1 3,057.9 3,405.5 
Latvia 1,401.1 605.8 1,220.0 
Lithuania 2,414.0 702.6 1,447.6 
Luxembourg 6,093.0 13,441.4 12,179.6 
Hungary 17,064.8 1,688.4 2,867.9 
Malta 817.9 2,038.3 3,001.0 
Netherlands 139,643.0 8,576.6 8,055.5 
Austria 68,733.8 8,409.5 8,062.1 
Poland 40,729.7 1,066.7 2,213.2 
Portugal 35,544.0 3,384.5 4,082.1 
Slovenia 6,382.7 3,196.1 4,379.3 
Slovakia 5,813.8 1,080.1 2,063.5 
Finland 40,572.3 7,760.3 6,897.4 
Sweden 92,772.8 10,315.5 8,756.3 
UK 455,629.9 7,612.9 6,993.8 
    
EU-15 average 2,753,047.0 7,129.6 7,252.1 
EU-25 average 2,848,257.0 6,188.3 6,188.3 
    
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/6/2007). 
 
It is more informative then to look at expenditure per head of 
population, shown in the second column of Table 2.5. Now we see that 
Ireland, spending €6,164 per annum per head of population, is well below 
the top-spending countries such as Luxembourg and Sweden which are at 
close to twice that figure, but at the same time Ireland is spending ten times 
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as much as the country with the lowest level of expenditure per head, 
Latvia. For convenience Table 2.6 shows where the various countries come 
when they are ranked in terms of € per head: we see that Ireland is in the 
middle, ranking 12th. This may be slightly misleading, though, in that there 
is a very substantial gap between Ireland’s level and that of the next group 
of countries, comprising Greece, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia and Cyprus, 
which are spending less than two-thirds of the Irish figure. So it might be 
more valid to see Ireland as clearly in the top half when ranked by € per 
head. It is also clear from the ranking that there is a strong relationship 
between social protection spending per capita and average income per 
capita, to which we return shortly. 
 
First, though, it is worth deepening the comparison of average spending 
per capita to take into account the fact that the cost of living, and thus 
what a euro will buy and the living standard a given level of income will 
support, differs across countries in a systematic way – with costs generally 
higher in better-off countries. It is, therefore, important to adjust for such 
differences by focusing on what is known as average spending in 
purchasing power parity terms, which is done in the final column of Table 
2.5. 
Table 2.6: Countries Ranked by Social Protection Expenditure Per Capita, 
EU Countries, 2004 
   
Rank €m Per Capita PPP Per Capita 
  1 Luxembourg Luxembourg 
  2 Denmark Sweden 
  3 Sweden Denmark 
  4 Netherlands Netherlands 
  5 Austria Austria 
  6 France Belgium 
  7 Belgium France 
  8 Germany Germany 
  9 Finland UK 
10 UK Finland 
11 Italy Italy 
12 Ireland Ireland 
13 Greece Greece 
14 Spain Spain 
15 Portugal Slovenia 
16 Slovenia Portugal 
17 Cyprus Cyprus 
18 Malta Czech Republic 
19 Hungary Malta 
20 Czech Republic Hungary 
21 Slovakia Poland 
22 Poland Slovakia 
23 Estonia Estonia 
24 Lithuania Lithuania 
25 Latvia Latvia 
   
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 8/6/2007). 
 
We see that this adjustment narrows the range of variation in spending 
levels across countries very substantially: the top-spending country is now 
at ten times that of the lowest-spending one, compared with seventeen 
times when the comparison is made in common currency terms but 
without this adjustment. However, the ranking of countries is not 
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significantly affected as Table 2.6 brings out, apart from several pair-wise 
switches by countries ranked beside each other (such as Denmark and 
Sweden or Belgium and France). As we see, Ireland’s ranking remains at 
the mid-point, 12th. 
 
As already noted, this has to be seen in the light of the differences in 
average income across countries and the extent to which average welfare 
spending per head varies in line with average income per head. The 
countries towards the top of the ranking by social protection spending are 
also among the richer in terms of average income, while those towards the 
bottom in social protection spending are very far below the EU average 
income. This is brought out by Table 2.7, which shows how GDP per 
capita in PPP terms varies across the 25 countries. We see that countries 
such as Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium 
and Germany, ranked highest in terms of social protection spending per 
head, all have average income per head well above the EU average (by at 
least 10 per cent); even more strikingly, the countries ranked lowest in 
terms of social protection spending have average income that is only about 
half the EU average. 
Table 2.7: GDP Per Capita in PPP Terms, EU Countries, 2005 (EU-25=100) 
   
Rank GDP Per Capita 
in PPP Terms 
Rank 
Belgium 118 6 
Czech Republic 74 17 
Denmark 122 5 
Germany 110 9 
Estonia 60 21 
Ireland 139 2 
Greece 84 14 
Spain 98 13 
France 108 11 
Italy 101 12 
Cyprus 89 15 
Latvia 49 25 
Lithuania 52 23 
Luxembourg 251 1 
Hungary 63 20 
Malta 74 17 
Netherlands 125 3 
Austria 123 4 
Poland 50 24 
Portugal 72 19 
Slovenia 82 16 
Slovakia 57 22 
Finland 110 9 
Sweden 115 8 
UK 117 7 
   
EU-15 108  
EU-25 100  
   
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 12/6/2007). 
 
Ireland appears right at the top of the ranking by GDP per head, second 
only to Luxembourg; in that sense its mid-point ranking in terms of social 
protection spending appears somewhat anomalous. GDP is a misleading 
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indicator in the Irish case for the reasons already mentioned, overstating 
income accruing to Irish residents. If we adjust the Irish figure downward 
by the likely scale of this overstatement, Ireland would move down in 
terms of average income per head, to a level similar to Belgium or the UK. 
However, this would imply a ranking in income per head terms that was 
still much higher (about 6th or 7th) than that seen for social protection 
spending. 
 
 Having examined current levels and patterns of social protection 
expenditure in Ireland in some detail, we now look at how it has evolved 
over time in recent years. We take 1990 as point of departure for this 
exercise, and Table 2.8 shows total social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP for Ireland and other EU countries for selected years. The figures for 
other EU-15 member states also go back to 1990, whereas for the new 
member states joining in 2004 Eurostat has produced figures only back to 
2000. 
2.5  
Levels of 
Welfare 
Spending 
Over Time 
Table 2.8: Total Social Protection Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, EU Countries, 
1990-2004 
        
Country  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 Social Protection as % of GDP 
Belgium 26.4 27.4 26.5 27.3 28.0 29.1 29.3 
Czech Republic - 17.4 19.5 19.4 20.2 20.2 19.6 
Denmark 28.2 31.9 28.9 29.2 29.7 30.7 30.7 
Germany 25.4 28.2 29.2 29.3 29.9 30.2 29.5 
Estonia - - 14.0 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.4 
Ireland 18.4 18.8 14.1 15.0 16.0 16.5 17.0 
Greece 22.9 22.3 25.7 26.7 26.2 26.0 26.0 
Spain 19.9 21.6 19.7 19.5 19.8 19.9 20.0 
France 27.4 30.3 29.5 29.6 30.4 30.9 31.2 
Italy 24.0 24.2 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.8 26.1 
Cyprus - - 14.8 14.9 16.3 18.5 17.8 
Latvia - - 15.3 14.3 13.9 13.4 12.6 
Lithuania - - 15.8 14.7 14.1 13.6 13.3 
Luxembourg 21.4 20.7 19.6 20.8 21.4 22.2 22.6 
Hungary - - 19.3 19.3 20.3 21.1 20.7 
Malta - - 16.3 17.1 17.1 17.9 18.8 
Netherlands 31.1 30.6 26.4 26.5 27.6 28.3 28.5 
Austria 26.0 28.7 28.2 28.6 29.1 29.5 29.1 
Poland - - 19.5 20.8 21.2 20.9 20.0 
Portugal 16.3 21.0 21.7 22.7 23.7 24.2 24.9 
Slovenia - - 24.9 25.3 25.3 24.6 24.3 
Slovakia - 18.4 19.3 18.9 19.0 18.2 17.2 
Finland 24.6 31.5 25.1 24.9 25.6 26.5 26.7 
Sweden 33.1 34.3 30.7 31.3 32.3 33.3 32.9 
UK 22.9 28.2 27.1 27.5 26.4 26.4 26.3 
        
EU-15 average 25.4 27.7 26.9 27.1 27.4 27.7 27.6 
EU-25 average   26.6 26.8 27.0 27.4 27.3 
        
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 11/6/2007). 
 
We see that Ireland’s social protection spending at the start of this 
period amounted to over 18 per cent of GDP, and that by 1995 it was close 
to 19 per cent. From the mid-1990s the rate of economic growth picked up 
and reached unprecedented levels, faster than any other OECD country in 
the second half of the 1990s. By 2000, social protection spending was 
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down to only 14 per cent of GDP, as the numbers unemployed declined 
dramatically and the rate of increase in incomes from work and profits out-
paced social protection benefits. From 2000 onwards, though, social 
protection spending has risen as a percentage of GDP, reaching 17 per cent 
by 2004.  
 
This brings out the immediate impact of the “Celtic Tiger” economic 
boom on social protection expenditure when framed against total national 
income (exaggerated by the difficulties in using GDP to measure national 
income already noted). The period from 2000, when social protection 
spending began to increase again as a share of GDP, has not been one of 
slow growth, but GDP has not been rising by the quite exceptional levels 
seen in the 1990s. This, together with increasing income support levels, was 
sufficient to reverse the downward trend in social protection expressed as a 
proportion of GDP.  
 
Over the same period, the table also shows that social protection 
spending levels in the EU-15 rose markedly between 1990 and 1995 but 
have been stable since on average – with considerable variation from 
country to country –  while for the EU-25 a more modest increase was 
seen between 2000 and 2004. This contributed to the widening gap 
between Ireland’s social protection spending as a proportion of GDP and 
that of our EU partners. 
 
Focusing on the EU-15, in 1990 Ireland’s figure was 9 percentage points 
below the EU-15 average; by 2000 this had widened to 13 percentage 
points, and in 2004 it had narrowed to under 11. 
 
Finally, it is worth looking at the evolution of social protection 
expenditure in real terms, adjusting for changes in prices to hold 
purchasing power constant. Table 2.9 shows how total social protection 
expenditure in constant (1995) prices changed over the period from 1990. 
The scale of the increase in spending in real terms in the Irish case is 
striking: the increase between 1990 and 2004 was 135 per cent, substantially 
more than doubling spending in real terms. This was the fastest increase 
among the EU-15, with only Portugal and Luxembourg coming close to 
that figure, and more typical rates of increase being of the order of 30-60 
per cent. 
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Table 2.9: Total Social Protection Expenditure in Constant (1995) Prices, 
EU Countries, 1990- 2004 
      
Country  1990 1995 2000 2004 % 
Increase  
1990-2004 
Belgium 48,382.4 56,839.3 62,114.7 73,111.8 51.1 
Czech Republic - 255,782.3 316,855.9 374,542.7  
Denmark 260,130.4 325,179.1 340,162.8 380,374.6 46.2 
Germany - 520,643.2 579,371.5 589,957.8  
Estonia - - 8,307.4 10,904.4  
Ireland 7,630.0 9973.4 12,429.2 17,964.3 135.4 
Greece 17,128.4 1,7819.8 24,368.3 30,197.4 76.3 
Spain 81,076.9 96,660.2 108,390.9 129,129.6 59.3 
France 30,9524.6 362,466.9 407,064.6 465,991.3 50.6 
Italy 222,651.3 228,875.0 257,943.9 285,177.8 28.1 
Cyprus - - 760.0 1,060.6  
Latvia - - 520.6 585.8  
Lithuania - - 5,413.7 6,178.9  
Luxembourg 2,297.0 3,131.4 3,864.6 5,103.0 122.2 
Hungary - - 1,292,937.6 1,754,303.5  
Malta - - 228.7 266.0  
Netherlands 85,027.2 93,349.4 98,008.0 111,893.4 31.6 
Austria 41,283.0 50,446.7 55,265.9 59,977.2 45.3 
Poland - - 83,919.6 96,078.8  
Portugal 11,902.3 17,890.1 23,269.8 27,682.2 132.6 
Slovenia - - 728,779.4 820,004.3  
Slovakia - 107,710.4 131,266.0 134,263.6  
Finland 25,396.2 30,201.7 29,805.2 34,677.2 36.5 
Sweden 57,2671.8 613,477.0 646,428.8 754,444.7 31.7 
UK 157,864.0 202,789.4 231,294.2 258,976.4 64.1 
      
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 11/6/2007). 
 
 This chapter has examined Ireland’s welfare spending, how it compares 
with other countries, and how it has been changing in recent years. Ireland 
was seen to have a particularly low level of social protection spending as a 
proportion of national income, with the shortfall compared with the EU 
average mostly concentrated in the area of old age pensions and that only 
partly a reflection of the population structure. Social protection spending as 
a proportion of GDP was 9 percentage points below the EU-15 average in 
1990; by 2000 this had widened to 13 percentage points, and in 2004 it had 
narrowed to under 11. Ireland is in the top half of the EU when ranked by 
social protection spending per head. Between 1990 and 2004 social 
spending more than doubled in real terms in the Irish case, faster than any 
other member of the EU-15.  
2.6 
Conclusions 
 
These aggregates serve to bring out the complex mix that must be taken 
into account in seeking to understand and assess the evolution of social 
protection expenditure, particularly in what was a most unusual 
macroeconomic context in the Irish case. A deeper understanding would 
require in-depth investigation of trends over time at the level of specific 
contingencies and schemes, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the broad picture described in this chapter should serve as 
background to the analysis of policy options at the level of contingencies 
and schemes, to which the bulk of the study is devoted. 
  
3. INTERNATIONAL 
EVIDENCE 
 A key feature of the EU’s “open method of coordination” for social 
policy is the comparison of each country’s social policies with “best 
practice” in the area. In this chapter, we look at evidence on risks of 
poverty (Section 3.2) in order to identify those countries which attain the 
best outcomes in this area. In Section 3.3, we explore possible reasons for 
the gap between the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Ireland and in the countries 
with the lowest risks of poverty. Section 3.4 briefly reviews the findings of 
a major study on future options for the Dutch welfare state. The main 
conclusions are drawn together in Section 3.5. 
3.1 
Introduction 
 
 There are two main sources of internationally comparable data on risks of 
poverty. Table 3.1 presents information drawn from the Luxembourg 
Income Study, which includes microdata from a range of countries 
including the US, Canada and Australia as well as a set of European 
countries (EU and non-EU). The countries are ranked in “league table” 
form, from those with the lowest poverty risk to those with the highest risk 
(at the 60 per cent of median income cut-off). The equivalence scale is one 
specifically developed by researchers from the Luxembourg Income Study. 
It depends simply on the number of persons in the household, making no 
distinction between the income needs of adults and children. The scale is 
the square root of the number of persons in the household. Thus, the LIS 
scale is 1 for a one-person household, 1.4 approximately for a two person 
household and 1.73 for a three-person household. EU and OECD 
calculations tend to be based on what is termed the modified OECD scale, 
which allows 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for other adults, and 0.3 for each 
child. Thus, a two-adult household would have a scale of 1.5 (as against 1.4 
in the LIS scale) and a two-adult two-child household would have an 
OECD scale of 2.1, as against a LIS scale of 2). 
3.2  
Cross-
Country 
Evidence on 
Risks of 
Poverty 
 
Table 3.1 shows the results of the LIS-based analysis. The best 
performing countries, in terms of low risks of poverty, are the Scandinavian 
countries, along with the Netherlands (the best ranked country) and 
Luxembourg. Poverty risks for these countries are about 11-12 per cent. 
The highest risk of poverty, above 20 per cent, are found in four English-
speaking countries (the US, Ireland, Australia and the UK) and two 
Mediterranean countries (Greece and Spain). Some of the continental 
European countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France) have risks 
of poverty which are one or two percentage points higher than the 
Scandinavian countries, and well below those observed elsewhere. The rank 
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Table 3.1: “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for Industrialised Countries from 
Luxembourg Income Study, 2000 or Nearest Year 
 
Country 
 
50 Per Cent 
of Median Income 
 
60 Per Cent 
of Median Income 
Netherlands (1999) 4.9 11.1 
Sweden  6.5 12.3 
Norway  6.4 12.3 
Finland  5.4 12.4 
Luxembourg  6.1 12.4 
Denmark  5.4 13.1 
Germany  8.4 13.4 
Austria  7.7 13.4 
Switzerland  7.7 13.5 
France  7.3 13.7 
Belgium  7.9 16.1 
Canada  12.1 18.6 
Spain  14.2 20.8 
United Kingdom 
(1999) 12.5 21.1 
Greece  14.3 21.4 
Australia (2001) 13.0 21.6 
Ireland  16.2 22.5 
United States  17.7 24.2 
   
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, key statistics.  
 
ordering by risk of poverty at 50 per cent of median income is very similar. 
There is some re-ranking within the main groups identified (low, high and 
medium risk) but no country moves from low to medium risk or vice versa. 
 
More systematic comparisons are possible with the group of EU 
countries, where harmonised surveys (the European Community 
Household Panel and the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC)) have been conducted for about 10 years. This means that we can 
look at more recent data (2005 instead of 2000) and also examine how 
stable the ranking is over time. 
 
Table 3.2 documents the Eurostat results for EU countries, which are 
based on the modified OECD scale. The countries are ordered by the risk 
of poverty in the latest available year, 2005. Again, the risks found in the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are the lowest. Poverty risks in 
some of these countries (Denmark and Finland) have risen slightly, while 
that in Austria has fallen, bringing it into this group. Once again, a set of 
continental European countries (Germany, where risks have fallen as living 
standards in the former East Germany have risen, Luxembourg and 
France) have risks only marginally higher than the lowest risk group of 
countries. The highest risks are found, once again, in the southern 
countries along with Ireland, where the poverty risk is around 20 per cent. 
There have been some falls in poverty risk for the high risk group – from 
20 to 18 per cent for the UK, and from 23 to 20 per cent for Portugal. 
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Table 3.2: “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for EU-15 Countries, 1995, 2000 and 
2005 
    
 1995 2000 2005 
Sweden     9 
Netherlands 11 11 11 
Finland   11 12 
Austria 13 12 12 
Denmark 10   12 
Germany 15 10 13 
Luxembourg 12 12 13 
France 15 16 13 
Belgium 16 13 15 
UK 20 19 18 
Italy 20 18 19 
Spain 19 18 20 
Ireland 19 20 20 
Greece 22 20 20 
Portugal 23 21 20 
    
EU-15 17 15 16 
New Member States     17 
    
Source: Eurostat database based on ECHP and EU- SILC, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Table 3.3: “At Risk of Poverty” Rate by Gender, EU-15 Countries, 2005 
 
 Total Males Females 
Sweden 9 9 10 
Netherlands 11 11 11 
Denmark 12 12 12 
Austria 12 11 13 
Finland 12 11 13 
Germany  13 12 14 
France 13 12 14 
Luxembourg  13 13 13 
Belgium 15 14 15 
United Kingdom 18 18 19 
Italy 19 17 21 
Ireland 20 19 21 
Greece 20 18 21 
Spain 20 19 21 
Portugal 20 20 21 
    
European Union (15 countries) 16 15 17 
New Member States (10 countries) 17 17 17 
    
 
Are risks higher for men or for women, and to what extent? Table 3.3 
shows male and female poverty risks for EU countries in 2005 (at the 60 
per cent income cut-off). Countries are again ranked by overall poverty 
risk, from lowest to highest. In the three countries with lowest risk 
(Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark) the risks are the same for men 
and women. In the other countries with below average poverty risk, the 
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rate for women is typically two percentage points above that for men. This 
is also the modal situation for countries with a risk higher than the average, 
including Ireland: the risk for men is one percentage point below the 
overall, and the risk for women is one percentage point above the overall 
risk. Only in Italy is a more substantial gap found, with the risk for women 
four percentage points higher than for men. 
 
 What accounts for the differences in poverty rates between countries. 
Broadly we may distinguish between two types of explanation for a country 
having a particularly low risk of poverty. This may arise:  
3.3   
Cross-
Country 
Policy 
Comparisons 
 
(a) because relatively few individuals in this country have characteristics 
 usually associated with poverty (e.g., unemployment, illness or lone 
 parenthood) or  
(b) because, although there are many individuals with characteristics 
 linked to a high risk of poverty, the risk in that country, given those 
 characteristics, is itself low relative to the risk in other countries. 
 
Callan et al. (2004) explored the extent to which the gap between Irish 
and Dutch poverty risks could be explained by factors of type (a), aspects 
of population structure. They used the European Community Household 
Panel to examine the significance of structural differences in the labour 
market, demographic profile and household composition for the extent of 
risk of poverty. The question asked was, in effect, what the “at risk of 
poverty” rate would be in Ireland if it had the same unemployment rate, or 
the same age structure, or the same household structure, as obtained in the 
Netherlands. The aim was to identify the impact of this single change in 
population structure, so the method involved ensured that there were no 
other changes. To derive the results, the actual survey data were simply 
reweighted to shrink or expand the size of the group in question, without 
changing any of their circumstances or the situation of the rest of the 
sample – most importantly, their incomes. 
 
The conclusion from these simulations was that differences in age 
profiles, patterns of labour force participation, and household composition 
do not in themselves appear to play the major role in explaining the 
substantial gap in “at risk of poverty” rates between Ireland and the 
Netherlands.5 This suggests that the key to the gap lies in type (b) factors, 
differences in the risks of poverty faced by similar population groups. 
Although it cannot be guaranteed that this result would hold in other 
comparisons, it is worth noting that it is entirely consistent with the results 
from a similar exercise carried out with data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study. Rainwater and Smeeding (1997) employ a similar simulation method 
based on reweighting the survey samples. Their analysis covers the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, Australia and 
the USA and arrives at similar findings to those discussed above. Rainwater 
and Smeeding conclude that social protection and the way household 
income is built up or “packaged” have far stronger effects on ‘at risk of  
poverty’ rates (and income inequality) than demographic factors such as age 
or household composition. Focusing on the Netherlands, they conclude 
that:  
 
5 In fact, the analysis was extended to cover 5 countries, and similar results were obtained. 
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It is the Dutch income package, not its demography, which 
produces low rates of poverty. (Rainwater and Smeeding, 
1997.) 
 
Biewen and Jenkins (2002), using somewhat different methods arrive at 
similar conclusions: most of the poverty difference between the US and 
Britain, and between the US and Germany was accounted for by higher US 
risks of poverty for any given set of personal characteristics. This was partly 
offset by a more favourable distribution of household characteristics in the 
US, principally a higher employment rate. 
 
This brings the focus back to factors influencing the poverty risks facing 
the same population groups. Differences in tax-benefit structures are 
clearly relevant here. To what extent can inter-country differences in ‘at risk 
of  poverty’ rates be attributed to differences in tax/transfer systems? 
Aggregate measures examined in Chapter 2 indicate that social expenditure 
as a proportion of national income in Ireland is much lower than in the EU 
countries with the lowest “at risk of poverty” rates. Ireland’s position in the 
ranking of countries by expenditure on social protection is not as high as its 
ranking in terms of national income.6 Aggregate level comparisons of 
“welfare effort” and ‘at risk of  poverty’ rates suggest that there is a 
relationship. There is, however, a more direct way to examine the possible 
impact of differences in tax and welfare structures on inter-country 
differences in “at risk of poverty” rates. This involves using a tax-benefit 
model which can examine the first-round impact of simulating a “foreign 
country” policy as well as its own domestic policies to arrive at a more 
precise estimate of how much policy differences contribute to the 
explanation of differences in poverty rates. Callan et al. (2004) used 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model to undertake such an analysis. 
Rather than directly “importing” Danish welfare payment rates, an 
alternative welfare system was modelled for Ireland with payment rates 
which were similar to those in Denmark in terms of their relationship to 
average earnings. 
 
A further key difference is that a greater proportion of the Danish 
population is covered for key social insurance schemes than in Ireland. For 
some of the biggest social insurance schemes in Denmark – including 
pensions – eligibility is linked to residence, so that how much is paid in 
pension depends on the length of stay in the country, not on former 
income or contribution record. In order to capture this difference, Callan et 
al. (2004) simulated a “Danish-style” system in Ireland under which the 
payment rates for non-contributory and contributory Old Age Pensions 
were the same, and were scaled to provide the same level of income in 
relation to average earnings as the Danish pension. 
 
The simulation results show substantial falls in the Irish “at risk of 
poverty” rate at 60 per cent of median income, the application of the 
Danish structure/support levels reducing the rate by 7 percentage points. 
There is little or no impact on poverty at the lower cut-offs. This means 
that differences in social protection could account for about two-thirds of 
the difference in actual relative poverty rates between the two countries at 
 
6 This applies even when the comparison takes account of the fact that Ireland’s GNP per 
head is considerably lower than GDP per head. 
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the 60 per cent of median income threshold. This simulation takes into 
account the need to increase taxes very substantially, but does not take 
account of behavioural responses in the labour market.7 
 
What are the broader lessons to be drawn from this analysis? Atkinson  
has pointed out that:  
 
Social investment in improving labour market skills and 
employability, or an ‘active welfare state’, is an important 
part of anti-poverty policy, but is not a complete substitute 
for social spending (Atkinson, 2000). 
 
Thus, for anti-poverty policy to make progress requires enhanced 
education and employment opportunities and improved income supports. 
Both elements are necessary – neither is sufficient on its own to ensure 
success in combating “at risk of poverty”. 
 
The success of countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands in 
keeping ‘at risk of  poverty’ at low levels over a sustained period depends 
crucially on both of these factors: a high employment rate and a 
comprehensive welfare system ensuring that those without income from 
employment have an adequate income. Each of these factors is necessary, 
but neither on its own can be regarded as sufficient to keep ‘at risk of  
poverty’ at a low level. Since the mid-1980s Ireland has made the transition 
from a labour market with relatively low participation rates and high 
unemployment to one with high employment and low unemployment. This 
represents a major achievement, and one of the two key elements identified 
above as distinguishing countries with low relative poverty rates such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands from others. Over this period, however, “at 
risk of poverty” rates in Ireland have remained higher than the EU average. 
Comparison with “best practice”, in the EU countries who do best on this 
indicator, suggests that achieving low rates of “at risk of poverty” risk 
would require a more comprehensive safety net and higher rates of welfare 
payment.  
 
Sapir (2005) gives a broader perspective on these issues. Figure 3.1, 
drawn from Sapir (2005), provides a useful typology of welfare regimes and 
their associated outcomes in terms of social inclusion (indicated by the 
proportion of persons not at “risk of poverty”) and economic efficiency 
(indicated by the overall employment rate, which takes into account not 
just unemployment but also labour market participation). The EU-15 
countries are plotted on this chart, with efficiency (measured by the 
employment rate) on the x axis, and equity (the percentage chance of not 
being “at risk of poverty”, or 100 minus the percentage risk of poverty). 
The four welfare regimes are the Scandinavian model; the Continental 
European system; the liberal model (termed Anglo-Saxon by Sapir and 
others); and the model of the Southern/Mediterranean countries, with a 
less developed welfare state. 
 
 
 
 
7 Issues regarding financing and behavioural responses are taken up again in Chapter 12.  
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Figure 3.1: Employment Rates and Probability of Avoiding Poverty, EU, 
2004 
Source: Sapir (2005). 
 
Sapir argues that this evidence indicates that the Scandinavian 
economies and welfare regimes are attaining both equity and efficiency 
goals. Ireland and the UK score well on the efficiency front, but not on the 
equity goal. The Continental economies, by contrast, score well on equity 
but not on efficiency; while the Mediterranean or southern EU countries, 
by and large, achieve neither efficiency nor equity. 
 
 A major study of options for the future of the Dutch welfare state was 
undertaken by de Mooij (2006). At present, the Dutch welfare state could 
be characterised as something of a hybrid between a Scandinavian style 
system and a typical Continental European system. Three major directions 
for reform were considered: 
3.4  
Reform 
Options: A 
View from 
the 
Netherlands 
 
• A residual welfare state, characterised by a more flexible labour market 
and greater emphasis on private responsibility, with a smaller role 
for government. The reform package analysed in this respect 
included lower benefits, a lower minimum wage and a flat tax 
schedule. 
• A universal welfare state, on the other hand, involves more generous 
and uniform social provision, “…combined with intensive and 
mandatory activation and public expenditures that are 
complementary to labour”. Reforms here included further 
individualisation of the tax system, public childcare support and 
“…intensified activation strategies with strict monitoring backed by 
sanctions”. 
• A diversified welfare state, where redistribution remains the preserve of 
central government, but is at a reduced level. Central government 
also sets some rules regarding certain types of social insurance, 
leaving it to “clubs” or “regions” to provide insurance in line with 
the rules. Reforms include a diversification of unemployment 
insurance, with average benefits and duration falling. 
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These alternative reform packages are simulated in a model which 
allows for behavioural responses such as changes in labour supply, within a 
consistent macroeconomic framework. 
 
What are the results for the different reform packages? Each of the 
packages leads to an increase in labour supply. The greatest increase is for 
the residual welfare state package; the least is for the diversified welfare 
state. Direct estimates of risks of poverty are not provided. But a 
“replacement rate” type measure is used as an indicator of social cohesion. 
This shows that the replacement rate is reduced substantially by the residual 
welfare state package, and more modestly by the diversified welfare state. 
There is little change (a slight fall) in the ratio under the universal welfare 
state package. Similarly, the residual welfare state leads to a strong increase 
in income inequality; while the universal welfare state reforms boost labour 
supply without an increase in inequality. 
 
 The proportion of persons “at risk of poverty” in Ireland is among the 
highest in the EU. Simulation approaches demonstrate that differences in 
the age profile, the pattern of labour force participation, and household 
composition do not play the major role in observed cross-country variation 
in the percentage “at risk of poverty”. Differences in tax and welfare rates 
and structures are more important: tax-benefit model simulations applying 
Danish welfare structures and support levels (relative to average income) to 
Ireland finds this substantially reduces the “at risk of  poverty” rate. There 
is of course a substantial extra cost associated with Danish-style payment 
rates and coverage. The simulations take account of the direct implications 
of financing this through income taxes, but not the behavioural 
implications. Issues concerning financing and labour market responses to 
changed policy are considered in Chapter 12. 
3.5 
Conclusions 
 
Sapir (2005) identifies the Scandinavian model as one which attains both 
efficiency (high employment rates) and equity (low risks of poverty). 
Successful anti-poverty policy requires both enhanced education and 
employment opportunities and improved income supports – neither is 
enough on its own. (Indeed, anti-poverty policy will also typically require 
the provision of other services, such as health care, housing, childcare and 
elder care.) Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have sustained 
both high employment and a comprehensive welfare system ensuring that 
those without income from employment have an adequate income. Over 
the last decade Ireland has successfully made the transition to high 
employment and low unemployment rates. The experience of other EU 
countries suggests that achieving low rates of “at risk of  poverty” would in 
addition require a more comprehensive safety net and higher rates of 
welfare payment relative to average incomes. In later chapters we will 
examine the scope for such changes and their potential impact on different 
vulnerable groups. The wider implications are brought together in Chapter 
12, which looks at alternative policy packages.   
 
4. DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTEXT 
 Ireland has seen major changes not only in its economic fortunes but also 
in its demographic and socio-economic profile over recent years, as a result 
of dramatic developments in migration but also more subtle longer-term 
trends. To further flesh out the context in which policy options and 
directions in specific areas have to be thought about, this chapter describes 
key aspects of that demographic and socio-economic context. We begin 
with an overview of Ireland’s current population profile and go on to 
highlight some important recent developments.  
4.1 
Introduction 
 
 The age structure of the population is fundamental to the context in 
which social policies operate, and the publication of data from the 2006 
Census of Population means that an up-to-date picture is now available. Table  
  
4.2 
Population 
Structure 
Table 4.1: Population by Age Group, Ireland 2006 
   
Age Number Per Cent 
  0-4 years 302,252 7.1 
  5-9     “ 288,325 6.8 
10-14   “ 273,872 6.5 
15-19   ” 290,257 6.8 
20-24 years 342,475 8.1 
25-29   “ 373,078 8.8 
30-34   “ 349,361 8.2 
35-39   “ 322,105 7.6 
40-44   “ 301,329 7.1 
45-49 years 274,745 6.5 
50-54   “ 247,068 5.8 
55-59   “ 225,328 5.3 
60-64   “ 181,727 4.3 
65-69 years 143,396 3.4 
70-74   “ 119,152 2.8 
75-79   “ 92,466 2.2 
80-84   “ 64,884 1.5 
85 years and over 48,028 1.1 
 
Total  4,239,848 100 
   
Source: Census of Population 2006. 
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4.1 shows that the population had reached over 4.2 million at that point, a 
marked increase on the previous Census when it was 3.9 million. This 
increase has major implications from a social policy and social protection 
perspective, but so does the age structure. We see that 21 per cent of the 
population was aged 14 years or under and 29 per cent were aged 19 years 
or under, a very high proportion of whom one would expect to be 
dependent on others in financial terms. At the other end of the age 
spectrum, 11 per cent are aged 65 years  or over, with under 3 per cent 
aged 80 years or over – again, these are likely for the most part not to be in 
the paid labour force. So about six out of ten persons in the population are 
in what we generally  thought of as the working age range.  
 
It is interesting to put this in comparative perspective, drawing on data 
for other EU member states (which refers to 2005). Table 4.2 shows that 
Ireland is distinctive in having substantially more children and fewer older 
people in the population than many other EU countries and the EU 
average. With these two divergences counter-balancing one another, the 
proportion of working age is close to the EU average. 
Table 4.2: Composition of Population by Age, EU Countries, 2005 
    
Country  Percentage 
Under 16 Years 
Percentage 16-64 
Years 
Percentage 65 
Years or Over 
Belgium 19 65 16 
Czech Republic 16 70 14 
Denmark 20 65 15 
Germany 15 66 19 
Estonia 17 67 16 
Ireland 22 67 11 
Greece 16 66 18 
Spain 15 68 17 
France 19 65 16 
Italy 15 66 19 
Cyprus 20 68 12 
Latvia 16 67 17 
Lithuania 19 67 15 
Luxembourg 20 67 14 
Hungary 17 68 15 
Malta 19 66 15 
Netherlands 20 67 13 
Austria 17 67 16 
Poland 18 69 13 
Portugal 17 66 17 
Slovenia 15 69 15 
Slovakia 16 71 12 
Finland 19 65 16 
Sweden 21 63 16 
UK 19 64 17 
    
EU-15 average 17 66 17 
EU-25 average 17 66 17 
    
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 31/5/2007). 
 
In terms of recent trends, Table 4.3 shows that this age structure has not 
shifted over the past twenty years in terms of the proportion aged 65 years 
or over; indeed even the proportion aged 80 years or over has risen only 
modestly, so Ireland has not (yet) experienced the “greying” of the 
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population seen in some other rich countries. However, over the same 
period there has been a marked decline in the share of the population made 
up by children. The table shows that the percentage of the population aged 
14 years or below fell sharply,  from 29 per cent to just over 20 per cent, 
over the two decades – with the consequent increase in the proportion of 
working age having profound economic as well as social implications. 
Table 4.3: Population by Age Group, Ireland 1986-2006 
   
 
Per Cent 
1986 
Per Cent 
2006 
  0-14 years 28.9 20.4 
15-64 years 60.2 68.6 
65 years and over 10.9 11.0 
of whom   
80 years and over 1.9 2.6 
   
Source: Census of Population 2006. 
 
Following this brief overview, we now focus in turn on population 
groups and family types of particular interest and highlight some important 
trends, before turning to migration which has been a key feature of recent 
developments. 
 
 In the previous section we saw that those aged 14 years or under 
comprised 20.4 per cent of the Irish population in 2006. If we look at the 
number aged under 18 years – a conventional cut-off in distinguishing 
“children” from “adults” - the recent Census showed just over one million 
persons (1,036,034) of that age, representing 29 per cent of the population. 
Of these, 29 per cent are aged between 0 and 4, similar numbers are aged 
5-9 and 10 to 14, and about 17 per cent are aged between 15 and 17 years. 
4.3  
Children 
 
We saw in the previous section that the share children comprise in the 
total population fell sharply from 1986 to 2006. If we take a longer time 
horizon, then Figure 4.1 shows that the share of the population aged 0-14   
  
Figure 4.1: Percentage Share of Children in the Irish Population Over 
Time, 1926-2006 
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Source: Census of Population. 
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years peaked in the 1960s, declined slowly until the mid-1980s, and fell 
sharply from then until 2002, with the recent Census showing it was stable 
since then. 
 
These changes primarily reflect trends in birth rates. The total fertility of 
women of normal childbearing age was much higher in Ireland than 
elsewhere in the EU15 in the 1960s, but as Figure 4.2 shows it fell rapidly 
for two decades from 1970. That decline bottomed out in the 1990s, and 
fertility then recovered slightly. By 2003 the total fertility rate was 
somewhat higher than it had been in 1995, and is now marginally below the 
population replacement rate.8  
Figure 4.2: Total Fertility Rates in Ireland and the EU-15, 1960-2005 
 Source: Eurostat. 
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Women in Ireland have traditionally had a late age at childbearing, and 
this remains the case. In 1960, the average age of women giving birth was 
31.6 years. Over the following two decades, that age shifted slightly 
downwards and was 28.8 years in 1980. Thereafter it edged slowly upwards 
again, and by 2003 had reached 30.6 years. At the same time childbearing 
has declined among those aged in the teens and early 20s on the one side 
and aged over 40 on the other, and has become increasingly concentrated 
among women aged in their 30s. Teenage birth rates now account for less 
than 6 per cent of births, and have fallen slightly since the early 1980s. The 
birth rate among women aged 40-44 years is now less than a third of what 
it was in the early 1970s, while births among those aged 45 years or over, 
while always unusual, have also declined since the 1970s. 
 
8 Technically, the ‘replacement’ fertility rate is the number of births that 100 women of 
reproductive age would need to have in order to replace themselves, that is, to produce 
100 women of reproductive age. This rate is now usually defined as 210 births per 100 
women (or 2.1 per woman). Of these 210 births, just over 108 on average will be male and 
just under 102 will be female (this gender imbalance is a biological feature of human 
reproduction). About two of the females will die before they reach the average 
reproductive age, thus yielding the 100 live females of that age. Replacement fertility in 
this sense is quite different from population replacement, since the latter is strongly 
affected in addition by migration.  
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A rapid increase in the share of fertility occurring outside of marriage 
began in the 1980s and continued unabated through the 1990s, 
approaching one-third of births in 2000 and then levelling off, as shown in 
Figure 4.3. This has implications for their family circumstances and the 
extent to which children are in lone parent families, a specific group we 
discuss in the next section. 
Figure 4.3: Births Outside of Marriage, 1960-2003 
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There has also been a marked fall in the number of children per family, 
and thus the number of siblings that each child has. The number of 
children aged under 15 years living in households with only one or two 
children (below 15) rose by 59 per cent between 1981 and 2002, while the 
numbers living in households with four, five or six or more children fell 
equally sharply, as shown in Table 4.4 (to be updated to 2006). This meant 
that by 2002, 60 per cent of children were living in households with one or 
two children, compared to 35 per cent in 1981, and 15 per cent were living 
in households with four or more children, compared to 38 per cent in 
1981. This reflects the fact that higher order births were exceptionally 
common in Ireland in the quite recent past, but have been declining very 
rapidly.  
Table 4.4: Distribution of Children by Number of Children in Household, 
1981 and 2006 
   
Children in 
Household 
1981 2006 
 Number of Children % Number of Children % 
1 118,041 11.5 209,402 24.3 
2 248,580 24.1 325,836 37.8 
3 267,225 25.9 213,915 24.8 
4 196,304 19.0 81,384 9.4 
5 or more 200,901 19.5 32,471 3.8 
     
Source: Census of Population. 
 
Large families, which can require special consideration from a policy 
perspective are, therefore, very much less common than they used to be 
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quite recently. From a comparative perspective, though, Table 4.5 shows 
that Ireland still has a very high proportion of households comprising a 
couple with three or more children –  the highest of any country in the EU-
25, and twice the EU average. 
Table 4.5: Share of “Large Families” Among All Households, EU 
Countries, 2005 
  
Country  Per Cent 
Couple with 3 or More Children 
Belgium 13 
Czech Republic 5 
Denmark 10 
Germany 8 
Estonia 7 
Ireland 15 
Greece 2 
Spain 5 
France 5 
Italy 9 
Cyprus 5 
Latvia 11 
Lithuania 5 
Luxembourg 7 
Hungary 13 
Malta 8 
Netherlands 9 
Austria 13 
Poland 8 
Portugal 8 
Slovenia 4 
Slovakia 6 
Finland 12 
Sweden 11 
UK 7 
  
EU-15 average 7 
EU-25 average 8 
  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 31/5/2007). 
 
 Lone parent families are also a particular focus for social policy and social 
protection, so it is of interest to look at the numbers involved and how 
they have been changing. The Census of Population and the Quarterly National 
Household Survey are the key statistical sources in this regard, and Figure 4.4 
shows the incidence of lone parenthood as measured by these sources. 
Each shows substantial growth in the incidence of lone parenthood over 
the past 25 years or so. On the Census measure, the numbers more than 
doubled from a base of about 30,000 in the early 1980s to almost 70,000 in 
2002. The QNHS measure suggests even more rapid growth, to a level 
close to 100,000 in 2005. The reasons for such a marked difference in the 
estimates are not clear. The 2006 Census introduced new questions on 
relationships within the household to help to identify lone parents more 
accurately. These results are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, but show a 
total of 152,542 households comprising a lone mother or father living with 
her or his offspring of any age and no other persons; a further 17,238 
4.4 
Lone Parent 
Families 
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households include a lone mother or father living with her/his children and 
other persons. 
Figure 4.4: Growth in the Incidence of Lone Parenthood, 1981-2005 
 
Source: Census of Population five-yearly intervals from 1981 to 2006 (with 2001 Census delayed 
to 2002) and Labour Force Surveys and Quarterly National Household Survey for years 
from 1983 to 2005. 
 
The rise in lone parenthood has been associated with an increase in 
marital breakdown, and a rise in non-marital childbearing (which includes 
cohabiting as well as lone parents). Working in the other direction, there 
has been a marked decline in the proportions widowed over the period. 
The proportion of births accounted for by non-marital births rose sharply 
through the 1980s and 1990s, but has levelled off since 2000 at just under 1 
in 3. It is also important to remember that not all lone parents are living in 
single-adult households, some live with one or both of their own parents in 
a multigenerational household, or in other housing arrangements. It 
appears that about 70 per cent of lone parent families with dependent 
children under 18 years live in “self-contained” lone parent households, 
with the remaining 30 per cent mostly in multi-generational households. 
 
Cross-country comparisons on the rate of lone parenthood are beset by 
difficulties (see Bradshaw, 1996 for details), but data produced by Eurostat 
presented in Table 4.6 show Ireland with an above average proportion of 
households being a single adult with children, but less than the UK which 
is a clear outlier. 
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Table 4.6: Share of Lone Parent Households, EU Countries, 2005 
  
Country  Per Cent 
Single Adult with Child(ren) 
Belgium 6 
Czech Republic 4 
Denmark 7 
Germany 8 
Estonia 7 
Ireland 7 
Greece 2 
Spain 2 
France 5 
Italy 2 
Cyprus 3 
Latvia 6 
Lithuania 6 
Luxembourg 3 
Hungary 5 
Malta 2 
Netherlands 4 
Austria 4 
Poland 3 
Portugal 3 
Slovenia 3 
Slovakia 3 
Finland 5 
Sweden 8 
UK 9 
  
EU-15 average 6 
EU-25 average 5 
  
Source: Eurostat (downloaded 31/5/2007). 
 
 The 2006 Census shows 467,926 persons aged 65 years or over in Ireland 
in April 2005, comprising 11 per cent of the total population. Of these, 56 
per cent are aged under 75 years, a further one-third are aged between 75 
and 84 years, and 10 per cent of older people are aged 85 years or over. As 
we have seen, the population share of this age group is remarkably low in 
Ireland, and has not been growing in recent years. The absolute number of 
older people has increased but the share in the total population has 
remained almost unchanged at around 11 per cent since the early 1960s, as 
shown in Figure 4.5. In the EU-15, the percentage of the population aged 
65 years or over rose from 12 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 2004, so 
Ireland is exceptional in this respect.   
4.5  
Older People 
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Figure 4.5: Older People (Aged 65+) in Ireland, 1961-2006: Number and 
Percentage of Population 
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A number of distinctive features of Irish demographic development 
account for this “non-ageing” of the population. One is the relatively high 
birth rates, especially up to the early 1980s, noted earlier. Another is the 
high emigration of the 1950s, which meant that the cohorts reaching 65 
years in the 1990s and early part of this decade were smaller than they 
otherwise would have been. A further factor has been the slow rate of 
improvement in older-age longevity in Ireland in the second half of the 
twentieth century, especially among men –  it is only since the latter part of 
the 1990s that older Irish people began to close the life expectancy gap 
with the rest of Europe. 
 
There is a growing tendency for older people to live apart from their 
children or other relatives, in Ireland as in other rich countries, which also 
has implications for social policy. In 2002, almost 60 per cent of those aged 
65 years or over were living either alone or as a couple. Figure 4.6 illustrates 
this trend by showing the household circumstances of older people in 
1981, 2002 and 2006. The household types among older people that have 
shown the largest increases are the solitary/living alone household and the 
couple household. In 2006, 29 per cent of older people were living alone 
and 35 per cent were living in a couple household, compared to 20 per cent 
living alone and 20 per cent in a couple household in 1981. Those living in 
couple households with children or others present have remained more or 
less as common as before, but those living in non-couple or more complex 
households (e.g. lone parents/the widowed living with children or non-
married elderly living with siblings or other relatives) have become much 
less common.  
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Figure 4.6: Household Circumstances of Older People in Ireland, 1981 
and 2002 
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The changing household composition of older people is associated with 
another important shift in their circumstances, namely the growing 
likelihood that they have been married at some point in their lives rather 
than remaining permanently single. Ireland had a uniquely low marriage 
rate in the period when the oldest of the present population were in the 
marriageable ages of their lives, and the consequences remained visible 
decades later; Figure 4.7 shows that in 1981 almost 25 per cent of older 
people were single. However, a marriage boom then occurred in Ireland in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Those who married at that time are now entering old 
age, increasing the proportion of married people in the older population. 
By 2006, for example, almost 50 per cent of older people were in a 
surviving marriage, compared to 42 per cent in 1981, while the proportion 
who had never married had fallen to 17.5 per cent and is likely to fall 
further over the coming period. (The proportion widowed has also fallen.) 
For older people of this generation, remaining single also usually entailed 
remaining childless, and so the shift away from singlehood in the older 
population means a decline in the proportion of older people who lack 
either a spouse or adult children to look after them in old age. This means, 
among other things, that the growing tendency for older people to live 
alone or apart from their children does not necessarily mean a 
corresponding rise in risk of isolation, since more older people are likely to 
have children and/or a spouse and so are less likely to be completely alone 
in the world.   
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Figure 4.7: Marital Status of Older People, 1981 and 2006 
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 Ireland’s economic boom from the mid-1990s resulted in a sustained 
increase in employment and decline in unemployment, and had a 
pronounced impact on migration flows in and out of the country. Figure 
4.8 shows the change from net emigration in the late 1980s to net 
immigration from the mid-1990s onwards. In 1987, 23,000 more people 
left than entered the country (40,000 left while 17,000 came in). In the early 
1990s the outflows and inflows were almost in balance. However, from 
1996 onwards net migration has made a positive contribution to Ireland’s 
population growth. The net inflow of immigrants increased from 8,000 a 
year in 1996 to 67,000  a year in 2006.  
4.6  
Migration  
Figure 4.8: Emigration, Immigration and Net Migration, 1987-2006 
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The composition of migratory flows to Ireland has become increasingly 
diverse. In 1991 about two-thirds of the total number of immigrants were 
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Irish people returning home, but by 1996 returning migrants accounted for 
less than half of the gross inflow. The importance of the return flow of 
people who had left Ireland continued to diminish and by 2006 it had fallen 
to 20,000 or less than one-quarter of the gross inflow of 87,000. At that 
point, over three-fifths of the gross inflow consisted of nationals from 
other EU countries, including the new Member States from Central and 
Eastern Europe who joined the European Union in 2004. Over four-fifths 
of the non-Irish migrants in 2006 were nationals of the EU-25. Figure 4.9 
shows how the country of origin of immigrants changed between 1991 and 
2006. In 1991, 56 per cent of all immigrants who moved to Ireland came 
from the UK and 13 per cent came from the US, many of whom were Irish 
workers returning home. Immigrants from the rest of the EU and the rest 
of the world amounted to 31 per cent in total. In 2006 immigrants from the 
rest of the EU and the rest of the world accounted for over two-thirds of 
the total inflow, with the biggest increase for the latter. 
Figure 4.9: Estimated Flow of All Immigrants by Country of Origin,         
1991-2006 (Thousands) 
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These changing patterns of migration, as well as having major 
implications for social policy in themselves, have had an impact on the 
composition of the population by nationality and ethnic origin. In 2006, 
over 10 per cent of the population were foreign nationals as shown in 
Table 4.7. Of these 113,000 were UK nationals, almost 165,000 were 
nationals of other EU countries, and 145,000 came from outside the EU. 
This compares to 67,000 from the UK in 2000, with 25,000 from other EU 
countries and 34,000 from outside the EU.  
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Table 4.7: Total Population in 2000 and 2006 Classified by Nationality 
(000s) 
   
Nationality 2000* 2006 
Irish 3,660.4 3,706.7 
UK 66.9 112.6 
Other EU 15/25 25.3 163.2 
Non EU 34.3 145.3 
 USA 8.0 12.5 
 Other 26.3 132.8 
Total Population 3,786.9 4,127.8 
Foreign Population 126.5 421.1 
Per cent Foreign 3.3% 10.2% 
   
Source: CSO, 2000 and 2007.  
*Note: The CSO has revised total immigration figures for 2000 but not nationality data. 
Consequently, the unrevised figures are supplied here. 
 
Migrants are distinctive in terms of age profile, and thus also have an 
impact on the profile of the population. Using the CSO’s Quarterly National 
Household Survey, Barrett, Bergin, and Duffy (2006) looked at non-Irish 
immigrants who arrived in Ireland in the ten years up to 2003 and were in 
the labour force at that point, and found that over 80 per cent were aged 
between 20 and 44 years, compared with 44 per cent of the native 
population (which includes return migrants born in Ireland and of Irish 
nationality). Figure 4.10 compares the age profile of residents of Irish 
nationality with those who did not have Irish nationality in the 2006 
Census.9 This again shows a much higher proportion of the non-Irish than 
Irish population in the 15-24 years and 25-34 years age ranges. 
Figure 4.10: Age Profile of Usual Residents by Age Distinguishing  
Non-Irish Versus Irish Nationality, 2006 
Source: Census of  Population. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 This does not correspond to a distinction between immigrants and non-migrants since 
some people not of Irish nationality may have been in Ireland since birth, but nonetheless 
serves as a reasonable approximation. 
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 This chapter has set out some important trends in population and family 
structures which provide the context in which policy has to be framed, 
including the declining share that children make up in the total population, 
falling family size and apparent recent stability in the importance of lone 
parent households. In concluding, it should be emphasised that the stability 
in the share of older people in the Irish population which has persisted for 
many years is likely to change in the future, and projecting the size of that 
population, though problematic, is also a key ingredient in thinking about 
social protection and pensions policy in particular. That is inextricably 
linked with prospects for migration, which is particularly difficult to project 
given its dependence on macroeconomic developments. 
4.7 
Conclusions 
 
 
5. ONE PARENT 
FAMILIES 
 In Ireland, as in many other countries, lone parents have tended to have a 
higher than average risk of poverty. There has also been substantial growth 
in the incidence of lone parenthood. Taken together, these factors mean 
that policies dealing with lone parents face particular challenges. The recent 
report on lone parenthood (Department of Social and Family Affairs 
(DSFA), 2006) reviews much of the relevant evidence, and presents for 
discussion proposals for a restructuring of policy regarding lone 
parenthood. Callan et al. (2007) provide a detailed statistical portrait of this 
vulnerable group, from which we draw at relevant points in this chapter. 
We begin by setting out the Irish experience in relation to the growth of 
lone parenthood (Section 5.2) and how its incidence compares with that in 
other countries. In Section 5.3 we examine how poverty risks for lone 
parents vary across countries, with a view to identifying countries 
embodying “best practice”, as emphasised by the EU’s “open method of 
coordination” regarding social policy and social inclusion. Employment 
rates across countries and over time are examined in Section 5.4, as a 
backdrop to the discussion of income and employment supports in Section 
5.5. We focus particularly on countries which have either low levels of 
poverty risk for lone parents, or have made good progress in reducing 
poverty risks. In Section 5.6 we look more closely at the official proposals 
(DSFA, 2006) for reform of Irish policy structures, and consider them in 
the light of the review of policies in countries with a successful track record 
in reducing poverty risks for lone parents or keeping that risk at a low level. 
The main conclusions are drawn together in the final section. 
5.1 
Introduction 
 
 The rapid growth in lone parenthood in Ireland was described in Chapter 
4 (Section 4.4). The number of one-parent families with a child aged under 
15 years rose from about 30,000 in 1981 to about 100,000 in 2006. Another 
perspective is given by examining what proportion of all families with 
dependent children is accounted for by lone parent families. Figure 5.1 
illustrates how this proportion has grown over time. Census data indicate 
that the proportion has risen from 7 per cent in 1981 to 21 per cent in 
2006. The Quarterly National Household Survey confirms the rise in the 
proportion since the mid-1990s, but suggests that the rate has stabilised 
since about the year 2000.  
5.2  
Growth in 
Lone 
Parenthood 
 
How does this rate of lone parenthood compare in international terms? 
Table 5.1 shows the rate of lone parenthood, measured in terms of lone 
parent households as a proportion of all households with children, for EU-
15 member states in 2005. The highest rate by some margin is in the UK, 
40 
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but the Irish rate of 18 per cent is second highest, jointly with Sweden and 
Belgium. Denmark and Germany also have above average rates of 16 per 
cent. The lowest rates of lone parenthood, as measured at household level, 
are in the Mediterranean/Southern European countries. Other continental 
European countries have rates between 9 and 14 per cent. 
Figure 5.1: Lone Parent Families as Proportion of All Families with 
Children Aged Under 15 Years, 1981-2006 
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Note: Lone parents are defined as those with at least one child aged under 15 years. 
Sources: Census of Population 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002 and 2006 and Labour Force 
Surveys and Quarterly National Household Survey for years from 1983 to 2005. 
 
Table 5.1: Prevalence of Lone Parent Households in EU-15 States, 2005 
 
 
Single Parent Households as Percentage of 
all Households With Children 
UK 24 
Ireland 18* 
Sweden 18 
Belgium 18 
Denmark 16 
Germany 16 
France 14 
Netherlands 13 
Austria 12 
Finland 10 
Luxembourg 9 
Portugal 7 
Italy 6 
Spain 6 
Greece 5 
Sources: EU Labour Force Survey data from Eurostat News Release 59/2006 except for 
Sweden, where this information was not available, and data from Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) Key Figures were used instead (accessed at 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm on 31/05/07). Irish data are based on 
QNHS, but it should be noted that the incidence of lone parent households 
within larger households is likely to be higher for Ireland than for other Northern 
European countries. Both QNHS and Census 2006 data indicate a higher rate of 
lone parenthood (about 21 per cent) on a family unit basis. 
 
 
42 TACKLING LOW INCOME AND DEPRIVATION: DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE POLICIES 
It must be stressed that measurement of the incidence of lone 
parenthood at family rather than household level is likely to alter some of 
these results. Lone parents living within wider households are relatively 
infrequent in many Northern European countries – Ireland being an 
exception –  and are more common in Southern European countries. 
 
In the next section we turn to the incidence of poverty among lone 
parents. Here we may note simply that countries with a high incidence of 
lone parenthood include some with the lowest risks of poverty, and others 
with the risks among the highest. 
 
 We draw on two key sources to examine risks of relative income poverty 
(the “at risk of poverty” measure in the Laeken indicators) for the lone 
parent group. The first is the Luxembourg Income Study, which includes a 
selection of EU and non-EU countries. Table 5.2 shows the risks of 
poverty at 50 per cent of the median equivalised income for the closest 
available year to 2000. It is clear that the lowest risks are faced by lone 
parents in the Scandinavian countries (6 to 13 per cent). Next lowest are 
Poland and Estonia, with rates of 18 and 23 per cent respectively. The 
major continental European countries (France, Germany and Spain) have 
risks of close to 30 per cent. Higher risks of poverty are faced by lone 
parents in the Netherlands (35 per cent) and in a range of English-speaking 
countries (Australia, the UK, Canada, Ireland and the USA – with risks of 
35 to just under 50 per cent). 
5.3  
Risks of 
Poverty 
Table 5.2: Risks of Poverty (at 50 Per Cent of Median Equivalised Income) 
Circa 2000 
  
Country Risk 
Denmark 6.1 
Finland 8.1 
Norway 10.9 
Sweden 12.9 
Poland (1999) 18.0 
Estonia 23.1 
France 28.8 
Germany 30.5 
Spain 32.8 
Israel (2001) 32.9 
Netherlands (1999) 35.1 
Australia (2001) 35.2 
UK (1999) 39.2 
Canada 40.7 
Ireland 46.3 
USA 49.5 
  
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures (accessed at 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm on 31/05/07).  
  
More recent data are available from Eurostat’s social inclusion statistics, 
which form the basis for Table 5.3. The 60 per cent of median income cut-
off is used to define the risk of poverty here. Again the lowest risks of 
poverty are in the Scandinavian countries (14 to 21 per cent); Slovenia also 
has a low risk (22 per cent). The next lowest risks are found in a group 
including France, the Netherlands, Austria and two more recent member 
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states (Hungary and Romania, with risks of 25 to 27 per cent. A further 
twelve member states, including Germany, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Spain 
and the UK have poverty risks for lone parents of between 30 and 37 per 
cent. The risk in the UK is close to 37 per cent, similar to Belgium, Italy 
and Spain. The poverty risk facing Irish lone parents is 45 per cent, similar 
to that in Greece and exceeded only in Lithuania and Malta. 
 
In looking for “best practice” in terms of achieving low risks of poverty 
for lone parents it is clear that the Scandinavian countries have a record 
which makes their policies towards lone parents of interest. Among 
Continental European countries it seems that France, the Netherlands and 
Austria fare best. 
Table 5.3: “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for Lone Parent Households, EU 
Countries, 2005 or Nearest Year 
  
Country 
“At Risk of Poverty” Rate,
(60 Per Cent of Median 
Income) 
Iceland 14 
Sweden 18 
Norway 19 
Finland 20 
Denmark 21 
Slovenia 22 
  
France 26 
Netherlands 26 
Hungary 27 
Romania 27 
Austria 27 
  
Germany  30 
Latvia 31 
Luxembourg 32 
Slovakia 32 
Bulgaria (2004) 33 
Croatia (2003) 34 
Portugal 34 
Cyprus 35 
Italy 35 
Belgium 36 
Spain 37 
United Kingdom 37 
  
Estonia 40 
Turkey (2003) 40 
Poland 40 
Czech Republic 41 
  
Greece 43 
Ireland 45 
Lithuania 48 
Malta 51 
  
Source: Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).  
 
What about countries which have achieved large falls in the risk of 
poverty for lone parents? Over the 1995 to 2005 period just six countries 
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are found by Eurostat to have achieved any reduction in this risk. The 
greatest reductions were in Germany and the UK, where poverty risks for 
lone parents were reduced by close to 25 percentage points. In Austria, the 
risk was reduced by about 12 percentage points and in the Netherlands and 
Ireland by about 9 percentage points. In the Dutch case, however, the most 
striking feature is that the risk fell by about 13 percentage points between 
2003 and 2005. 
Figure 5.2: “At Risk of Poverty” Rate for Lone Parents, Germany, UK and 
Austria, 1995-2005 
Source: Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).  
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Figure 5.3: “At Risk of Poverty” Rate for Lone Parents, Ireland, 
Netherlands and France, 1995-2005 
Source: Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).  
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The Eurostat figures are for lone parent households; they do not include 
households in which there is a lone parent along with another adult or 
adults (often the parent of the lone parent). National analysis of the Living 
in Ireland data suggests that the level and evolution of risk for this total 
group has been somewhat different. The level of risk is a good deal lower 
for all lone parents, as emphasised by Whelan, Nolan and Maître (2005), 
because the resources of other adult household members help to keep the 
household above the poverty line income. On the other hand, the overall 
risk for this wider group of lone parent – about 26 per cent in 1994 – has 
risen by about 6 percentage points over the period. A significant part of 
this rise relates to the fact that a higher proportion of lone parents are now 
living in lone parent households rather than as part of wider households. 
 
 Employment is a key differentiating factor in understanding the risk of 
poverty faced by lone parents. Table 5.4 shows that in 1994 the poverty 
risk for lone parent families headed by a parent not in employment was 
almost seven times greater than for a family headed by a parent in 
employment. Between 1994 and 2001 the risk rose for families headed by 
an employed person and particularly strongly for families headed by a 
parent not in employment. The overall employment rate rose sharply over 
this period, from just under 40 per cent to almost 70 per cent. Despite this, 
however, the overall risk of poverty rose. This was mainly due to the rise in 
the risk of poverty for those not in employment; if this had remained 
constant then the overall risk would have fallen. 
5.4  
Lone Parents 
and 
Employment 
Table 5.4: Risks of Poverty for Lone Parent Families, 1994 and 2001 
(60 Per Cent of Median Equivalised Income) 
 
Lone Parent Group “At Risk of Poverty” 
1994 (Employment rate: 38 Per Cent)  
Employed 5.0 
Not employed 34.1 
All lone parents 25.5 
2001 (Employment rate: 70 Per Cent)  
Employed 10.8 
Not employed 55.8 
All lone parents 31.9 
  
Source: Living in Ireland Survey, 1994 and 2001. 
 
The gap between the risks of poverty for those in and out of 
employment is very substantial. This is one of the reasons why policy 
towards lone parents in many countries has shifted towards supporting 
connection with the labour market and movement into employment. 
Dynamic considerations reinforce this point, as time spent out of the 
labour market tends to reduce potential earnings, while time spent in 
employment tends to increase the wage that can be commanded. The Irish 
evidence from Table 5.4, along with cross-national evidence in Figure 5.5, 
points to more complex relationships between employment and poverty 
risk than might be apparent at first sight. 
 
It is clear from Figure 5.4 that low employment rates can be associated 
with high poverty risks (e.g., UK, the Netherlands and Germany) but also 
with relatively low poverty risks (Belgium and Italy). The lowest poverty 
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risks are found in Denmark, Finland and Austria, countries with the highest 
employment rates, close to 80 per cent. On the other hand, a high 
employment rate does not guarantee a low poverty rate. Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain all have employment rates close to 70 per cent, but risks of 
poverty are among the highest in the EU.  
Figure 5.4: Employment Rates and “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for Lone 
Parents, EU Countries, 2001 
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Note: Employment rate is for female lone parents aged 25 to 49 years. “At risk of 
poverty” rate is for all lone parent households. 
Sources: Employment rates from Eurostat (2004) Statistics in Focus, Population and Social 
Conditions, Theme 3-5/2004. “At risk of poverty” rates from Eurostat website 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
 
 Up to now we have focused on key outcomes for lone parents, in terms 
of employment and poverty risk. Now we turn to the environment and 
processes which generate these outcomes, focusing in particular on policies 
geared at supporting the incomes of lone parents, and at supporting their 
participation in the paid labour market. We saw earlier that one useful 
classification of welfare regimes was into four types: Scandinavian, 
continental European, English-speaking countries, and 
Southern/Mediterranean. The countries with the lowest risks of poverty 
for lone parents are found in the Scandinavian countries, so the policy 
regimes in place in these countries merit particular attention. As we have 
seen, several Continental European countries also have poverty risks for 
lone parents which are substantially below those in Ireland; and in the UK, 
poverty risks have been substantially reduced over the past decade. In this 
section we will look at one main example from each of these welfare 
5.5  
Income and 
Employment 
Supports 
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regimes,10 in the next section we will outline the current Irish system and 
the proposals for reform in the Government discussion paper (Department 
of Social and Family Affairs, 2006). 
5.5.1 NORDIC COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF NORWAY 
While all the Scandinavian countries have low risks of poverty for lone 
parents, Norway is of particular interest, because  
 
In a Scandinavian context, the Norwegian welfare state has been a 
latecomer with regard to making the combination of paid work and 
childcare easier for Norwegian mothers, particularly in relation to 
developing public childcare provision. At the same time, the 
Norwegian welfare state has given women better rights to continue 
their traditional roles as housewives and mothers after divorce, the 
death of a husband, or when supporting a family through childbirth 
in the absence of a male provider. (Syltevik, 2003). 
 
The Norwegian “Transitional Allowance” for lone parents, established 
in 1964, was built around a categorical approach, covering widows and 
unmarried mothers.11 In 1981 the scheme was extended to cover separated 
and divorced persons, and made gender-neutral by including lone fathers. 
Persons eligible for the scheme were entitled to: 
 
• a guaranteed minimum income through the allowance, if they 
preferred to take care of their child or children at home, until the 
youngest child was about 10 years of age; 
• a top up to wage income, if required, for those engaged in part-time 
or full-time work; 
• child-care benefits for parents in education or paid work; 
• an educational allowance to cover the costs of books and travel 
expenses; 
• an extra child allowance until the youngest Child was 18 years old; 
• reduced levels of income taxation. 
 
Most lone parents (70 per cent in the 1980s and 60 per cent in the 
1990s) made use of the scheme at some time,12 but few used it for long 
periods – the average time on the scheme was three years in the early 
1990s. (Terum, 1993). Thus, at any given time, a majority of Norwegian 
lone parents were supporting themselves without use of the transitional 
allowance. 
 
 
 
 
10 We do not examine the situation in Southern/Mediterranean countries, which have 
poverty risks towards the high end of the EU scale. 
11 Also included were those classed as “family widows” – a group with circumstances 
similar to those dealt with by the Single Woman’s Allowance in the Irish welfare code, 
having taken care of elderly parents or other relatives, and without an income after their 
death. 
12 Kjeldstad and Roalso (1995). 
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The numbers in receipt of transitional allowance grew, with rising 
numbers of divorces and separations. Syltevik (2003) notes that this did not 
lead to a “moral panic” regarding lone parents, but that it was questioned 
whether the transitional allowance gave lone parents sufficient incentive to 
take up employment. “It was argued that the allowance made lone parents 
‘passive’ and ‘dependent’ for a longer time than necessary, and was 
therefore counter-productive in relation to goals of increased self-
provision” (Syltevik, 2003, p.67). Furthermore, as general policy towards 
childcare had made substantial investment in measures to help all families 
combine work and care for children, there had been changes in the 
possibilities of combining work and care for lone parents. 
 
Policy changes for lone parents came as part of a wider welfare reform 
package in the late 1990s, with an emphasis on welfare-to-work, gender 
equality and increased women’s labour market participation. The key 
changes in the transitional allowance for lone parents were: 
 
• Transitional allowance was restricted to three years, although this 
could be extended by a further two years for lone parents engaged 
in education. 
• Only those with a child aged under 8 years (previously 10 years) 
were eligible for the allowance.  
• Where the youngest child was aged 3 years or over, the recipient 
had to be active in the labour market – either with a job of at least 
half of full-time hours, or studying at least the same amount of 
time, or actively seeking work. 
• There is also provision for payment of the allowance when the 
youngest child is older than 8 and under 10 years, if the lone parent 
has “special difficulties adjusting to a new situation”. 
• Rates of financial support were slightly increased, and a higher 
proportion of childcare costs was covered by the state (Millar and 
Evans, 2003). 
 
Assessing the impact of these changes, Syltevik (2003) finds that the 
reform has reduced the use of transitional allowance. Eurostat’s poverty 
risk figures show that Norway is still among the countries with relatively 
low poverty risk for lone parents – the risk in 2005 was 19 per cent, and it 
varied between 16 and 21 per cent between 2003 and 2005. Syltevik (2003) 
argues that “…problems with the new scheme in Norway are related to an 
over-optimistic picture of the possibilities for lone parents in the labour 
market and an under-estimation of the difficulties they face in combining 
care and paid work”. 
5.5.2 CONTINENTAL EUROPE: THE CASE OF THE 
NETHERLANDS 
The Dutch welfare state has had relatively high benefit levels, similar to the 
Scandinavian countries, but until recently has been based a “male 
breadwinner” model, with low labour market participation by women – in 
marked contrast to the Scandinavian countries. Over the past two decades, 
however, the Dutch welfare state has moved strongly towards “activation”, 
promoting and/or enforcing employability, employment and participation 
(Knijn and van Berkel, 2003). Policies towards lone parents have changed 
in line with this more general policy shift. There has also been growth in 
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the incidence of lone parenthood. Between 1980 and 2002 the incidence of 
lone parenthood, as measured by lone parent families as a proportion of all 
families with dependent children, doubled from 8 per cent to 16 per cent. 
 
Until the mid-1990s lone mothers with a child aged under 12 years had 
an exemption from the general work requirement attaching to social 
assistance. In 1996, a new General Social Assistance Act, which laid great 
stress on activation, resulted in the introduction of a work obligation for 
mothers whose youngest child was aged 5 years or over. (Knijn and van 
Berkel, 2003.) The Act gave considerable scope to local authorities to take 
account of individual variation in circumstances. An investigation by the 
Dutch General Audit Office shows that the number of exemptions from 
work obligations was high. In September 2002 less than 20 per cent of all 
lone parents had full work obligations imposed – about half had a full 
formal exemption (many because of having a child under 5 years) and the 
remainder had partial exemptions or de facto exemptions (in which case 
work obligations were not enforced). OECD (2002) stated that application 
of the work test varied “…depending on the attitude of staff and local 
politicians, some of whom believe that the mother should be able to look 
after her children at home”. Knijn and van Wel (2001) also find that local 
policymakers and caseworkers tended to resist a rigid interpretation of the 
reform and “…reject the full-time work obligation for lone mothers who 
have a strong care ethos”; and were hesitant about insisting that lone 
mothers take up jobs which might not improve their incomes. 
Figure 5.5: Employment Rate and “At Risk of Poverty” Rate for Lone 
Parents in the Netherlands, 1995-2005 
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Sources: Employment rates from Eurostat (2004) Statistics in Focus, Population and Social 
Conditions, Theme 3-5/2004. “At risk of poverty” rates from Eurostat website 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
 
A further reform was introduced in 2003, which strengthened 
provisions requiring activation. There is now no general exemption for lone 
parents of a young child. If unable to find work, a lone parent must engage 
with a “Centre for Work and Income” or reintegration organisation 
charged with helping the applicant to find suitable work or training. The 
comprehensive approach is designed to promote labour market entry or 
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“social activation”13 of all social assistance recipients, including lone 
parents. 
 
The evolution of the employment rate and the “at risk of poverty” rate 
for lone parents in the Netherlands over the period 1995 to 2005 is set out 
in Figure 5.5. The employment rate rose sharply between 1995 and 2003, 
which might have been expected to reduce the risk of poverty. But the “at 
risk of poverty” rate rose initially and then stayed close to 40 per cent.14 
5.5.3 ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
UK 
In the UK, lone parents have been entitled to income support until the 
youngest child reached the age of 16 years. Initially, active labour market 
policy focused mainly on those in receipt of unemployment payments, 
largely ignoring lone parents (Evans, 2003). The New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP) (rolled out nationwide in 1998) was designed “…to 
encourage lone parents to improve their prospects and living standards by 
taking up and increasing paid work, and to improve their job readiness to 
increase their employment opportunities”. (Material from Department of 
Work and Pensions, quoted in Evans, 2003). One-to-one tailored advice 
and support from a specialist adviser is a central part of the NDLP. The 
advisers can help with job search, claiming of appropriate in-work benefits 
and finding suitable educational and training opportunities. 
 
Unlike some of the reforms discussed in other countries, a key feature 
of the NDLP was that it was voluntary. However, attendance at a work-
focused interview with a personal adviser was made mandatory for all those 
on Income Support from 2001. Evans (2003) estimates that between 15 
and 20 per cent of lone parents on Income Support availed of the New 
Deal for Lone Parents. Those most likely to participate tended to have 
higher qualifications, recent work experience and a short claim history. 
Factors making participation less likely included having a child under 3 
years, having more than one child, and having health problems or a 
disability. For lone parents with a child aged under 3, the take-up of the 
NDLP was at about 5 per cent. 
 
How effective is the programme in terms of increasing the employment 
of lone parents? This question must be answered in two stages. Lessof et al. 
(2003) found that 50 per cent of NDLP participants moved into 
employment, as against 26 per cent of matched sample of non-participants. 
This suggests a very strong pro-employment impact on those who 
participate. The other key factor is the rate of participation, estimated at 
about 20 per cent in 2002. Evans (2003) comments that “…improving 
participation without changing the content of the programme is logical for 
as long as there is a large proportion of non-participants who look very 
similar in all respects to participants and would gain similarly from the 
programme”. However, he cautions that making participation in NDLP 
 
 
 
13 Social activation includes voluntary work, for which a small allowance for expenses may 
be paid. 
14 National sources (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006) indicate that the risk remained 
close to 40 per cent in 2005. 
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itself compulsory is unlikely to achieve much more than the mandatory 
Personal Adviser meetings are already achieving. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows how the employment rate and “at risk of poverty” rate 
have evolved in the UK over the past decade. Over the full period, the 
employment rate rose by about 12 percentage points. The “at risk of 
poverty” rate fell slightly over the full period. But between 1996 and 2004, 
the employment rate rose by about 10 percentage points, while the “at risk 
of poverty” rate fell by about 8 percentage points. The headline policy 
initiatives affecting lone parents over the 1998-2004 period was the New 
Deal for Lone Parents; but other policy changes,15 including greater income 
support for lone parents not in employment, and the introduction of a 
National Minimum Wage also played a role in generating these results. 
Figure 5.6: Employment Rates and “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for Lone 
Parents, UK, 1995 to 2005 
Sources: Employment rates from Eurostat (2004) Statistics in Focus, Population and Social 
Conditions, Theme 3-5/2004. “At risk of poverty” rates from Department of Work 
and Pensions, Households Below Average Income. 
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5.5.4 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE? 
The cross-country evidence shows clearly that for lone parents, the lowest 
risks of poverty are in the Scandinavian countries. How is this achieved? 
Key features of the Swedish and Finnish systems, as summarised by 
OECD (2005),  are: 
 
• Strong emphasis is placed on participation in employment for all 
citizens. 
• An extensive childcare system makes employment feasible for lone 
parents. 
 
 
 
15 Documented in Evans et al. (2003). 
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• A comprehensive system of employment supports, including 
training and skill upgrading as well as job matching, is made 
available. 
• The work-test in the benefit system applies to all, including lone 
parents. 
 
Norway, as we have seen, has had a rather different approach to lone 
parenthood, starting with a categorical benefit (payable until the youngest 
child reached 12 years of age), and reflecting a different attitude towards 
the role of lone parents as carer’s for their children. Recent reforms have 
moved Norway towards the mainstream Scandinavian approach, and the 
poverty risk is low, with a high employment rate. 
 
What of the continental model? The poverty risk for the Netherlands 
and Austria is just over 25 per cent – somewhat higher than that in the 
Scandinavian countries (close to 20 per cent), but well below the rates in 
Ireland (45 per cent) and the UK (40 per cent). Again, the Dutch model has 
involved an increase in the employment rate, and some extension of 
childcare; but the timing of the fall in the poverty risk means that other 
factors must also be at work. Given the size of the poverty reduction which 
would be involved in a move to Dutch levels of poverty risk for lone 
parents, this merits closer investigation. 
 
The UK poverty risk for lone parents has fallen sharply, and is now 
somewhat below the Irish rate. Gregg and Harkness (2007) stress that the 
design was radically different from US welfare reforms: 
 
In the UK the generosity of in and out-of-work benefits 
were both increased substantially for families with children, 
there has been no use of time limits for welfare payments to 
lone parents and participation in job search and training or 
other support programmes has remained, to date, voluntary. 
The only element of compulsion has been for lone parents 
to attend interviews at the Job Centre to discuss work 
options. (Gregg and Harkness, 2007, p. 3.) 
 
There are some common factors to be found in comparing countries 
which have achieved low risks of poverty for lone parents, and those which 
have had marked reductions in recent years; and there are also some 
divergences in the policies used which need to be considered. Common 
factors include: 
 
• Promotion of employment as a route out of poverty: this involves 
more than simply promoting a transition for non-employment or 
unemployment into employment. It also requires structures which 
“make work possible” by assuring the availability of suitable and 
affordable childcare and which “make work pay” for those making 
the transition. 
• “Making work pay” is often thought of as involving policies such as 
tax credits and in-work benefits. These do, indeed, have a role to 
play. But education and training are also vital in ensuring that 
employment can be found, and that progression to increased pay 
can be achieved. 
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• Irrespective of other conditions, the age at which children of lone 
parents cease to be regarded as dependent appears to be lower in 
other countries than in Ireland. 
 
The major divergence between countries in terms of their policy 
approaches seems to be in the extent to which a work-test is required of 
lone parents of school-going children. In order of strictness, one might 
start with the Scandinavian countries (where the work test is applied strictly 
to all persons looking for social assistance, including lone parents); then the 
Netherlands (where the work test has become more strict, although 
possibly with local variation); and then the UK (where the New Deal for 
Lone Parents is voluntary, albeit with a mandatory work-focused 
interview). New Zealand has moved from a system where work search was 
mandatory for lone parents with school age children to a system of 
“enhanced case management”, where the focus is on getting the right 
outcome for the individual, regardless of children’s ages. (Hutten, 2003.) 
 
In the next section we consider current Irish policy towards lone 
parents, and official proposals for its reform, in the light of this review of 
international experience. 
 
 A detailed description of the One-parent Family Payment (OFP) and its 
evolution over time can be found in Ireland (2006). Here we summarise 
key features of the current system. To claim OFP, a person  
5.6  
Policy 
Towards 
Lone Parents 
in Ireland 
 
• must be widowed, separated, divorced, or unmarried,16  
• must be the main carer for, and have charge of, at least one 
child,  
• must satisfy a means test, 
• must not have gross earnings above €400 (the rate from May 
2007), 
• must make efforts to seek maintenance, 
• must not be cohabiting, 
• divorced or separated persons must have been separated for at least 
a year. 
 
The means test includes income from earnings, maintenance and 
imputed income from capital and property (other than the family home). 
Only half of maintenance income is assessed as means, so that an incentive 
remains for OFP claimants to seek support. The treatment of earnings has 
also been changed in recent years so as to improve the incentive to take up 
employment. A significant tranche of earnings is disregarded (up to 
€146.50 per week). Earnings in excess of that amount lead to partial 
withdrawal of the benefit, at the rate of 50 cent per euro of earnings. 
Benefit is completely withdrawn if earnings exceed an upper limit, currently 
€400 per week. Beneficiaries of OFP are entitled also to apply for support 
 
 
 
16 Prisoner’s spouses also qualify. 
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under the Family Income Supplement (FIS), if they satisfy the conditions 
of that scheme. 
 
The rate of payment and child additions are in line with several other 
means-tested and contributory schemes, currently at €185.80 per week17 
with a Qualified Child Increase of €22 per week. 
 
As noted earlier, there has been continuing growth in the number of 
lone parents. Changes in the scheme, including higher rates of payment and 
a lower rate of benefit withdrawal for those with earnings, have also 
contributed to growth in the number of beneficiaries of the scheme. The 
net effect has included a substantial rise in expenditure on the scheme. 
There has also been a shift in composition, with a greater proportion of 
claims arising from separation and divorce, and a smaller proportion from 
the death of a spouse. Average length of claim is estimated at 5 to 6 years 
(Ireland, 2006, p.64). Exits from the scheme arose in roughly equal 
proportions from three main sources: 
 
• Marriage or cohabitation. 
• Earnings exceeding the upper earnings limit. 
• Falling out of the scope of the scheme as the youngest child 
reaches the upper age limit. 
5.6.1  ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 
Issues highlighted by Ireland (DSFA, 2006) included the fact that a scheme 
based around the contingency of lone parenthood created a financial 
incentive favouring that state. In particular, the loss of the contingency 
based payment could be an obstacle to the formation of new relationships 
involving cohabitation or marriage and joint parenting. In any event, rules 
regarding cohabitation are seen as difficult to enforce. The implicit 
rationale behind the structure of the scheme can also be seen as based 
around the “male breadwinner” model, while social developments have 
moved away from this approach over recent decades. The review also 
highlighted wider issues concerning educational disadvantage, childcare and 
financial stability. 
 
The proposals in the review are built around a more direct response to 
needs, and a view that the longer-term welfare of lone parents is best 
served by encouraging and promoting their attachment to the labour 
market. Several options were considered, but the one advocated contains 
the following elements:  
 
• A new means-tested parental allowance for all low income families, 
replacing not only the One-parent Family Payment but also the 
Qualified Adult Addition to other welfare benefits.  
• The Parental Allowance would be payable until the youngest child 
reaches a certain age (e.g., 7 or 8 years). 
 
 
 
17 Beneficiaries aged 66 years or over receive a higher payment. 
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• There would be no conditions up to age 5 years, but if the youngest 
child was aged over 5 years, there would be compulsory 
engagement with a Job Facilitator/Departmental Representative 
who would provide information and advice on education, training 
and employment options. It was envisaged that there would be 
three years of engagement, during which the parent might take up 
employment, but would not be required to do so. 
• Over a higher age (8 years or over), Parental Allowance would 
not be payable and former recipients would be expected to seek 
work or training, with options including Back-to-work 
Allowance, Back-to-education Allowance and Unemployment 
Assistance. For lone parents, the condition of “genuinely seeking 
work” could be met by seeking a part-time job of 19 hours or 
more – which would meet the FIS qualification condition. 
• It was envisaged that the activation process would be positive in 
nature, with mutual obligations. 
• The critical issue of childcare was not dealt with directly as it forms 
part of a wider childcare policy; but it was possible that the 
activation package could include a direct child care allowance. 
• The earnings disregard would be reduced from €146.50 to €120, 
but the taper would be at 40 per cent rather than 50 per cent, 
with a cut-off at €400. 
• There would be transitional arrangements for existing recipients. 
5.6.2  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY 
Key advantages of the approach proposed include the fact that it provides 
support on an even-handed basis to all low income parents. It also does 
away with the need for a cohabitation test, and removes obstacles to 
cohabitation implicit in the current system. The reform is not a  
“piecemeal” one designed  purely with lone parents in mind. It is set in a 
wider context, with a move away from the “male breadwinner” model of 
adult dependancy to a more nuanced support for low income parents. The 
activation proposals are in line with those in the “best practice” countries. 
Childcare is, however, a crucial piece of the jigsaw. A strong childcare 
system is central to the success of the proposed reform, and the phasing of 
its introduction must be linked with the development of childcare access. 
 
A further theme that arises in implementing the proposal is that of 
flexibility versus discretion. As stated, the proposals on activation are 
conditioned purely on the age of the youngest child. But transitions into 
lone parenthood need to be taken into account as well. For example, in the 
case of a separation arising from domestic abuse, even if the youngest child 
is aged above the cut-off, one might regard it as reasonable that such a case 
be treated differently. More generally, circumstances such as the recency of 
separation might be of relevance to the nature and extent of activation that 
could be expected. 
 
Finally, the lesson from best practice countries also includes higher 
levels of income support. We can examine the potential impact of this 
element using SWITCH. A 10 per cent rise in welfare rates would have the 
direct effect of reducing “at risk of poverty” rates among lone parents by 
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about 2 percentage points. A 20 per cent rise in welfare payments would 
see a further 1 percentage point reduction in the risk of poverty at 60 per 
cent of median income. Further analysis of packages involving increased 
welfare payments will be undertaken in Chapter 12, and the implications 
for lone parents will be considered. 
 
 European and worldwide comparisons show that Scandinavian countries 
have the lowest “at risk of poverty” rates for lone parents. This is achieved 
by a system of activation, which promotes employment for all, and 
supports for employment including a comprehensive childcare system, as 
well as education and training. The UK has reduced risks of poverty for 
lone parents substantially, but they still remain at the high end of the EU 
scale. The Netherlands may represent an intermediate possibility. The 
Dutch welfare state embodies elements of the Scandinavian approach (high 
benefits with an emphasis on activation) and “at risk of poverty” rates for 
lone parents have fallen to levels substantially below Irish and UK rates, 
although still somewhat higher than those in Scandinavia. 
5.7 
Conclusions 
 
The structure of income supports and activation for lone parents 
proposed in the Government’s discussion document (Ireland, 2006) is in 
line with best international practice as exemplified by Norway and the 
Netherlands. Much depends, of course, on the implementation of the 
approach. Here we highlight some key points with respect to 
implementation. 
 
The proposals note that “Introduction of an activation requirement is 
predicated on childcare supports being available”. This is a critical issue. 
While childcare structures and policy have been developing in recent years, 
they are still far from the fully developed systems found in Scandinavia. 
There must be a linkage between childcare provision and activation 
provisions, so that what is sought in terms of activation is in line with the 
possibilities afforded by the childcare structures. 
 
Another key decision in the design of the system is whether activation 
or a work-test is to be voluntary or compulsory. In the Scandinavian 
countries activation is typically compulsory, not just for lone parents but 
for all social assistance beneficiaries. This is in the context of an excellent 
and fully fledged childcare system, making it possible for families, including 
lone parent families, to combine work and care. This context does not (yet) 
exist in Ireland. In the UK (where the childcare system is perhaps more 
developed than in Ireland, though less so than in Scandinavia) the New 
Deal for Lone Parents operates on the basis of voluntary participation. 
New Zealand has moved away from a compulsory work test towards a 
more flexible system of “enhanced case management”. Again, this contrast 
suggests that the extent of compulsion needs to be linked to the extent of 
childcare provision. 
 
The government’s proposals suggest that payment of a Parental 
Allowance would be conditional on what the UK terms “work-focused 
interviews” when the youngest child reached the age of 5 years, and would 
cease when the child reached the age of 7 or 8 years. This contrasts with 
the current situation, in which payment of OFP continues until the child 
reaches the age of 18 years, but can continue beyond that if the child is in 
full-time education. While the proposals leave some room for debate as to 
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the precise age cut offs involved, it is clear from international comparisons 
that the current situation is a highly unusual one. 
 
The outcome of implementing proposals along these lines also depends 
on how the new system is perceived. To what extent is it seen as designed 
to promote the welfare of lone parents, offering advice and support in 
finding suitable employment, education, training and childcare? In addition, 
to what extent is it seen as a measure curtailing the benefits of lone parents, 
aimed at savings on welfare expenditure rather than the welfare of parents? 
Both design and implementation must aim to achieve, in reality and in 
perception, the former outcome to a much greater extent than the latter. In 
this context a substantial impact on employment rates and on risks of 
poverty can be achieved. 
 
6. CHILDREN 
We begin by reviewing Irish goals relating to child poverty, and consider 
how they relate to recent developments in UK policy (Section 2). We then 
draw on international comparisons to situate Irish policy and performance 
in a wider setting (Section 3). In particular we focus on what Ireland may 
have to learn from countries representing “best practice” in minimising 
child poverty. This is in line with the EU’s approach to social policy 
development, which under its “open method of coordination” lays great 
emphasis on countries comparing their performance with best practice in 
the social policy area. 
6.1 
Introduction 
 
 Ireland’s National Anti-Poverty Strategy introduced a specific target for 
the reduction of child poverty in 2002. (Ireland, 2002). The strategy 
focused on a reduction in the number of children who are “consistently 
poor” i.e., live in households with incomes below 60 per cent of the 
median (middle-ranking) income adjusted for family size and composition 
and are in households which are experiencing “basic deprivation”. In 
Building an Inclusive Society, (Ireland, 2002) the target for reduction of child 
poverty was set as follows:  
6.2 
Child Poverty 
Targets: Irish 
and UK 
Experience 
 
Over the period to 2007, the Strategy will aim at reducing 
the numbers of children who are ‘consistently poor’ below 2 
per cent, and, if possible, eliminating consistent poverty, 
under the current definition of consistent poverty18. (Ireland, 
2002, p.14). 
 
This was the focus of a special initiative to “End Child Poverty” 
initiated under the Sustaining Progress partnership agreement, and continued 
as an element of the current partnership, Towards 2016.  
 
The most recent National Action Plan for Social Inclusion, 2007-2016 
(Ireland, 2007) does not contain a specific target for consistent poverty 
relating to children. Instead, there are three specific goals relating to 
educational outcomes, and a commitment to maintain total child income 
supports at 33 to 35 per cent of the minimum adult payment rate, and to 
review child income supports aimed at assisting children in families on low 
income. However, the overall goal is now:  
58 
 
 
 
 
18 The “current definition” refers to the use of an 8-item index, with lack of any one item 
indicating basic deprivation, and an income cut-off of 60 per cent of median income per 
adult equivalent. 
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To reduce the number of those experiencing consistent 
poverty to between 2 per cent and 4 per cent by 2012, with 
the aim of eliminating consistent poverty by 2016, under the 
revised definition. (Ireland, 2007, p.13.) 
 
In order to achieve this goal, the consistent poverty rate must fall for all 
groups, including children. The most recent EU-SILC indicates that the 
consistent poverty rate is just under 7 per cent overall, but about 11 per 
cent for children. 
 
Identification of “basic deprivation” is explored in Maître, Nolan and 
Whelan (2006), who find that, in the context of a rapidly changing society, 
what counts as “basic deprivation” may not be captured by a fixed set of 
indicators but require that the set of indicators be changed over time. Thus, 
the deprivation element of the original “consistent poverty” measure was 
based on having to do without at least one item from a set of 8 indicators 
(measured in the Living in Ireland Surveys). With changes in living 
standards, and a new data source (the CSO’s EU Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions – EU-SILC), a new measurement approach was 
proposed by Maître et al. It involves a total of 11 indicators (including 
some, but not all of the original 8) and a household is regarded as deprived 
if lacking 2 or more of these. This approach has been officially adopted in 
the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (Ireland, 2007). 
 
The UK target for child poverty follows the tiered approach pioneered 
by Nolan (1999, 2000). Thus, the UK target is summarised by the 
Department of Work and Pensions (2003) as follows: 
 
Our new measure of child poverty will consist of: 
Absolute low income – to measure whether the poorest 
families are seeing their incomes rise in real terms. 
Relative low income – to measure whether the poorest 
families are keeping pace with the growth of incomes in the 
economy as a whole. 
Material deprivation and low income combined – to 
provide a wider measure of people’s living standards. 
Using this measure, poverty is falling when all three indicators 
are moving in the right direction. 
(Department of Work and Pensions, 2003, Executive 
Summary.) 
 
The rationale for the inclusion of a relative income component in the 
poverty measure has been succinctly stated by the UK authorities: 
 
Measures of relative low income are widely used in industrial 
nations, and this is the most widely watched indicator in the 
European Union. EU agreements entered into at Lisbon (2000) 
and Laeken (2002) mean that relative low income is a central 
yardstick in measuring the success of our drive to increase social 
cohesion. Relative income measures are important because when 
children fall too far behind the typical family, they will not be able 
to take a full part in the activities that social inclusion demands. So 
to tackle social exclusion it is essential that as well as increasing 
incomes, we also help the poorest children narrow the gap with the 
rest of society as the nation overall grows richer. 
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(Department of Work and Pensions, 2003, paragraphs 32 to 34.) 
 
In this context, it is to international comparisons of rates of child 
poverty based on relative poverty lines (or the EU’s “at risk of poverty” 
measure) that we now turn. 
 
 Table 6.1 presents data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study, 
which harmonises microdata for a wide range of countries in order to 
permit cross-country comparisons of income distribution and poverty 
statistics.  
6.3  
An 
International 
Perspective 
on Child 
Poverty 
Table 6.1: Incidence of Children “At Risk of Poverty”, Circa 2000, 
Luxembourg Income Study  
 
 
Country 
(2000 Unless Otherwise 
Stated) 
 
50 Per Cent of Median 
Income Per Adult  
Equivalent 
 
60 Per Cent of Median 
Income Per Adult  
Equivalent 
Norway  3.4 7.5 
Finland  2.8 8.0 
Denmark  2.7 8.9 
Sweden  4.2 9.2 
Netherlands (1999) 6.3 12.2 
Slovenia (1999) 6.9 12.3 
Belgium  6.7 12.8 
Germany  9.0 14.2 
Switzerland  8.9 15.0 
Austria  7.8 15.9 
France  7.9 15.9 
Taiwan 8.0 16.1 
Hungary (1999) 8.8 16.9 
Luxembourg  9.1 18.4 
Greece  12.7 18.7 
Estonia   13.6 20.1 
Ireland  15.8 21.8 
Australia (2001) 14.9 23.0 
Canada  15.2 23.6 
Spain  16.0 24.0 
Poland (1999) 18.5 26.7 
United Kingdom (1999) 17.0 28.0 
Israel (2001) 18.0 28.5 
Russia 22.1 28.8 
United States  22.3 30.2 
Mexico   26.9 
 
34.8 
  
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Key Figures accessed at www.lisproject.org,  
10 May 2007. 
 
What might be termed English-speaking countries19 are clustered 
towards the higher end of the child poverty risk spectrum. Six of the ten 
countries with the highest risks of child poverty can be regarded as English 
speaking; and of the other four countries in that ten, three are at much 
 
 
19 More precisely, countries in which English is the primary language of a majority of the 
population. 
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lower levels of income per head. Ireland and Australia are the English-
speaking countries with the lowest risks of child poverty at around 15-16 
per cent below the 50 per cent of median income cut-off, and 22-23 per 
cent below the 60 per cent line. These levels are substantially above not 
only those in the Scandinavian countries, but also those obtaining in most 
of the Continental European countries. Similar findings were obtained by 
UNICEF (2005). Micklewright (2004) extends this analysis and finds that 
the English-speaking countries also perform poorly on other indicators of 
child welfare. 
 
More detailed figures, over a longer time span, are available from 
Eurostat’s database. Table 6.2 shows risks of child poverty (at the 60 per 
cent of median income cut-off) for EU-15 countries from 1995 to 2005. 
The countries are ranked with lowest poverty risk (in 2005) at the top and 
highest poverty risk at the bottom. The Scandinavian countries have the 
lowest risks of child poverty on a consistent basis over this period. The risk 
in Ireland has fallen over time, but has always been at the high end of the 
international spectrum along with countries such as the UK, Spain and 
Portugal.  
Table 6.2: “At Risk of Poverty” Rate for Children (Under 16 Years) for EU countries, 1995 to 
2005 
 Cut-off point: 60 Per Cent of Median Equivalised Income after Social Transfers 
 Countries Ranked from Lowest Risk of Poverty for Children to Highest, 2005 
 
            
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sweden   7  7  7 10  11 8 
Norway         8 8 9 
Denmark 6  6  7  7  9 9 10 
Finland  5 5 5 7 6 9 10 10 10 10 
Germany 18 15 15 13 13 13 14    13 
France 16 16 16 16 17 18 16 16 15 14 14 
Austria 16 18 15 15 14 12 13  16 15 15 
Netherlands 13 14 13 14 14 17 17 17 18  16 
Belgium 16 15 14 13 12 11 12  16 17 19 
Greece 18 19 18 17 17 19 18  21 20 19 
Luxembourg  16 14 16 20 19 18 18  15 19 20 
Ireland 26 27 25 23 21 22 26  20 22 22 
United Kingdom 28 25 27 29 29 27 23 23 22  22 
Spain 24 23 26 24 25 25 26 21 19 24 24 
Italy 24 24 23 21 22 25 25   25 24 
Portugal 26 23 25 26 26 26 27   23 24 
New Member States       19 20 20 22 24 
            
 
Interestingly, no country has achieved a substantially lower rate of child 
poverty than of overall poverty. On the other hand, there are two countries 
with quite low overall poverty risks (Netherlands and Luxembourg) which 
have significantly higher child poverty risks. This suggests that there may 
be quite severe constraints on the scope for a policy which targets children, 
with the aim of reducing the child poverty rate below the overall poverty 
rate. 
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Table 6.3 shows that the pattern of risk identified above is maintained 
when the focus shifts to poverty risk at the 50 per cent of median income 
cut-off. 
Table 6.3: “At Risk of Poverty” Rates for Children (Under 16 Years) at 50 
Per Cent of Median Income, EU Countries, 2005 
 
Country 
 
“At Risk of Poverty” Rate (%) 
Finland 3 
Sweden 4 
Denmark 5 
Norway 5 
Austria 6 
France 6 
Germany 7 
Netherlands 9 
Luxembourg  10 
Belgium 11 
Greece 12 
United Kingdom 13 
Ireland 14 
Italy 16 
Portugal 16 
Spain 16 
New Member States 17 
 
 
 What policy mix offers the best prospects for tackling child poverty? We 
summarise our recent review of these issues (Callan et al., 2006) and then 
consider the implications of a recent OECD paper (Whiteford and Adema, 
2007) focusing on the same issue. 
6.4 
Tackling 
Child Poverty 
 
The lowest rates of child poverty and of overall poverty shown in Table 
6.2 are for the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland and Sweden among 
the EU countries, and Norway. The logic of the “best practice” approach 
dictates that special attention should be paid to these countries in order to 
understand how they have achieved low rates of child poverty and general 
poverty, and what lessons may be learned from their experience. This is all 
the more so because the child poverty outcomes for children achieved in 
these countries represent “best practice” not just within the EU but in 
global terms.  
 
We begin by considering how income support paid by the state in 
respect of children varies across countries: clearly this has the potential to 
affect child poverty outcomes. Child income supports can vary according 
to the age and number of the children concerned, and may also depend on 
whether one or two parents are present in the household, and on the 
labour force status and income of the parent(s). Bradshaw and Finch 
(2002) examine child income support packages for a wide range of family 
types and labour market/income situations. They choose a subset of these 
cases, giving greater weight to those occurring more commonly. While this 
does not provide a fully representative picture of families in any one 
country, this approach provides a standardised framework with which to 
assess the nature of the income support packages across countries. Their 
analysis shows that the package of cash income supports offered in Ireland, 
as of 2001, was among the most generous across countries. Ireland ranked 
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third in terms of the value of the cash package of income supports for 
children – mainly child benefit and Qualified Child Increases. The total 
value of the package, averaged over a wide range of family situations, was 
just over 13 per cent of the average industrial wage, compared with 15 per 
cent for the country with the most generous package. The value of the 
package in most countries – including the four Scandinavian countries – 
was between 5 and 10 per cent of the average wage.  
 
On the other hand, the value of Ireland’s overall child support package, 
taking into account housing benefits and provision of non-cash services 
such as subsidised childcare, was towards the lower end of the international 
spectrum in 2001. Increases in child benefit since then, and the 
introduction of the Early Childcare Subsidy will have boosted Ireland’s 
overall child support package, and its position in the country rankings of 
child supports. Because this support is delivered through a cash 
mechanism, while other countries typically use non-cash mechanisms for 
childcare, Ireland’s position in the ranking of cash income supports will be 
further enhanced, while its low ranking in terms of directly provided 
services will remain unchanged. 
 
It is striking that the four Scandinavian countries, which have the lowest 
child poverty rates, had child income support packages of between 6 and 
10 per cent, in the middle of the international ranking. Thus, their 
exceptional performance in terms of reducing child poverty is not due to 
exceptionally high child income supports. Indeed, both Ireland and the UK 
have higher valued cash supports – but as we have seen, child poverty rates 
in Ireland and the UK are close to the highest in the EU, while those in the 
Scandinavian countries are among the lowest. 
 
The clear message from these international comparisons is that, to date, 
the most effective policy regimes in countering both child poverty and 
general poverty have been those of the Scandinavian countries. 
Furthermore, the success in countering child poverty is not due to 
especially high child income support payments, but to the more general 
income support regime and to the extent to which the welfare state more 
broadly reconciles equity and efficiency goals and underpins a high 
employment rate. 
 
However, welfare state expenditures have to be financed. If Ireland, like 
other English-speaking countries, is unwilling to finance expenditure at the 
levels seen in Scandinavian countries, then the question arises as to what 
can be achieved with a more targeted approach to the reduction of child 
poverty. In the following section, therefore, we concentrate on the recent 
evolution of policy in Ireland and in other English speaking countries, 
which relates to the development of more targeted child income supports. 
It must be remembered, however, that these supports operate in an 
environment where child poverty is substantially higher than in the 
Scandinavian countries. 
 
Whiteford and Adema (2007), in a broad ranging analysis of the 
effectiveness of the policy mix in different countries, identify the 
effectiveness of the tax and benefit system with the proportion of the pre-
transfer poverty risk that is eliminated by transfers. Table 6.4 summarises 
the main results. It can be seen that, for households with children, the three 
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countries with the most effective systems are Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden. 
Table 6.4: Effect of Tax and Benefit Systems on Child Poverty, OECD 
Countries, 2000 
 
 
Country 
 
Reduction in Pre-Transfer Poverty Risk for Households 
with Children 
 
 Percentage Reduction 
Denmark 80 
Finland 77 
Sweden 77 
Belgium 75 
France 73 
Norway 72 
Czech Republic 68 
Australia 58 
Germany 47 
Netherlands 46 
UK 46 
New Zealand 44 
Canada 37 
Ireland 35 
US 19 
Portugal 3 
Italy 2 
Switzerland -11 
Japan -20 
OECD Average 40 
  
Source: Whiteford and Adema (2007), Table 7. 
 
Whiteford and Adema (2007) then calculate the potential for reduction 
in poverty risk from an improvement in the effectiveness of tax/transfer 
systems in other countries. The results of this calculation are set out in 
Table 6.5. Countries are ranked by the scope for tax-benefit policy to yield 
further reductions in the risk of child poverty. The extent to which further 
reductions could be attained is defined by Whiteford and Adema by 
reference to the effectiveness not of the best performing tax/transfer 
system, but of the third best system. In the case of child poverty, this is the 
Swedish system, which lifts out of poverty 77 per cent of those whose pre-
transfer income would leave them “at risk of poverty”. 
 
The country with the greatest scope for further reduction in poverty 
through tax-benefit policy is the USA, where a high pre-transfer poverty 
count coexists with a tax-benefit system which lifts less than 1 in 5 of the 
pre-transfer poor out of poverty. Other countries with relatively high scope 
for reductions in poverty through tax-benefit policy include: 
 
• Italy, Portugal and Japan, where pre-transfer poverty 
gaps are moderate but the tax-transfer systems have 
little impact on poverty. 
• Ireland and the UK, where tax-transfer systems have 
somewhat greater impact on poverty, but pre-
transfer poverty counts are higher. 
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Table 6.5: Actual Reduction in Poverty from Tax-Transfer System and Possible 
Further Impact if Tax-Transfer System Matched “Best Practice” 
Effectiveness 
  
Pre- 
Transfer
 
Post- 
Transfer
 
Extent of Further Reduction 
Possible if Transfers Match 
“Best Practice” 
Effectiveness 
 
 
Level Achievable if 
Transfers Match  
“Best Practice”  
Effectiveness 
 % % % Point Reduction % 
 
USA 26.6 21.7 15.7 6.0 
Italy 15.9 15.7 12.1 3.6 
Portugal 16.4 15.6 11.9 3.7 
Japan 12.9 14.3 11.4 2.9 
Ireland 24.9 15.7 10.1 5.6 
United Kingdom 29.1 16.2 9.7 6.5 
Canada 21.1 13.6 8.9 4.7 
New Zealand 28.7 14.6 8.2 6.4 
Germany 19.9 10.9 6.4 4.5 
Australia 26.6 11.6 5.6 6.0 
Netherlands 16.1 9.0 5.4 3.6 
Switzerland 7.8 6.8 5.1 1.7 
Czech Republic 21.4 7.2 2.4 4.8 
France 27.7 7.3 1.1 6.2 
Norway 11.8 3.6 1.0 2.6 
Belgium 14.9 4.1 0.8 3.3 
Sweden 16.1 3.6 0.0 3.6 
Finland 16.7 3.4 0.0 3.4 
Denmark 11.8 2.4 0.0 2.4 
OECD 20.5 12.1 7.8 4.3 
 
Source: Whiteford and Adema (2007), Table 9. 
  
In a parallel exercise, Whiteford and Adema explore the potential impact 
of: 
• a reduction in the proportion of jobless households; 
and 
• an increase in the proportion of two-earner couples. 
 
with each country’s rate of jobless households being decreased (and of two 
earner couples increased) to the level of the country with the third highest 
employment rate (Portugal). Ireland is again one of the countries where the 
potential impact of such a change is greatest. Combining these two 
elements, the household poverty rate could be reduced by about 6 
percentage points, similar to the potential impact of a more effective tax-
benefit system. 
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 Identifying the impact of changes in child income support policies on the 
risk of income poverty facing children requires more than a simple 
comparison of changes over time. We need to hold constant the 
population, and all policies other than child income support. Callan et al. 
(2006) do this using SWITCH, the ESRI tax benefit model. Their analysis 
suggests that changes in child income supports (including the sharp 
increase in Child Benefit in 2001/2 and the Early Childcare Supplement in 
2006) led to a reduction of 4.2 percentage points in the incidence of  “at 
risk of poverty” (using the 60 per cent median cut-off) for children. This 
represents a fall of one-fifth in the head count measure. The “poverty 
gap” measure which takes account of the depth of income poverty for 
those experiencing it falls rather more, by about one-third, because it also 
takes into account those who are brought closer to but not above the 
poverty threshold. 
6.5  
Potential 
Developments 
to Counter 
Child Poverty 
 
One way of achieving greater “targeting” with child benefit would be to 
increase it while making the payment taxable. This would give a full 
payment to those with lowest incomes, a payment reduced by 20 per cent 
for those on the standard rate of tax, and reduced by 42 per cent for those 
on the top rate of tax. This option was debated during the 1990s, and 
would have had much to recommend it. At a time when the basic child 
benefit payment was being increased so rapidly, all those with children 
would have seen their Child Benefit increase despite its being made taxable, 
but there would have been larger net increases for those on lower incomes. 
This approach was not adopted, instead universal child benefit was 
increased but without making it taxable (while CDAs were frozen as we 
have seen). The taxable status of child benefit could have been changed 
more readily at the same time as substantial increases in payment levels 
were introduced. In the absence of substantial further increases in child 
benefit, making the payment taxable would require the “clawing back” of 
some of the net benefit for high earners. Making the payment taxable 
would also affect marginal tax rates and how they change as those with 
children move into the tax net or from the standard to the higher tax band. 
None the less, it remains a way of introducing some element of targeting to 
the payment without affecting its essential structure and the way it is paid.  
A CHILD BENEFIT SUPPLEMENT 
The possibility of a “second tier” child income support, which would be 
income-tested, but unrelated to employment status, has been under 
consideration for some time. (See, for example, Ireland, 2004). Key factors 
here include the desire to have an income-tested supplement, so as to 
maximise the impact on child poverty for a given level of resources; a 
seamless transition between child income support when out of work and 
when in employment, in order to facilitate those wishing to take up 
employment; and the low rate of take-up of Family Income Supplement 
(FIS), the existing in-work benefit for families with children. 
 
What might such a payment look like? One possibility is that it could 
take the form of “…a tapered, employment-neutral Child Benefit 
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Supplement”.20 This is the form of unification which is examined here. 
Other possible designs are not excluded, but the non-categorical, income-
tested Child Benefit Supplement (CBS) provides a clear starting point and 
benchmark against which other options can be compared. 
 
Callan et al. (2006) sketch what such a supplement (CBS) might look 
like, its likely cost and its potential impact on the risk of poverty and on 
financial incentives to take up employment, Here we update and extend 
that analysis. Our analysis is based on SWITCH, the tax benefit model, 
which contains all the relevant information and can, therefore, calculate 
each family’s entitlement accurately. Implicit in the analysis is that each 
family has the same income for each week of the year. Difficulties arising 
from problems of administration and take-up of such a benefit are 
discussed later. 
 
Currently, Child Benefit is paid in respect of all children under the age 
of 16 years, as well as 17 and 18 year olds who are in full-time education. 
Qualified Child Increases are paid to recipients of most welfare payments 
in respect of children under the age of 18 years, with an extension (in most 
cases) to age 22 years on production of evidence that the child/young adult 
is in full-time education. In what follows, our analysis assumes that 
payment of Child Benefit Supplement is made to all children aged up to 16 
years, and to all those in full-time education under the age of 22 years.21 
Currently, Child Benefit and FIS are regarded as “family benefits” under 
EU regulations, and are, therefore, payable to parents living in Ireland with 
children living in another EU state. This is not the case with Qualified 
Child Increases for social welfare payments which are not themselves 
classed as family benefits. A new Child Benefit Supplement seems likely to 
be classified as a family benefit, which would entail payments to persons 
with children living outside the state. The additional cost cannot be 
estimated on the basis of household survey data used here. 
 
There are three key parameters to be set for a Child Benefit Supplement: 
 
• the weekly or monthly rate of payment for CBS; 
• the income level up to which a full payment is made; 
• the rate of withdrawal (taper, “phase-out”) applied to the benefit as 
income rises above that limit. 
 
We set the level of the Supplement at a rate which bridges the gap 
between current child income supports and the official target for the total 
child income support package i.e., 33-34 per cent of the main social welfare 
payment rate. We translate this in cash terms into €24.50 per week – a little 
above the current rate of Qualified Child Increase. We also consider a 
higher level of payment, designed to bridge the gap between child benefit 
and 33 per cent of the “at risk of poverty” threshold22 at 60 per cent of 
 
 
20 The quote is from Combat Poverty Agency (2005). 
21 The aggregate cost and impact would vary slightly if the payment were made in respect 
of 17 and 18 year olds not in full-time education; while this is a rather small set, they are 
disproportionately located in low income households. 
22 This could be thought of as the “child addition to the “at risk of poverty” threshold”.  
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median income. This translates in cash terms to about €48 per week, more 
than double the level of the current Qualified Child Increase payments. All 
qualified child addition rates are set to zero, as the logic of the approach is 
that these are replaced by the CBS. 
 
The situation with respect to replacement of FIS is not so 
straightforward. A key feature of FIS is that it can provide a very high level 
of support for those in employment at low incomes – even if there is only 
one child in the family. The level of additional support in respect of second 
and higher order children was, for many years, similar to the level of the 
Qualified Child Increase (previously known as Child Dependant 
Additions). There have been very marked changes in policy in this area in 
recent years. Between 2005 and 2007, the “per child” addition implied by 
the FIS thresholds rose from about €15 per child (for the 2nd and 3rd 
children) to over €40 per week – well above the €22 per week rate of 
Qualified Child Increases. The rise for higher order children  was even 
more striking, with payments of between to €55 to €60 per week for each 
of the next four children in a family. It is not possible for a fixed, per-child 
payment such as a Child Benefit Supplement to replicate this structure; and 
even the addition of a “per family” element to the CBS (equivalent to a 
higher rate for the first child in the family) would not fully replicate the 
structure of support provided by FIS. 
  
This point was recognised in the analysis of the Tax and Welfare 
Working Group (1996). The approach adopted there was to allow for a 
“residual” FIS scheme to provide this form of income support. The 
success of a Child Benefit Supplement (CBS or other such scheme in 
“migrating” low income working families off FIS could then be gauged by 
the reduction in the numbers of FIS recipients and FIS expenditure. Some 
of the schemes examined by the working group resulted in the “residual” 
FIS scheme becoming very small; but, depending on the design of the 
scheme and the levels of payment, FIS could remain a significant feature of 
the overall package. Where any given package lies on this continuum is a 
matter for empirical investigation, using the simulation techniques 
employed here.23  For a package involving a Child Benefit Supplement rate 
of €24.50 per week, we report results for both cases – with FIS abolished, 
and with FIS retained – in order to clarify what is at issue. 
 
Table 6.6 summarises the cost of the alternatives examined, and their 
direct or “first round” impact (i.e., before any adjustments to behaviour, 
which may be induced by changes in the budget constraints caused by the 
policy change) on risks of poverty at the 60 per cent of median income cut-
off. A CBS set at €24.50 per week, with an income limit of about €500 per 
week and a withdrawal rate of 20 per cent is found to cost around €60 
 
 
23 The Child Benefit Supplement examined here is designed primarily to replace Qualified 
Child Increases. It will also replace some element of FIS payments, with the exact extent 
depending on the parameters of the scheme. An example using round numbers may help 
to clarify. If the FIS income limit for a one child family were €400 per week, and the 
family’s income was €300 per week, then the FIS entitlement would be €60 per week. 
Now suppose a Child Benefit Supplement of €20 per week is introduced. The FIS 
entitlement falls to €48 per week, a reduction of €12 per week, or 60 per cent of the 
amount of the Child Benefit Supplement. 
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million if FIS is abolished, or €120 million if FIS is retained for those still 
eligible after payment of the supplement. The direct impact is to reduce the 
risk of poverty overall by about 1 percentage point, and of child poverty by 
about 2 percentage points. 
Table 6.6: Cost and Anti-Poverty Impact of Alternative Implementations of a 
Child  Benefit Supplement (Baseline: 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Cost 
€m Per Annum
 
Percentage Point 
Reduction in Child 
Poverty 
 
Percentage Point 
Reduction in Overall 
Poverty 
CBS €24.50, FIS abolished 63 1.9 0.8 
CBS €24.50, FIS retained 120 2.3 1.0 
CBS €48, FIS abolished 619 5.1 1.9 
CBS €48, FIS retained 
 
657 5.2 2.0 
Source: SWITCH. 
 
Table 6.7 examines the distributional impact of introducing a Child 
Benefit Supplement (at €24.50 per week) and abolishing FIS. It can be seen 
that there are significant numbers of losers – about 50,000 families in the 
lower half of the income distribution. These are mainly in deciles 4 and 5 – 
above the poverty line, but still a focus of interest for policy in terms of 
“making work pay”. Typical losses are of the order of €25 to €30 per week. 
In our overall packages in Chapter 12, we therefore allow for a 
continuation of the FIS scheme, but with extra resources for Child Benefit 
Supplement helping to “float” more recipients off FIS. 
Table 6.7: Distributional Impact of a Child Benefit Supplement (€24.50) 
and Abolition of FIS 
 
Number of Cases (000s) 
 
Loss > 
€0.50 pw 
 
No 
Change 
 
Gain > 
€0.50 pw 
 
Total 
Bottom 4 236 22 263 
2nd 4 145 31 180 
3rd 8 193 20 221 
4th 18 140 64 221 
5th 14 188 19 222 
6th 4 215 3 221 
7th 3 217 1 221 
8th 1 220 0 221 
9th 1 221 0 222 
Top 0 222 0 222 
All 57 1,998 159 2,214 
 
 
The application of substantially greater resources through the Child 
Benefit Supplement can have a greater impact on poverty risk. A Child 
Benefit Supplement paid at the rate of €48 per week – the amount required 
to make the total child income support package correspond to the “child 
addition to the poverty threshold” – has a direct impact on overall poverty 
of about 2 per cent, and reduces the risk of child poverty by about 5 
percentage points. The cost is correspondingly higher at around €660 
million if FIS is retained. At this level of payment about half of FIS 
recipients would have been “floated off” the scheme by the supplement. 
 
How is this improvement in poverty reduction impact achieved? One 
difference is that as a purely income-related supplement, Child Benefit 
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Supplement is payable to all those with low incomes. Family Income 
Supplement, on the other hand, is not payable to those who are self-
employed, including farmers. While there can be considerable diversity in 
this low income group, it is likely to include significant numbers who are 
falling below relative income thresholds, but who may not be in “consistent 
poverty”.  
 
A further key difference with respect to the existing structure is that it is 
assumed that the new Child Benefit Supplement is paid to all those who 
qualify, and only to those who qualify. Thus, it is assumed that the Child 
Benefit Supplement does not experience the problems with take-up which 
have been associated with schemes such as the Family Income Supplement. 
On the other hand, there is also an implicit assumption that the new 
benefit will be given only to those who are entitled to receive it. The UK 
experience with tax credits suggests that this is not easily achieved. The 
House of Commons Treasury Committee (2006) noted that about one-
third of all tax credit awards were overpaid, at an average cost per case of 
about UK£1,000. 
 
A useful point of comparison can be provided by examining what the 
existing income support structure would achieve, if perfect take-up of 
benefit could be guaranteed. Callan et al. (2006) found  that moving from 
low take up to full take up of FIS would lead to a 3 percentage point 
reduction in the key “at risk of poverty” indicator. Thus, while CBS 
involves more than just changes in take-up, a key element of its impact in 
poverty reduction comes from the assumed full take-up. Achieving full 
take-up, and avoiding overpayments and reclaiming of payment, as in the 
UK experience, would be vital to the success of the scheme. 
 
The balance of advantage between FIS and CBS as instruments of child 
income support policy may have changed in recent years, with changes in 
the structure of the FIS scheme on offer, and possible changes in terms of 
take-up of the benefit. New empirical data regarding non-take-up of FIS 
are envisaged and due to take place during 2008. Results from this new 
source of information will be of interest. The re-basing of the SWITCH 
model to use 2005 SILC data will also permit some new insights into levels 
of take up, and the potential impact of increased take-up. The numbers of 
persons eligible for FIS can be expected to have increased because of 
changes in the income limits; and the size of the SILC sample is also bigger 
than that of the Living in Ireland Survey.24 More fundamentally, however, 
there are differences in the focus of the current FIS scheme and the CBS 
structure, in that the FIS is geared not only towards support of incomes for 
low income working families, but also towards ensuring a greater financial 
incentive to work. In this context, the issue of whether the introduction of 
a CBS is designed to replace FIS completely, or only partly substitute for 
FIS, is a critical one. 
 
 
 
 
24 It must be noted, however, that the focus of the EU-SILC is on annual incomes, and as 
a result data on current FIS receipts are not included; the analysis which can be undertaken 
regarding take-up is restricted as a result. 
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 There are strong links between child poverty and the overall “at risk of 
poverty”. The countries with the best record on the reduction of child 
poverty – the Scandinavian countries – also tend to have the lowest rates of 
overall poverty. The “best practice” approach to improving EU 
performance in this area suggests close attention should be given to the 
policies and structures of the best-performing countries. The logic of the 
approach is, therefore, that other countries should compare their 
approaches with those of the Scandinavian countries – which are the best 
performers in this regard not only in Europe but in global terms. 
6.6 
Conclusions 
 
By contrast, much of the debate on child poverty has focused on 
restructuring income-tested income support for families with children, with 
attention centering on recent initiatives in English-speaking countries. 
While some reductions in poverty have been achieved by these initiatives, it 
is clear that rates of child poverty in the English speaking countries remain 
above those in most European countries, and well above Scandinavian 
levels. 
 
This approach is associated with a tendency to view child poverty as a 
problem to be dealt with, in the main, through child income support. The 
problem with this is that children are not poor on their own – they have a 
parent or parents living in poverty with them. So avoidance of poverty 
requires that parents have adequate incomes too. As Sutherland (2005) puts 
it: 
 
One feature of the “successful” countries in Europe is that 
relatively large parts of their benefit systems are not child-
contingent but nevertheless succeed in keeping children as 
well as adults out of poverty. Sutherland (2005, p. 32). 
 
Tackling child poverty requires a strategy that takes a broad view of 
welfare income supports, and “activist” measures to increase participation 
in employment. Solutions lie not with welfare alone, or employment alone, 
but a combination of both. 
 
7. OLDER PEOPLE: 
POVERTY RISKS AND 
PENSIONS POLICY 
The National Pensions Policy Initiative (NPPI) recommended a target 
replacement income of 50 per cent of pre-retirement income before tax, 
and an overriding minimum income of 34 per cent of gross average 
industrial earnings (GAIE). The Pensions Board (2005), in its National 
Pensions Review, confirmed these targets.25 However, a number of Board 
members 
7.1 
Introduction 
 
…believe that a higher minimum pension target is needed to 
ensure that pensioners without supplementary pensions have 
an adequate income by reference to household incomes 
generally. Other board members also support an increase in 
the basic pension target for reasons of greater social equity. 
 
Here we revisit these issues, and are able to analyse the trade-off 
between the costs of state pensions, the cost of state support for private 
pensions and the overall impact on poverty and the distribution of income. 
 
Our perspective includes both the minimum income guaranteed through 
the state’s old age pension and pensions provided by employers (including 
the state and public authorities as employers). We also take account of 
privately organised pensions unrelated to the state or to employers. We 
begin (Section 7.2) by reviewing evidence on the risks of poverty faced by 
older people. As well as Irish evidence, we draw on a recent review of EU 
experience, which points to links between differences in pension systems 
and differences in poverty risk. Section 7.3 then examines more closely the 
impact of changes in state pension payment rates between 2000, when “at 
risk of poverty” rates for older people were very high, and 2006, by which 
time “at risk of poverty” rates for older people were much lower, and close 
to the average. In this section we use the SWITCH model to isolate that 
part of the reduction in poverty risk due to the changes in payment rates. 
 
The following sections look at possible policy options for the future. 
Section 7.4 considers a targeted policy change, based on the fact that “at 
risk of poverty” rates are particularly high for an older person living on his 
or her own. A new supplement, which we call “Living Alone Supplement”, 
 
25 The report notes that the  representative of the Department of Finance did not agree to 
this target. 
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was incorporated into the model and the impact of implementing such a 
payment is examined. 
 
Section 7.5 looks at options related to the income tax treatment of 
pension contributions. At present, all contributions – whether by an 
employer, the individual himself or herself, the state as employer, or made 
to a private pension plan – are allowable against income tax at an 
individual’s marginal rate of tax.26 We estimate the total size and 
distributional impact of this tax expenditure. We then consider an 
illustrative package involving a “standardisation” of the tax relief on 
pensions – allowing it only at the standard rate of tax, as was done with 
mortgage interest relief and relief on health insurance premia. This would 
generate a rise in income tax revenue which could be used in many ways. 
For simplicity, we examine first of all a flat rate increase in social welfare 
pensions (including all of the rates for those over 66 years outside the main 
pension schemes). We then estimate the net cost and distributive effect of 
the package, and its likely “first round” impact on the “at risk of poverty” 
measure. The final section draws together the main findings. 
 
 
7.2.1 POVERTY RISKS AMONG OLDER PEOPLE: TRENDS, 
LEVELS AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES IN IRELAND 7.2  
Poverty Risks 
Among Older 
People 
Table 7.1 shows how “at risk of poverty” rates have evolved over the past 
ten years, drawing on results from the Living in Ireland Survey (1994 up to 
2001) and in more recent years, the EU Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). 
Table 7.1: “At Risk of Poverty” Measure for Older People and for All 
Persons, Ireland, Selected Years, 1994-2005 
  
Data Source 
 
Percentage of 
Older People “At 
Risk of Poverty”
 
Percentage of  
All Persons  
”At Risk of Poverty” 
1994 LII 5.9 15.6 
1997 LII 24.2 18.2 
2000 LII 38.4 20.9 
2001 LII 44.1 21.9 
    
2003 CSO EU-SILC 29.8 19.7 
2004 CSO EU-SILC 27.1 19.4 
2005 CSO EU-SILC 20.1 18.5 
2006 CSO EU-SILC 13.6 17.0 
Note: While the income definitions in the two data sources (the Living in Ireland Survey up 
to 2001 and the EU-SILC from 2003 onwards) are very similar, there is a difference 
which particularly affects older people. Non-cash benefits such as free electricity, gas 
and a TV licence are not included as part of disposable income in the Living in 
Ireland survey, but are included with cash incomes in the  EU-SILC measure of 
disposable income. 
 
 
26 The amount allowed is subject to a limit in terms of the proportion of income that can 
qualify. 
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“At risk of poverty” rates were high for older people in the 1980s, but 
fell to 6 per cent by 1994 – well below the corresponding risk for all 
persons. This risk for older people rose sharply in the following years, 
rising to almost 1 in 4 by 1997, and to 44 per cent by 2001. By this time the 
risk was more than double that for all persons. It is not yet clear how much 
of the decline from 44 per cent (Living in Ireland, 2001) to 30 per cent 
(EU-SILC, 2003) is due to the difference in income definitions between the 
surveys (see note to table for details). Initial analysis suggests that up to half 
of the fall in the risk of poverty for the elderly between the LII 2001 and 
EU-SILC 2004 may be accounted for by this difference in income 
definition. But figures from the CSO’s EU Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) indicate that “at risk of poverty” rates for older 
people declined from just under 30 per cent to about 14 per cent between 
2003 and 2006. This sharp decline means that  “at risk of poverty” rates for 
older people are now lower than the risks for other persons, both adults 
and children. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that “at risk of poverty” rates for older 
people are quite volatile. The volatility of the risk relates in part to the fact 
that many older people are heavily dependent on the state pensions, 
contributory and non-contributory. If these payment rates are close to the 
poverty threshold, then a small change either way (or a small additional 
income) can move many people above or below the threshold. 
 
We know that income is a key resource, but not the only element of 
“command over resources” that affects individuals’ and families’ standard 
of living. Nolan and Whelan (1996), argued for the use of a combination of 
information on income with information on key indicators of basic 
deprivation (being unable to afford basic items or activities) to identify 
those living in what was termed “consistent poverty”. This is the approach 
which has been adopted by the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion. 
Table 7.2 draws together published evidence on the rate of consistent 
poverty for older people, and for all persons. 
Table 7.2: Proportions of Older People and of All Persons in Consistent 
Poverty, Selected Years, 1997-2005 
  
Older People 
 
All Persons  
 
 At 60 Per 
Cent Median 
Income 
At 70 Per 
Cent Median 
Income 
At 60 Per 
Cent Median 
Income 
At 70 Per 
Cent Median 
Income 
1997  8.4 7.8 10.7 
1998   6.0 7.7 
2000   4.3 5.4 
2001  3.9 4.1 4.9 
2003 5.8  8.8  
2004 3.3  6.8  
2005 3.7  7.0  
2006 2.1  6.9  
Sources: 1997-2001: Whelan et al.  (2003); 2003-2006: CSO Statistical Releases on EU-SILC. 
 
Two key points emerge clearly from this table. First, the rate of 
consistent poverty for older people is always below the rate of consistent 
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poverty for all persons. This contrasts with the “at risk of poverty” 
measure, where older people were sometimes at much lower risk than 
others, and sometimes at much greater risk. Second, the rate of consistent 
poverty for the elderly is very far below the “at risk of poverty” measure 
e.g., for 2003 the “at risk of poverty” rate was close to 30 per cent (at the 
60 per cent of median income cut-off) while the corresponding rate of 
consistent poverty was under 6 per cent. 
 
What gives rise to these quite different results for “at risk of poverty” 
rates and consistent poverty? The major factors relate to the non-income 
resources available to support the standard of living of the elderly. These 
include the fact that most older people own their own homes outright, 
without any mortgage. As a result, their housing costs are very low, and 
their cash incomes can stretch further to meet other needs. The standard 
economic approach to take this into account is to move to a broader 
measure of income which includes the value of the “in-kind” benefit 
enjoyed by the home owner from his or her own property. Different 
valuation methods have been proposed, but the simplest way of thinking 
about this is that rather than the owner paying zero rent and having zero 
income from the property, he or she rents it to himself/herself. This 
“imputed rent” is added to the home-owners’ income to put the resources 
of the home owner on a similar footing to a tenant. Tenants may also 
benefit from an imputed rent, if they enjoy the use of a property at less 
than the market rent. These issues, including different valuation methods 
for imputed rent, and the implications for measurement of income 
distribution and poverty, are currently being examined in a project 
involving eight European countries.27 
 
Zaidi et al. (2006a) also point to the financial assets and wealth of older 
people as important considerations in determining their overall command 
over resources. For example, assets built up over earlier stages of the 
lifecycle may be used to provide resources additional to income. Family 
support may also allow an older person to maintain a standard of living 
higher than their income alone would allow. 
7.2.2 “AT RISK OF POVERTY” AMONG OLDER PEOPLE: 
IRELAND IN EU  CONTEXT 
A recent review of EU experience regarding the risk of poverty for older 
people is provided by Zaidi et al. (2006a), drawing mainly on results from 
the Eurostat database on social inclusion. It is important to realise that 
there is a significant difference between the income concept used by 
Eurostat and that used in national analyses of Irish data by the CSO (in its 
regular publications based on the Irish element of the EU Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions) and the ESRI (in analyses of the Irish 
element of EU-SILC and of the earlier Living in Ireland Survey). One 
crucial difference is the treatment of private pensions (i.e. pensions which 
are privately organised by the individual, most often the self-employed, and 
not forming part of a state scheme or an occupational scheme). In national 
analyses, these are considered as part of disposable income; but in the EU 
level database they are excluded. Persons relying on this income, and 
without sufficient income from other sources, will therefore be deemed to 
 
27 The project is part of a broader one on Accurate Income Measurement for the 
Assessment of Policy (AIMAP). 
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be “at risk of poverty” in EU level analyses, whereas the national level 
approach may find they have sufficient income, including private pensions, 
to keep them above the poverty threshold.28 The origins of these 
differences lie in different institutional structures, which make 
standardisation of the measurement approach problematic. 
 
A further difference which should be borne in mind is that the 
“equivalence scales” – method of adjusting incomes to take account of  
differences in household size and composition – used at EU and national 
level are also different. At EU level, the equivalence scale counts 1 for the 
first adult in the household, 0.6 for each other adult, and 0.3 for each child. 
The scale frequently used in Ireland allows 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for 
each other adult and 0.33 for each child. The lower allowance for additional 
adults and for children results in a higher poverty line for single person 
households, making many elderly persons (especially in single person 
households) more likely to fall below the “at risk of poverty” threshold. 
 
Zaidi et al. (2006a) divide countries into low, medium and high poverty 
risk groups. The high poverty risk group includes Ireland and the UK along 
with Spain, Greece and Portugal. The latter, Southern countries have 
traditionally had a less developed welfare state than Northern European 
countries. The fact that Ireland and the UK feature in this group – and that 
Ireland has such a remarkably high poverty risk in this analysis – is in part 
due to the income measurement issue mentioned earlier. However, the 
extent to which this explains the high figures for the UK and Ireland is not 
yet known.  
 
The low poverty risk group includes several accession states, all of 
which  belong to the Central and East European Countries. These 
countries are all from the former communist bloc. Comparisons with low 
poverty risk countries which have longstanding market economies – 
namely the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg – may be more 
productive. The Dutch system has the lowest poverty risk of the three. 
Zaidi et al. (2006a) point to the fact that the Netherlands has a universal, 
residence-based basic pension, indexed in line with wages, along with 
mandatory occupational pensions and generous survivors’ benefits in 
occupational pensions.  
 
Callan, Nolan and Walsh (2007) consider other comparative analyses of 
poverty risks for the elderly, including the EU’s Joint Social Inclusion 
Report (European Commission, 2006). The divergence in results based on 
the EU’s framework and national analysis is worthy of further 
investigation. In what follows, we focus on results with the national 
framework, which is geared to take account of the nature of the Irish 
pensions system. 
 
 
 
 
28 There are other differences between the approaches which may contribute to 
differences in measured poverty risks. For example, the treatment of pension 
contributions (public or occupational, not private) differs in that the Eurostat database 
treats superannuation contributions as a deduction from gross income before arriving at 
disposable income; national level analysis treats superannuation contributions as part of 
disposable income.  
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 Evidence from the CSO analysis of EU-SILC surveys points to a sharp 
reduction in the proportion of older people “at risk of poverty”. In 2003, 
the risk for older people was close to 30 per cent – about one and a half 
times the risk for all persons. By 2005 the risk had fallen to just over 20 per 
cent, not much more than the risk for all persons. In 2006, a further fall 
puts the risk of poverty for the elderly at just under 14 per cent, 
significantly below that for other adults and children. Comparison of the 
risk figures with earlier years is complicated by a difference in the treatment 
of non-cash benefits such as free electricity, etc. 
7.3  
Exploring 
the Impact of 
Recent 
Changes in 
State 
Pensions 
 
Here we try to identify how much of the reduction is due to changes in 
the rates of payment for the main state pension rates (Old Age 
Contributory and Non-Contributory Pensions) along with rates paid to 
those on other schemes who are of pension age. We analyse this question 
by comparing the actual 2006 policy with a counterfactual policy, under 
which these pension rates would be indexed in line with wage growth from 
their 2000 levels, while all other policy parameters would remain at their 
actual 2006 levels. This isolates the impact of 2006 actual policy over and 
above a “neutral” policy, simply indexed in line with wages. (For a detailed 
rationale of this “distributionally neutral” policy, see Callan et al. 2005). 
 
The total cost of the actual 2006 pension rates, over and above the 2000 
rates indexed in line with wage growth of 42 per cent, is estimated at €515 
million. Table 7.3 shows how this amount is distributed over the deciles of 
equivalised income, and the proportionate gain in income for each decile. 
Table 7.3: Impact of Changes in Pension Rates, Over and Above Wage 
Indexation, 2000-2006 
 
Decile Aggregate Gain in €m p.a. Percentage Gain 
Bottom 89 5.7 
2nd 67 3.6 
3rd 180 6.1 
4th 102 2.1 
5th 25 0.4 
6th 20 0.3 
7th 11 0.1 
8th 7 0.1 
9th 5 0.1 
Top 8 0.0 
All 515 0.8 
   
 
The gains are strongly concentrated on the bottom four deciles of the 
income distribution. This group obtains 85 per cent of the total benefit 
from the package of policy changes implemented between 2000 and 2006. 
Income in these deciles rises by between 2 and 6 per cent, as against an 
overall figure of 0.8 per cent. 
 
Despite this strong concentration towards the bottom of the income 
distribution, the head count measure of the risk of poverty for older people 
declines by no more than 5 percentage points (from a base of about 40 per 
cent). However, there is a substantial reduction in the “poverty gap” 
measure which takes into account both the incidence of poverty – as 
measured by the head count – and the depth of poverty, how far those in 
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poverty are below the “at risk of poverty” line. This “poverty gap per 
person” measure falls by 45 per cent. 
 
Such findings are not unusual, and reflect a key weakness in the 
commonly used “head count” measure of poverty. A policy may improve 
the lot of many poor persons, without raising any of them above the 
poverty threshold. The head count measure will record no change in 
poverty, but the poverty gap measure will show a reduction depending on 
the extent to which the policy has brought people closer to the poverty 
threshold income. On the other hand, a policy which left the aggregate 
income of those initially in poverty unchanged, but transferred income 
from those who were poorest to those close to the poverty line income 
could result in a substantial fall in the head count. The lesson to be drawn 
is that we must look at both head count and poverty gap measures in order 
to obtain a fuller picture of the impact of policy changes (or of economic 
and social developments) on poverty risks.29 
 
 
7.4  
Targeting 
Vulnerable 
Older People: a 
“Living Alone 
Supplement”? 
7.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
“At risk of poverty” rates for older people living alone are particularly high. 
This is not simply an Irish phenomenon. Zaidi et al. (2006a) report that “in 
many countries, single elderly persons have the highest risk of poverty 
across all household types”. Could a payment targeted on these households 
be an effective (and efficient) instrument of anti-poverty policy? To explore 
this, we investigate the potential of what we call a “living alone 
supplement” to reduce risks of poverty among the elderly population. We 
begin by describing the current Living Alone Allowance and then describe 
how the “living alone supplement” would complement this to provide a 
higher level of income support for persons over the age of 70 who are 
living alone. The key questions are of the “what if” type – what would be 
the impact on poverty if such a supplement were introduced. A tax-benefit 
model is an essential tool in addressing such questions. We use the 
SWITCH model to explore the costs of such a supplement, and the net 
impact on risks of poverty in the overall population and among older 
people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 It should be noted that there are two types of poverty gap measure. One, due to Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke (1990) combines information on the extent of poverty (as measured 
by the head count) and the depth of poverty (how far below the poverty line each poor 
person falls). An alternative measure is used in recent EU social inclusion analyses. It looks 
at the poverty gap (as a proportion of the poverty threshold) for the median poor person 
i.e., halfway between the poorest person and the poor person whose income is closest to 
the poverty line. There are advantages and disadvantages to each measure, but in either 
case, it is necessary to consider both the head count measure and the poverty gap measure 
to obtain a full picture. Here we use the poverty gap measure developed by Foster, Greer 
and Thorbecke. 
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7.4.2 LIVING ALONE ALLOWANCE AND A POSSIBLE LIVING 
 ALONE SUPPLEMENT 
At present the Living Alone Allowance (LAA) is a supplementary payment 
for people on certain social welfare payments30 who are deemed to live 
completely or mainly alone. It represents an increase of €7.70 on top of the 
welfare payment. It is possible for recipients of certain payments, such as 
Disability Allowance, Invalidity Pension and Blind Person’s Pension, to 
receive the LAA if they are aged under 66 years. For the other benefits to 
which LAA applies recipients must be over 66 years old. 
 
A Living Alone Supplement could either be a non-means-tested 
payment or a means-tested payment. Here we investigate the potential of a 
non-means-tested supplement. In this way, it is possible to arrive at an 
estimate of the scope that such a proposal may have in effecting a 
reduction in the risk of poverty for the elderly. A non-means-tested benefit 
would, however, involve substantial transfers of income to the non-poor 
elderly (particularly those with occupational pensions). Designing 
appropriate income or means-tests to achieve the optimal balance between 
the costs and anti-poverty benefits of such a proposal would require careful 
consideration. But for the moment, the focus is on estimating the 
maximum attainable benefit under a non-means-tested scheme. 
 
The eligibility conditions we consider are simply: 
 
• that the individual be aged 70 or over; 
• that the individual be living alone i.e., in a one-
person household. 
 
For these individuals, the Living Alone Supplement (LAS) replaces the 
Living Alone Allowance (i.e., the payment is made instead of LAA, not as 
well as the LAA – as the rate of payment examined is well above the LAA 
rate, this involves a gain for all those eligible for the LAS).  For those aged 
less than 70 years, the LAA continues as at present. 
 
Three rates of payment for the LAS were examined: 
 
• a rate of €46.50 per week; 
• a rate of €30.00 per week; 
• a rate of €20.00 per week. 
 
7.4.3  COST OF A LIVING ALONE SUPPLEMENT 
The Statistical Report on Social Welfare Services records expenditure on the 
Living Alone Allowance as €44 million in 2000, rising to €49 million in 
 
30 The relevant payments are Disability Allowance, Invalidity Pension, Unemployability 
Supplement, Blind Person’s Pension, Old Age Contributory Pension, Old Age Non-
Contributory Pension, Retirement Pension, Widow’s/Widower’s Contributory Pension, 
Widow’s/Widower’s Non-Contributory Pension, Invalidity Pension, Deserted Wife’s 
Benefit or Allowance, Prisoner’s Wife’s Allowance, and Widow’s/Widower’s/Dependent 
Parents Pension under the Occupational Injuries Benefit Scheme.  
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2004.31 The corresponding SWITCH estimate is of an aggregate cost of €49 
million in 2000 and €52 million in 2006. The SWITCH estimates are 
therefore of the same order of magnitude as the officially recorded 
expenditure. The gap between the two was about 10 per cent in the year 
2000, but seems to have declined since then.  
 
Table 7.4 presents the estimates from SWITCH for expenditure on the 
LAS and total social welfare expenditure (which takes account of the 
savings made through the abolition of the LAA for those aged over 70 
years). More than 100,000 people are estimated as receiving the 
supplement.  
Table 7.4: Expenditure on the Living Alone Supplement and the Increase 
in Social Welfare Expenditure at Alternative Rates of Payment  
(€million p.a.) 
 
Rate of LAS 
 
Expenditure on LAS 
 
Increase in Total SW 
Expenditure  
Per Week 
€million 
 Per Annum 
€million 
Per Annum 
€46.50 255 211 
€30.00 165 121 
€20.00 110 66 
   
7.4.4  IMPACT ON “AT RISK OF POVERTY” RATES  
Using the modified OECD equivalence scale (1 for the head of household, 
0.5 for other adults, and 0.3 for children aged under 14 years) the LAS 
would lead to a small reduction in the overall poverty. However, it would 
have a bigger impact on the poverty rate of the older people, especially for 
those aged over 80 years. Table 7.5 below gives the proportions of the 
whole population, those aged over 65 years and those aged over 80 years 
whose equivalised disposable income falls below the poverty thresholds of 
less than 60 and 50 per cent of median income.  
Table 7.5: Impact of Living Alone Supplement on Headcount Numbers 
Below Poverty Thresholds Based on Median Income (%) 
   
 <60 Per Cent of Median Income <50 Per Cent of Median Income 
 
 All Older 
People 
Aged 
Over 80 
Years 
All Older 
People 
Aged 
Over 80 
Years 
       
Current Policy 19.2 40.3 63.1 10.8 24.0 40.2 
LAS at €20.00 19.2 40.0 61.6 10.6 22.0 29.9 
LAS at €30.00 19.2 39.9 61.6 10.1 17.7 10.1 
LAS at €46.50 19.1 39.6 60.3 9.1 8.5 0.5 
       
Source: SWITCH estimates using OECD modified equivalence scale. 
 
 
31 These figures come from multiplying the number of recipients of the LAA under each 
scheme given in Tables B7, C11, and E5 by the rate of the allowance. 
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As Table 7.5 shows, the greatest impact of the LAS on “at risk of 
poverty” rates would be for people aged over 80 years whose disposable 
income is below 50 per cent of the median income. The proportion of this 
group whose income is below that threshold would fall from around 40 per 
cent under the current system to less than 1 per cent under the proposed 
LAS at the rate of €46.50. The corresponding impact of the LAS at the two 
lower payment rates would obviously be smaller, but would still be 
substantial. The impact on those aged over 65 years, though less striking 
than that for the very elderly, would still be considerable. Again focusing 
on the highest rate of €46.50, the income poverty risk for this group (at the 
50 per cent cut-off) would fall from 24 per cent to around 9 per cent. 
 
It is well known that headcount measures of poverty can be very 
sensitive to the precise location of the poverty line in relation to income 
support levels. This is particularly so for the elderly, for whom welfare 
income may be the only, or the preponderant, element of income, so that 
large numbers have incomes at very similar levels. In these circumstances 
the poverty gap measure, which takes account not only of the extent but 
also of the depth of poverty,32 can provide a better picture of the impact of 
policy changes. At the 60 per cent of median income threshold, Table 7.5 
shows that the LAS would have a relatively small impact on the 
headcounts. However, as shown in Table 7.6, the poverty gap measure 
would be reduced by a substantial amount. For example, at the rate of 
€46.50, the LAS would lead to a fall in the poverty gap by one-third for 
older people (aged 65 years or more), and by one-half for those aged 80 
years or over. 
Table 7.6: Poverty Gap (Per Person) at 60 Per Cent of Median Income (%) 
    
 All Older People 
Aged Over 80 
Years 
    
Current Policy 4.1 7.9 11.1 
LAS at €20.00 4.0 7.0 9.2 
LAS at €30.00 4.0 6.3 7.7 
LAS at €46.50 3.8 5.2 5.3 
Reduction in Poverty Gap (%) 
LAS at €20.00 2.2 11.0 17.1 
LAS at €30.00 4.1 20.1 30.5 
LAS at €46.50 7.3 34.6 52.1 
    
 
All of the above results on the impact of the LAS on poverty have been 
calculated using the OECD modified equivalence scale. As stated earlier, 
this scale assigns a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional 
adult member and 0.3 to each child in the household when calculating the 
household’s equivalised income. The alternative national scale that has been 
employed in Irish poverty research, and within the NAP inclusion, assigns 
a value of 1 to the household head, 0.66 to each additional adult member 
and 0.33 to each child. This latter scale is more representative of the 
current social welfare system in Ireland where qualified adult additions have 
 
32 The “poverty gap” measure takes into account not only how many people fall below the 
poverty line, but how great is the gap between their income and the poverty threshold. 
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been moving from around 60 per cent of the personal rate of payment 
towards 70 per cent. For this reason results based on the 1/0.66/0.33 scale 
are also of interest.  
 
At the 60 per cent of median income threshold, the impact of the LAS 
policy on the headcount of “at risk of poverty” is greater when the 
1/0.66/0.33 scale is used than under the 1/0.5/0.3 scale. At the rate of 
€46.50, the LAS reduces the proportion of older people who fall below the 
poverty line from 39 to 32 per cent when the 1/0.66/0.33 scale is used – as 
against a fall of less than one percentage point with the OECD scale. 
Similarly, for those aged over 80 years, under the 1/0.66/0.33 scale the risk 
of income poverty falls from 58 to 28 per cent, as against a fall of 3 
percentage points with the OECD scale. The different equivalence scales 
also affect the impact on the poverty gap. For the poverty line of 60 per 
cent of median income, under the 1/0.66/0.33 scale the LAS of €46.50 
cuts the poverty gap by one-half for the elderly, and by three-quarters for 
the very elderly. This contrasts with the results under the modified OECD 
scale where the corresponding poverty gaps are cut by one-third and one-
half. 
 
Why are these results so sensitive to the equivalence scale used? In 
general terms, this arises because the policy is specifically focused on one-
person households, so that the balance struck by the equivalence scale 
between the first adult, and all other members of the household becomes 
particularly important. The equivalence scale has a marked impact on the 
level of the poverty line for a single person household. For 2006, using 
income growth factors kindly supplied by the Revenue Commissioners, 
SWITCH estimates suggest that the “at risk of poverty” threshold is about 
€30 higher under the OECD equivalence scale than under the alternative 
national equivalence scale, which gives greater weight to other adults and 
children. An Old Age Contributory Pension at the maximum rate, together 
with the proposed Living Alone Supplement, comes close to the threshold 
under the national equivalence scale, but is still well short of the threshold 
under the OECD scale.  
 
A further sensitivity analysis was undertaken to allow for the fact that 
average income in the EU-SILC surveys is significantly lower than would 
be expected on the basis of results from the Living in Ireland Survey. (As a 
result, poverty thresholds based on SILC are lower than those based on 
forward projections from the Living in Ireland database). In order to 
explore the potential impact of this difference, income growth settings 
were reduced in SWITCH, and the analysis was repeated, to explore how 
this would alter the estimated impacts on poverty risk. Given that the 
policy is targeted on the elderly population, much of which has an income 
fixed at social welfare pension rates, the expectation was that initial poverty 
risks would be lower, and that a fixed €46.50 income increase would have 
more of an impact on poverty.  This proved to be the case. In the “low 
income growth” scenario, the risk of poverty was reduced for older people 
by 18 percentage points rather than 7. For those aged over 80 years, the 
risk was reduced by 39 percentage points rather than 30. 
7.4.5 CONCLUSION 
The results are sufficient to indicate that the proposed Living Alone 
Supplement could have a significant impact on poverty risk. Balancing this 
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benefit with the cost requires further fine tuning of the analysis, and of 
possible income or means-testing aspects of the proposal. 
 
 The current tax treatment of occupational pension contributions is that 
both employer and employee contributions are deducted when calculating 
income for tax purposes. Alternatively, this can be viewed as a tax-free 
allowance equal to the value of the employee and employer contributions, 
allowable at the individual’s marginal rate of tax, be it standard rate or top 
rate. Payments by the self employed in respect of retirement annuity premia 
are also treated in the same way. These tax reliefs on pension contributions 
can also be regarded as “tax expenditures”. 
7.5 
Tax 
Expenditures 
on Private 
Pensions 
 
The “tax expenditure” approach highlights the fact that the tax system is 
sometimes used to achieve goals which are similar to those of the public 
expenditure system. Identifying the cost of the tax reliefs, and their 
distribution across persons, is then an important element in assessing 
whether the policy approach is an efficient and effective way of achieving 
these goals. 
 
Tax expenditures are identified with reference to a benchmark tax 
system, including definitions of the tax base and the rate structure. As 
Whitehouse (1999) notes, there are variations in international practice in 
the identification of tax expenditures regarding pensions. 
 
In Australia, Canada, Spain and the United States, the 
comprehensive income tax – with pension benefits tax-free and 
contributions and investment returns taxed – is used as the 
benchmark. In the United Kingdom, the actual tax treatment is 
compared with a so-called ‘unapproved’ scheme, where 
contributions and investment returns are taxed but the withdrawal 
of the pension as a lump-sum is tax-free. This is equivalent to the 
comprehensive income tax treatment (i.e., TTE). Other countries 
(such as the Netherlands) do not report tax expenditures for 
pensions at all or (for example, Germany) choose a benchmark very 
much closer to the actual treatment. Whitehouse (1999, p. 29). 
 
 There is also substantial variation across countries in the actual tax 
regime applied to pensions, as documented by Whitehouse. The classic 
theoretical treatments of pension contributions, pension fund income, and 
pension payments to beneficiaries include (using the notation T for Taxed, 
E for exempt): 
 
EET: Pension contributions and pension fund income are exempt, and 
pension payments are taxed in the hands of the beneficiary. This 
corresponds to the expenditure tax treatment. 
 
TEE: This also relates closely to expenditure tax treatment, and is 
sometimes termed the “prepaid” expenditure tax treatment. 
 
One feature of interest in the present context is that countries use 
different forms of limitation on the amount by which tax liability can be 
reduced through increasing pension contributions. Whitehouse (1999) 
identifies the following possibilities: 
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• absolute limits on the amount of contributions (e.g., 
Australia, Germany); 
• limits on the proportion of contributions that can be 
deducted (e.g., Austria, Finland); 
• limits on the proportion of income on which 
contributions can be made (e.g., Ireland and the 
UK). 
 
In this paper we investigate another type of limitation, which limits the 
deductibility of contributions at higher rates of income tax. Like many of 
the actual systems examined by Whitehouse, this diverges from the classic 
theoretical treatments, but analysis of this case is of some independent 
interest, given the political economy of standardising tax reliefs. 
Investigation of a full TEE regime is a topic of interest for further research. 
 
Whitehouse goes on to show that restricting the deductibility of 
contributions is close to introducing a comprehensive income tax, whereas 
the current treatment in Ireland and in the UK is close to that of an 
expenditure tax. If the overall tax system were to move towards an 
expenditure tax base rather than an income tax one, the existing tax 
arrangements for pensions would involve little or no redistribution. 
Arguments for and against the differing treatments of pension 
contributions need to be considered in this wider context, but the 
likelihood of such a fundamental shift – debated here some years ago when 
the Commission on Taxation reported – seems slight. A prerequisite for an 
informed debate on this topic is a sense of the scale of the tax reliefs, and 
the distribution of the benefits which arise from them. It is to this issue 
that we now turn.  
 
Hughes and Sinfield (2004) show that similar tax arrangements in the 
UK and the US, designed to encourage the growth of private pension 
schemes, lead to a concentration of tax relief among the highest income 
groups. This is for two reasons.33 The first is that the rate of membership 
of occupational pension schemes (and contributions by the self-employed) 
rise strongly with income. The second is that tax relief is allowed at the top 
marginal rate. Hughes (2005) shows that tax relief is also highly 
concentrated towards the top of the Irish income distribution. 
 
This is confirmed by analysis using the SWITCH model. It differs from 
Hughes (2005) in two respects. First it is based on family units rather than 
households – though the results are similar in either case. Second, whereas 
Hughes looks at quintiles of employees and self-employed separately, we 
use family income per adult equivalent, over the full income distribution, as 
the ranking criterion for division into quintile groups. The results are 
shown in Figure 7.1, and are broadly similar to those of Hughes. If 
anything, the contributions are concentrated somewhat more in the top 
quintile. Hughes (2005) found that the tax relief from retirement annuity 
premia paid by the self-employed were more strongly concentrated towards 
 
33 Agulnik and Le Grand (1998) and Hughes (2005). 
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the top of the self-employed income distribution than the relief from 
employee contributions.34 
 
It could be argued that the current income of the household is not the 
most relevant point of reference in thinking about the distributional 
implications of different approaches, and that some currently middle- or 
high-income households benefiting from the arrangements will be on much 
lower incomes when they retire. It would be very useful to complement the 
present analysis with a lifetime income perspective, and studies for some 
other countries have sought to do so. However, the evidence still suggests 
that, as Sinfield (1997) puts it (in relation to broadly similar arrangements in 
the UK): The greatest beneficiaries are those who have the least needs by any measure 
used in social policy analysis. It is of interest then to establish more closely the 
extent of the support being provided through this mechanism, and examine 
possible reallocations of resources which might better serve the overall 
objectives of social policy and pensions policy. Similar arguments have 
been accepted and acted upon in the case of mortgage interest tax relief, 
which is now allowed at the standard rate of tax, not at the top marginal 
rate. 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of Benefit from Exemption of Employee  
Superannuation Contributions by Quintile of Family Units 
2nd
1%
Top
73%
3rd
7%
4th
19%
 
Source: SWITCH model. 
In order to provide a benchmark for the extent of the resources implied 
by the tax treatment of pension contributions, we have attempted to 
estimate the cost of tax reliefs in respect of employee contributions, 
 
34 The overall impact of state interventions in relation to pensions also includes the State 
Pensions, contributory and non-contributory. The former is financed by pay-related social 
insurance contributions, but takes the form of a flat rate benefit, which features combine 
to make it strongly progressive. 
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employer contributions and self-employed contributions. One issue which 
arises in this context is the correct treatment of the State’s own public 
service superannuation scheme. This is a “pay as you go” scheme so there 
are no contributions to the core scheme, and benefits are paid out as they 
become due. In the present context, where both employer and employee 
superannuation contributions are exempt from tax, there are no particular 
tax issues associated with the accrual of pension benefits under the 
civil/public service superannuation scheme. If employee and employer 
contributions were to become – to any extent – taxable, then an inequity 
would arise if the state scheme were to maintain a tax-free status because it 
is not explicitly funded. Thus, in principle, a similar approach would be 
required for the state superannuation scheme. The accrual of pension 
benefits, while not recorded in pay, would amount to a “benefit-in-kind” 
that would have to be valued and taxed in the same way as contributions to 
a fund. Otherwise a sharp inequity would arise between public and private 
sector employees. There are of course many issues which would arise from 
such a change, including implications for wage bargaining in the public and 
private sectors, and the detail of how it would be administered and 
implemented. Here we abstract from these issues to get a broad view of the 
overall impact of a shift in the tax treatment in pensions. It is worth noting, 
however, that if, tax relief were restricted to the standard rate, then only 
those on the top rate of tax would be affected by the change.  
 
The estimates of pension contributions were constructed as follows: 
 
• Employee contributions were derived from 
information provided by employees on deductions 
from pay. Employee membership of an occupational 
pension scheme was measured using questions from 
the Living in Ireland Survey, as used in studies of the 
coverage of pensions.  
• Typically employee contributions were of the order 
of 5 per cent, and employer contributions at 10 per 
cent. But as this split could differ, and we had direct 
information on employee contributions only, 
employer contributions were constructed as the 
balance between the employee contribution and 15 
per cent. This assumption involves the same total 
contribution rate for all schemes. If, as is likely, 
contribution rates are higher for higher paid workers 
– as a tax efficient method of compensation – then 
the estimates derived here would understate the 
share of top earners in the tax relief. 
• For the self-employed, information directly provided 
by respondents was used. 
• For public sector employees, it was assumed that the 
government’s contribution was sufficient to bring 
the total contribution to 20 per cent of pay, given 
that the public service pension scheme offers higher 
income guarantees (including parity with those in 
employment in the same grade). 
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This combination of data and “stylised facts” about pension systems 
allows a more comprehensive picture of the pension contribution/ 
financing situation than has been possible heretofore.  Table 7.7  provides 
SWITCH-based estimates of the income tax foregone by the tax treatment 
of pensions. These are compared with estimates by the Revenue for 2000. 
 
For both employees and the self-employed, the SWITCH estimate of 
tax foregone is 54 per cent of the corresponding Revenue estimate. For 
employer contributions, however, the SWITCH estimate is more than 40 
per cent higher than the Revenue estimate. Given that the employer 
contributions are estimated as a residual from the average total rates of 
contribution, this may arise if employees in reporting their incomes 
understate or neglect to state the amount of their own contribution. In this 
case the estimate may be close to the total contribution, though the split 
between employer and employee is inaccurate. Thus, the ratio between the 
SWITCH estimate of the cost of tax relief for employer, employee and self-
employed contributions is very similar to the Revenue estimate. It should 
be noted, however, that the SWITCH estimate is derived by attributing the 
benefit of employer contributions to the relevant individuals, so that the 
tax relief is at the relevant personal rate of tax. The Revenue estimates, on 
the other hand, may value the tax relief of employer contributions made by 
companies at the relevant, and much lower, corporate income tax rate. 
Table 7.7: Estimates of Tax Foregone on Pension Contributions, SWITCH and Revenue 
      
Component SWITCH 
Estimate of 
Tax 
Foregone 
2000 
Revenue 
Estimate of 
Tax 
Foregone 
2000/01 
SWITCH as 
Percentage 
of Revenue 
Estimate 
 
SWITCH 
Estimated 
Aggregate 
Contributions 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Implied by 
SWITCH 
Analysis 
 
€m  
Per Annum 
€m  
Per Annum % 
€m  
Per Annum % 
Employee contributions 255 472 54 820 31 
 
Self-employed/retirement  
 annuity premia 111 205 54 362 31 
 
Employer contributions 922 646 143 2,321 40 
 
Government as employer, 
 contribution equivalent 706 n.a. n.a. 1,751 40 
 
Total, excluding 
 government 1,288 1,323 97 3,503 37 
      
 
 When this is taken into account, it seems likely that the SWITCH 
estimates of the value of tax foregone are lower than might be expected. 
One factor contributing to this is that, in general, household survey data do 
not obtain good coverage of the very highest echelons of the income 
distribution – a group which tends to have very large pension 
contributions. Another, mentioned earlier, is the assumption that total 
contribution rates are constant across income groups, when tax efficiency 
suggests that contribution rates are likely to rise with income. 
 
Some further evidence on the internal consistency of the estimates is 
provided by the implicit tax rate (the value of the tax relief divided by the 
total amount of contributions in the relevant category). For employees this 
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is 31 per cent, at a time when the standard tax rate was 22 per cent, and the 
top tax rate 44 per cent. As higher rate taxpayers are known to be more 
likely to contribute to pension schemes, and more likely to contribute 
greater amounts, this is not implausible. The implicit tax rates for employer 
contributions and imputed government contributions seem rather closer to 
the top tax rate than one might expect. On the other hand, the implicit tax 
rate for the self-employed is no higher than that for employees, when a 
higher figure might have been expected. These results suggest that further 
work is required in calibrating the estimates of contributions, but it is 
nonetheless of interest to use these initial estimates as a basis for an 
exploration of policy issues. 
 
The inequity of having higher rates of support for the pensions of high-
earners (top rate taxpayers) is recognised in the National Pensions Review 
(Pensions Board, 2005).35 The approach suggested there is one of “levelling 
up” support so that all those paying contributions to private pensions 
would enjoy relief at the top tax rate. But this involves extra resources for 
those who can afford to pay for private pensions (and still involves greater 
amounts for those with top incomes). An alternative is to allow the relief at 
a single lower rate than 40 per cent. Here, for simplicity, we examine 
policies involving standardisation at the standard tax rate of 20 per cent, as 
has been implemented for mortgage interest tax relief and health insurance 
premia. We look at the impact of doing this and channelling some of the 
resources gained by the Exchequer into an increase of €50 per week in the 
state pension. 
Table 7.8: Standardisation of Pension Tax Relief and €50 Rise in State 
Pensions 
   
Decile 
Aggregate Gain/Loss in  
€m  
Per Annum 
Percentage  
Gain 
Bottom 4 0.3 
2nd 88 3.5 
3rd 430 14.3 
4th 267 5.2 
5th 48 0.8 
6th -12 -0.2 
7th -94 -1.2 
8th -183 -2.1 
9th -403 -3.8 
Top -770 -4.3 
All -626 -0.9 
   
 
Table 7.8 shows that the net gains from this package are concentrated in 
the third and fourth deciles. The greatest proportionate gain is also for the 
third decile. This reflects the improvements in the relative income position 
of pensioners in recent years. On balance, there are losses for all deciles in 
the top half of the income distribution. 
 
 
35 It should be noted, however, that the structure of the social insurance system, with pay-
related contributions and flat rate benefits, is an offsetting influence. A closer study of the 
redistributive impact of the social insurance system, taking into account life cycle elements, 
would be of considerable interest. 
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It should be noted, however, that this reform is not revenue-neutral. It 
generates over €600 million per annum of extra net revenue for the 
Exchequer. These resources could be used to redesign the package in 
various ways. For example, instead of full standardisation, part of the 
pension contributions could be allowed against the top rate of tax, thus 
moderating the income losses for top-rate taxpayers associated with the 
package. That is, of course, on the assumption that additional resources on 
this scale are indeed generated by this change in tax treatment of pensions. 
The sums shown are the product of an arithmetic calculation assuming a 
change in tax treatment and no change in the size of the flows involved. It 
is likely that behaviour would in fact change, with some of the resources 
previously channelled into private pensions being redirected towards other 
tax-favoured forms of saving. It is extremely difficult to judge how great 
this response might be – and it could be taken into account in adjusting tax 
treatment of other types of saving if necessary – but it would have to be 
factored in to an assessment of the overall budgetary impact. (The potential 
sensitivity to changes in tax treatment provides one rationale for moving to 
standard-rating the relief rather than abolishing it entirely.) 
 
What of the impact on poverty? We look first at the impact on the risks 
of income poverty for older people, and then at the implications for overall 
poverty risk. Table 7.9 shows the effect on the head count and “poverty 
gap per person” measures at both the 50 per cent and 60 per cent of 
median income cut-offs. (It should be remembered that the initial poverty 
risks are the result of a simulation of the year 2006, based on uprated 2000 
data – these are not intended as precise estimates of poverty rates in 2006, 
but incorporate many key features of the 2006 situation. Our interest, 
however, is in changes in poverty risk due to policy changes, and here the 
simulations have an advantage over actual data in being able to “hold 
constant” all things other than policy.) 
Table 7.9: Risks of Income Poverty: Headcount and Poverty Gap at 50 
Per Cent and 60 Per Cent of Median Income: Baseline 
Estimates  (2006) and Pension Reform Package 
    
 Baseline Pension 
Reform 
Package 
Percentage 
Change in 
Measure 
 
“At Risk of Poverty” Headcount  % % % 
50 per cent of median income 
 
8.2 
 
1.3 
 
84 
60 per cent of median income 
 
40.5 
 
3.1 
 
92 
 
Poverty Gap 
 
50 per cent of median income 0.7 0.4 43 
 
60 per cent of median income 5.0 0.7 86 
    
 
The pension reform package involving standardisation of income tax 
relief and a higher state pension leads to the virtual elimination of the risk 
of income poverty at both the 50 per cent and 60 per cent lines. 
Correspondingly, the poverty gap measures also fall to very low levels. 
 
90 TACKLING LOW INCOME AND DEPRIVATION: DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE POLICIES 
These costings are based on the current population structure. The 
National Pensions Review (Pensions Board, 2005) points out that the ratio 
of persons in work to those aged over 65 years is projected to fall from 4.3 
in 2006 to 2.7 in 2026 and to 1.4 in 2056. With these declines, the balance 
between the revenue gain from restriction of tax relief and the cost of 
increases in pensions will become less favourable. But the considerations of 
target efficiency of state support for pensions apply also when the elderly 
population is larger. The design of a long-term sustainable pension policy 
must take account not only of the ageing of the population, but also of the 
target efficiency of state pensions as against tax expenditures supporting 
private pensions. 
 
 In this chapter we have examined risks of income poverty for older people 
in Ireland. Over time, the “at risk of poverty” rate (at 60 per cent of 
median income) rose from low levels in 1994 to over 40 per cent around 
the year 2000, but has been coming down since then. Latest figures, from 
EU-SILC 2006, indicate that the risk of poverty for elderly persons is 
below the average risk for all persons. Comparisons with other EU 
countries are made difficult because of differences in definitions of income, 
which reflect structural differences in pension systems. Published EU 
figures indicate that the “at risk of poverty” rate for elderly persons in 
Ireland is relatively high. The extent to which this arises because of 
differences in income definitions, and in equivalence scales used to adjust 
for family size and composition, deserves further investigation. 
7.6 
Conclusions 
 
Older people in Ireland have lower than average consistent poverty rates 
– that is, when both low income and direct measures of deprivation are 
used – with home ownership, financial assets and family support all 
contributing to explaining this contrast with the picture based on income 
alone. The impact of recent changes in state pension rates on the risk of 
poverty was identified. While the impact on the “head count” measure of 
poverty was limited, the changes did reduce the depth of poverty for older 
people substantially. 
 
A restructuring of state supports for public and private pensions, 
limiting tax relief on pension contributions to the standard rate of tax, was 
found to offer scope for substantial reductions in poverty for older people. 
On a purely arithmetic basis, standardisation could bring in to the 
Exchequer more than enough resources to allow the state pensions to be 
increased by €50 per week, which would virtually eliminate the risk of 
income poverty for older people. There are, of course, many issues 
involved in such a restructuring. Some of these are discussed in the paper, 
but others are left for further research, including the implications of 
demographic ageing, and how the flow into pension-related savings would 
respond, which would determine the impact on revenue for the Exchequer. 
However, the results indicate that further analysis of options of this type is 
well worthwhile.  
 
8. PEOPLE WITH A 
DISABILITY 
 People with a disability are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social 
exclusion. Disability affects people throughout the life-cycle, but rather 
different issues arise in relation to children, those of working age, and older 
people. The household surveys on which we have to rely here in simulating 
policy options do not provide information about children with  disabilities, 
so our attention is restricted to adults. We first discuss the available 
information on which the subsequent analysis has to be based. We then 
look at poverty risk and consistent poverty rates for people with a 
disability, at the circumstances of people with a disability in terms of 
poverty, and at the key channels through which disability seems to be 
having its effects on poverty status. We then look at strategies for reducing 
poverty and poverty risk for adults with a disability; since, disability impacts 
on living standards most directly through its effects on work, our primary 
focus at that stage is on those of working age. Finally, the main findings are 
summarised. 
8.1 
Introduction 
 
 The empirical measurement of disability poses serious difficulties, in 
Ireland as elsewhere. The definition of disability employed varies from one 
data source to another, and the precise way it was captured also differs 
from one dataset to another, making it very difficult to obtain a rounded 
picture (see National Disability Authority (NDA), 2006). The 2002 Census of 
Population included a series of questions about the presence of long-lasting 
conditions, sight or hearing loss, physical disability, and difficulty carrying 
out specific activities. Taking these together, these showed 6.4 per cent of 
the working-age population with a disability. The Census does not include 
information on income, so it cannot serve as a basis for analysing disability 
and poverty, our interest here. The national disability survey on disability 
prevalence and impact which has recently been carried out by the CSO, 
following up on the information on disability obtained in the 2006 Census of 
Population, will be a landmark in terms of in-depth information about 
people with disabilities. However, results from that survey will not be 
available until late 2007, and in any case the examination of income support 
options –  a key focus here – can most easily be carried out using the 
SWITCH tax-benefit model, which has to rely on the information obtained 
in general household surveys.  
8.2  
Disability in 
Household 
Surveys 
 
The information relating to disability obtained in these surveys comes 
from questions about whether the individual has a chronic or long-standing 
illness or disability, and/or is hampered or restricted in the activities they 
can carry out. The Living in Ireland Surveys and special modules on 
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disability included with the CSO’s QNHS in 2002 and 2004 have been 
analysed in some depth in this context (see Gannon and Nolan, 2005). The 
QNHS modules are restricted to adults of working age, and show 10-11 per 
cent of those aged between 15 and 64 years reporting a long-standing 
health problem or disability. The Living in Ireland Survey shows a higher 
proportion reporting a chronic illness or disability – 15-16 per cent of those 
of working age – illustrating the sensitivity of the measured prevalence of 
disability to the precise questions employed.36 The QNHS does not obtain 
information about income, so while it is very helpful in examining the 
profile of those reporting disability and their labour market participation, it 
does not serve as a basis for analysis of disability and poverty. 
 
A particular problem arises in that respect with the EU-SILC survey. 
Unlike the QNHS and Living in Ireland Surveys, which ask about long-
standing/chronic health problems/illness or disability, EU-SILC asks 
whether the respondent suffers from any chronic (long-standing) illness or 
condition (health problem) –  the term “disability” is not included. The 
survey then asks separately “in the last 6 months have you been limited in 
activities people usually do, because of a health problem?” where 
respondents can reply that they were strongly limited, limited, or not 
limited. About 16 per cent of working-age respondents report being limited 
or strongly limited in their activities in EU-SILC 2004, but whether this 
(perhaps in combination with the “chronic illness” question) is a 
satisfactory way to capture people with a disability needs in-depth 
investigation. From present purposes we, therefore, rely on the data from 
the Living in Ireland Survey (which is in any case what underpins the 
current version of the SWITCH model). 
 
 We now turn to the relationship between disability and poverty. The 
CSO’s published results from EU-SILC (e.g. CSO, 2006) include some 
figures relating to disability and poverty, but these are based on categorising 
persons by labour force status, not by disability per se. They refer to people 
who are categorised in labour force terms as “not at work because ill or 
disabled”, which is not the same as a measure of individuals with chronic 
illness or disability. Gannon and Nolan (2004) carried out a detailed 
analysis of the relationship between these two measures, and showed that 
many adults of working age reporting a chronic illness or disability are not 
in that labour force category (and some people in that labour force category 
do not report such an illness or disability). It is worth noting nonetheless 
that in EU-SILC 2005 the “at risk of poverty” rate for those categorised as 
ill/disabled in labour force terms was 41 per cent, while their consistent 
poverty rate was 17 per cent –  both very much in excess of the average 
(see CSO, 2006, Tables 4 and 7).  
8.3  
Disability 
and Poverty 
 
Results from the Living in Ireland Surveys relating to households where 
the reference person is in the labour force category, ill or disabled have also 
 
 
36 Possible factors underlying this difference between the surveys are discussed in Gannon 
and Nolan (2004). The questions themselves were different – the Living in Ireland Survey 
referring to “any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability”, and the 
QNHS to “any longstanding health problem or disability”. Also, a much higher proportion 
of the QNHS individual questionnaires were answered by proxy, whereas those 
responding directly about themselves appear to be more likely to report a long-standing 
health problem or disability.  
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been presented in the various ESRI publications focused on monitoring 
poverty trends. These have often been used as a point of reference in 
relation to poverty and disability (for example in the Report of the Working 
Group on the Review of the Illness and Disability Schemes, 2003). It is 
clear that having the household reference person in that situation may have 
a marked impact on household income and poverty. However, here we are 
concerned with the overall relationship between disability and poverty and 
how best to design policies to minimise it, so it is more satisfactory to focus 
on all adults with a disability. (The same point applies to those in receipt of 
illness and disability-related social welfare payments: only a sub-set of 
adults with a disability will be in receipt of such payments.) 
 
As we have seen, data from the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey show 16 
per cent of those of working age reporting a chronic illness or disability; 
this was the case for a higher proportion of those aged 65 years or more, as 
would be expected, so overall 22 per cent of adults reported such an 
illness/disability. Table 8.1 shows that 38 per cent of these adults were in 
households “at risk of poverty” – that is, below 60 per cent of median 
equivalised disposable household income. This was more than twice the 
poverty risk for adults not reporting a chronic illness or disability, which 
was 17 per cent, and well above the overall average rate for adults in the 
sample which was 21 per cent.  
Table 8.1: Risk of Poverty and Illness/Disability, Adults, Living in Ireland 
Survey 2001 
  
 % “At Risk of Poverty” 
Ill/disabled 37.5 
Not ill/disabled 16.7 
All 21.3 
  
 
Table 8.2 shows the percentage of long-term ill or disabled persons who 
are in households experiencing basic deprivation, and their consistent 
poverty rate. We see that the percentage in households experiencing basic 
deprivation, at 13 per cent, is nearly twice as high as for other adults. The 
consistent poverty rate is over 7 per cent for ill or disabled adults, 
compared with 3 per cent for other adults and the overall average for all 
adults of 4 per cent. (These figures for basic deprivation and consistent 
poverty in 2001 are based on the original 8 deprivation items rather than 
the revised/adapted set to be employed in the future.) 
Table 8.2: Consistent Poverty and Illness/Disability, Adults, Living in 
Ireland Survey 2001 
   
 
% Experiencing Basic 
Deprivation 
% Consistently Poor 
Ill/disabled 13.2 7.4 
Not ill/disabled 7.4 2.9 
All 8.6 3.9 
   
 
Additional information obtained in the LII surveys on the extent to 
which chronically ill or disabled people reported being hampered in their 
daily activities provides some insight into the variation in poverty outcomes 
by extent/nature of disability. Table 8.3 looks at the variation in the risk of 
poverty and consistent poverty across the three categories used – hampered 
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severely, to some extent, or not at all – and shows a very pronounced and 
consistent relationship between degree hampered and poverty. Almost half 
those reporting severe hampering are “at risk of poverty”, this figure falls 
to 40 per cent for those hampered “to some extent”, and to 21 per cent for 
those who say they are not hampered at all. The poverty risk facing the 
“not hampered” group is still higher than those who do not report chronic 
illness or disability, but not by much. Turning to consistent poverty, 16 per 
cent of those who are severely hampered are in households in consistent 
poverty, which is about five times higher than the rate for those with no 
chronic illness or disability. The rate for those hampered to some extent is 
about twice that for those with no chronic illness or disability. Finally, for 
those who say they are not hampered at all, the consistent poverty rate is 
no different to that for adults with no chronic illness or disability.  
Table 8.3: Poverty and Degree Hampered, Adults, Living in Ireland Survey 
2001 
   
Ill/Disabled and… “At Risk of Poverty” 
% 
Consistently Poor 
% 
-  Severely hampered 49.4 15.7 
- Hampered to some extent 39.6 6.1 
-  Not hampered 21.4 2.7 
Not ill/disabled 16.7 2.9 
   
 
We can also look at trends over time – although only up to 2001 – by 
comparing the results on poverty risk and consistent poverty from 2001 
with the corresponding figures from the 1995 Living in Ireland Survey.37 
Table 8.4 shows first that the percentage “t risk of poverty” rose sharply 
for long-term ill or disabled adults between 1995 and 2001, from 21 per 
cent to 38 per cent, whereas the poverty risk for other adults was stable 
over that period at about 17 per cent. This is linked to the extent to which 
people with illness or disability and the households in which they live rely 
on social welfare payments as a source of income. Social welfare accounts 
for most of the income accruing to households with an ill/disabled 
member, as we shall see shortly, and over this period social welfare 
payment rates, although increasing in terms of purchasing power, lagged 
behind the very rapid pace of increase in incomes from work. As a result, 
those who continued to rely on social welfare for their household incomes, 
which was the case for many people with a disability, saw their living 
standards improve but their poverty risk rise. Focusing on consistent 
poverty, there was only a marginal decline between 1995 and 2001 for 
those with a long-term illness or disability whereas other adults saw their 
consistent poverty rate fall from 6 per cent to 3 per cent. For those with a 
disability or long-term illness, the proportion experiencing basic 
deprivation did fall but this was offset by the rise in the proportion below 
the relative income threshold. A significant number of households 
containing adults with a chronic illness or disability and relying on social 
welfare went from being clustered above the income threshold to falling 
below it. 
 
 
 
 
37 The first Living in Ireland Survey, in 1994, had slightly different wording for key 
questions. 
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Table 8.4: Poverty and Illness/Disability, Adults, Living in Ireland Surveys 
1995 and 2001 
   
 
“At Risk of Poverty” 
% 
Consistently Poor 
% 
Ill/disabled   
1995  21.2 7.8 
2001  37.5 7.4 
Not ill/disabled   
1995  16.7 6.0 
2001  16.7 2.9 
All   
1995  17.6 6.3 
2001  21.3 3.9 
   
 
As noted earlier, results from the Living in Ireland surveys relating to 
households where the reference person is classified as ill or disabled in 
labour force terms have often been a point of reference in assessing the 
relationship between disability and poverty, and it is also worth noting the 
patterns these figures show. As the Report of the Working Group on the 
review of the Illness and Disability Payment Schemes (2003) brought out, 
both the risk of poverty and consistent poverty rates for such households 
were substantially above average in 2001.38 Two-thirds were below 60 per 
cent of median equivalised disposable income, three times the rate for all 
households, while over one-fifth were in consistent poverty, which was 
four times the rate for all households. Over the period from 1994 the “at 
risk of poverty” rate for these households doubled; while the consistent 
poverty rate declined by about one-third. This was much less rapid than the 
decline in consistent poverty for all households over the period. 
 
One can also look directly at poverty rates and trends for those in 
receipt of illness/disability-related social welfare payments.39 In 2001, half 
those in receipt of such payments were in households below the 60 per 
cent of median income threshold, and 16 per cent were in consistent 
poverty. In terms of trends over the period from 1994, the “at risk of 
poverty” rate for this group rose very sharply indeed, from 10 per cent to 
just under 50 per cent, while the consistent poverty rate fell but only from 
23 per cent to 16 per cent –  again, much less favourable trends than those 
for the sample as a whole. 
 
  The relationship between disability and poverty, underpinning the 
heightened poverty risk and consistent poverty rates we have just 
described, is a complex one. Disability can impact on poverty and 
disadvantage through a variety of channels, starting with its potential 
effects on educational attainment and its direct and indirect impact on the 
individual’s working career and perhaps also that of others in household. 
Studies using Irish data, and for other rich countries, have shed some light 
on these channels of influence but much remains to be learned.  
8.4 
Understanding 
the 
Relationship 
Between 
Disability and 
Poverty 
 
 
38 See Chapter 7 and Appendix V of the Report for details. 
39 Once again, these are the Report of the Working Group on the review of the Illness and 
Disability Payment Schemes (2003) See Chapter 7 and Appendix V of the Report for 
details. 
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It is useful in this context to distinguish between adults of working age 
and those aged 65 years or over. Disability itself is strongly related to age, 
and there is also a marked relationship between age and poverty. The 
percentage of adults in the 2001 LIIS reporting a chronic illness or 
disability rises from about 12 per cent in the 25-44  years age range to 
about 16 per cent between 45 and 64 years, and then rises much more 
sharply to 35 per cent for those aged 65 years  or  over. As a consequence, 
35 per cent of the adults reporting a chronic illness or disability in the 
survey are aged 65  years  or over; of those aged between 15 and 64  years 
and reporting such an illness/disability, half are aged between 45 and 64 
years.  
 
Table 8.5 shows how both poverty risk and consistent poverty vary by 
age, for those who do versus those who do not report a chronic illness or 
disability. There is a heightened poverty risk for ill/disabled people 
throughout the age groups, but the gap between them and others is 
proportionately greatest in the 45-64 year age range. On the other hand, 
poverty risk itself peaks in the age group 65 years plus. While risk of 
poverty rises sharply for over-65s among those not reporting disability, 
though, for those with a disability there is a much more gradual increase 
with age in the risk of poverty. 
Table 8.5: Poverty and Illness/Disability by Age, Adults, Living in Ireland 
Survey 2001 
   
 % “At Risk of Poverty” % Consistently Poor 
Years Ill/Disabled Not Ill/Disabled Ill/Disabled Not 
Ill/Disabled 
Age 15-24 28.0 14.7 2.2 4.3 
25-34 15.1 10.8 3.8 2.5 
35-44 18.2 15.8 5.9 2.8 
45-54 37.6 12.6 11.2 1.6 
55-64 46.3 19.1 13.5 4.7 
65+ 49.5 37.3 6.0 1.6 
     
 
Focusing on consistent poverty, the consistent poverty rate is higher for 
the ill or disabled group than for all others throughout the age range, 
except in the youngest age category. The gap between the incidence of 
consistent poverty for the disabled and others is now proportionately 
greatest in the 45-54 and 65+ age ranges. However, the rate of consistent 
poverty for those reporting chronic illness/disability is highest in the 45-64 
year range, not among those aged 65 years or over.  
 
Among those of working age, those with a disability are much less likely 
to be in work than others in the same age group, and this is the most 
obvious and direct channel of influence from disability to poverty. Gannon 
and Nolan (2004) found that about 40 per cent of those reporting a 
longstanding/ chronic illness or disability and of working age in the Living 
in Ireland Survey were in employment, with the remainder mostly not 
active in the labour force (rather than unemployed). This compared with an 
employment rate of close to 70 per cent for those not reporting such an 
illness or disability. Other data sources such as the Census of Population and 
the Quarterly National Household Survey also show people with disabilities 
having much lower employment rates than others (see also NDA, 2005). 
(Those who are at work are also more likely to be part-time: the QNHS 
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shows that one-quarter of those with a disability at work are working part-
time, versus 16 per cent for the rest of the working-age population.) 
 
Not all of that difference in employment rates may be attributable to the 
presence or absence of disability per se, because those who report disability 
may also have other characteristics that disadvantage them in the labour 
market – for example in terms of age, gender, education and skills, or 
geographic location. (Some of those other disadvantages may themselves 
have been affected by the presence of a long-standing disability, of course, 
for example, level of education). Analysis of cross-sectional data 
incorporating such characteristics in Gannon and Nolan (2004a,b) showed 
that those reporting a longstanding/chronic illness or disability that 
hampers them in their daily activities or restricts the kind of work they can 
do have a significantly reduced probability of participating in the paid 
labour force. For men who report being severely hampered or restricted, 
that reduction is as much as 60 percentage points or more, while for 
women it is about 50 percentage points. For those who report being 
hampered or restricted “to some extent” rather than severely the effect is 
much smaller but still substantial. On the other hand, for those reporting a 
longstanding/chronic illness or disability that did not hamper or restrict 
them, the probability of being in the labour force was similar to others of 
the same age, gender and educational attainment and not reporting any 
such condition. Gannon and Nolan (2006) showed that disability that 
persisted over the life of the Living in Ireland Surveys had a particularly 
pronounced impact on employment rates and consequently on poverty 
outcomes. 
 
As well as the work status of the individual with a disability, the 
numbers in the household at work have a crucial impact on poverty and 
poverty risk – and this is the case both for working-age individuals with 
disabilities and those with disabilities aged 65 years or over. Nolan and 
Gannon (2006) brought this out by distinguishing three sets of persons, 
within different age categories:  
 
1. Those not reporting a chronic illness or disability, 
2. Those reporting a chronic illness or disability but not “at risk of 
poverty” (i.e. in households above the 60 per cent of median income 
threshold), and 
3. Those reporting a chronic illness or disability and “at risk of 
poverty” (i.e. in households which are below the 60 per cent of 
median income threshold).  
 
For each of these groups it then looks at the proportion in households 
where no-one was at work, where one person was at work, and where more 
than one person was at work. The results for those aged under 65 years 
showed that those reporting a chronic illness or disability who are “at risk 
of poverty” are mostly in households where no-one is at work; very few 
indeed have more than one person at work. In the 45-64 year age range, for 
example, four-fifths of those reporting chronic illness/disability are in 
households with no-one at work. So this is clearly a central influence on the 
income of the household and its poverty risk. For those reporting chronic 
illness or disability but not “at risk of poverty”, by contrast, only a small 
minority are in households with no-one at work, and a high proportion are 
in households with two or more people at work (close to the proportion 
for those who are not ill or disabled). 
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For those aged 65 years or over, the number at work in the household is 
less important but still has a role to play. For over 65s who are ill or 
disabled but above the poverty risk income threshold, about 30 per cent are 
in households where someone is at work, and about 10 per cent have two 
or more at work. For over-65s with a disability or long-term illness and 
whose incomes are below the threshold, on the other hand, only 10 per 
cent have someone in the household at work and hardly any have more 
than one. 
 
The related issue of sources of income coming into the household, and 
in particular the extent of dependence on social welfare payments, is 
examined in a summary fashion in Table 8.6. This shows that for non-
disabled people, on average over 80 per cent of the income of the 
household came from work – from earnings or self-employment income. 
For those with a long-term illness or disability but above the risk-of 
poverty line, while the share was lower, still about two-thirds of household 
income was from work. For people who were ill or disabled and “at risk of 
poverty”, by contrast, only 10 per cent of income was from work and 86 
per cent was from social welfare payments.  
Table 8.6: Poverty Risk, Illness/Disability, and Main Source of Income, 
Adults, Living in Ireland Survey 2001 
    
Main Source of 
Income 
Not Ill/Disabled 
% 
Ill/Disabled but 
Not “At Risk of 
Poverty” 
% 
Ill/Disabled and 
“At Risk of 
Poverty” 
% 
Work 81.4 67.0 10.0 
Private Pension 4.2 13.7 0.7 
Social Welfare 13.3 18.3 86.5 
Other 1.1 1.0 2.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    
 
So what distinguishes people with a long-term illness or disability in 
households below the “at risk of poverty” threshold is that their 
households have little engagement with paid work and are highly 
dependent on social welfare. Statistical analysis shows that even when one 
controls for age, gender, region and household composition, the estimated 
effect of having a hampering chronic illness or disability on the likelihood 
of being “at risk of poverty” and consistently poor is pronounced.40 
Overall, the increase in the proportion “at risk of poverty” where the 
individual was severely hampered, was 22 percentage points; where the 
individual was hampered to some extent the increased rate of being “at risk 
of poverty” was 12 percentage points. Whereas the consistent poverty rate 
was about 7.5 per cent for someone without an illness or disability, an 
individual with a severely hampering illness or disability was predicted to 
have a rate between 6 and 13 percentage points higher. Someone with an 
illness or disability that hampers them to some extent had a predicted rate 
of consistent poverty that was 2-4 percentage points higher. A substantial 
proportion of this effect (perhaps up to half) operates through the 
individual’s education level and whether he or she was in work.  
 
 
 
40 See Gannon and Nolan (2006) for a full description. 
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 In thinking about policies designed to address poverty among people with 
a disability, income support is of central importance but is by no means the 
whole story. As highlighted in the Report of the Working Group on the 
Review of the Illness and Disability Payment Schemes (2003), promoting 
employment also has a key role to play, and a variety of measures across 
different Departments and agencies are involved in that context. Without 
looking in any detail at these measures and how their effectiveness might 
be improved, we can examine the impact that greater success in promoting 
employment among people with a disability would have on the incomes 
and poverty risk of their households. First, though, we concentrate on 
income support and on the potential impact of channelling more resources 
through existing schemes and/or introducing a new scheme to help meet 
the costs associated with disability.   
8.5  
Policies 
Aimed at 
Reducing 
Poverty for 
People with a 
Disability 
 
As far as the current structure of income support is concerned, a person 
who is ill or disabled may qualify for one of the following: 
 
• Illness Benefit (called Disability Benefit up to 2006) for people who 
are currently incapacitated for work;  
• Invalidity Pension, for people who are permanently incapacitated 
for work; 
• Occupational Injury Benefits (including Injury Benefit and 
Disablement Benefit) for those who are injured at work or contract 
a prescribed occupational disease;  
• Disability Allowance and Blind Person’s Pension, means-tested 
support for people whose employment capacity is substantially 
reduced because of their disability;  
• Supplementary Welfare Allowance, means-tested support for 
people who are incapable of work and not entitled to Illness 
Benefit (e.g. because they do not meet the social insurance 
contribution conditions). 
 
We look at the impact of a rise of 10 per cent, and of 20 per cent, in the 
welfare payments on these schemes, in the context of an overall rise in 
welfare payment rates at these levels, and here try to identify the impact of 
such a policy change on the risks of  poverty facing people with a disability.  
Table 8.7 shows the main results. 
Table 8.7: Reduction in Poverty Risk for People with a Disability from 
Increases in Welfare Payment Rates  
    
 No Chronic 
Illness/Disability 
Chronic 
Illness/Disability 
and Somewhat 
Hampered 
Chronic 
Illness/Disability 
and Severely 
Hampered 
 
Baseline 2007 12.9 33.8 40.4 
With 10 per cent  
increase in 
welfare 
payments 
10.3 26.2 31.0 
With 20 per cent 
increase in 
welfare 
payments 
8.5 21.2 22.0 
    
Source: SWITCH simulations. 
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It is clear from these results that welfare payment increases could play a 
substantial role in reducing the risks of poverty facing disabled people. A 
10 per cent rise in welfare payment rates leads to a fall in risk from about 
40 per cent to around 30 per cent for those who are “severely hampered” 
and to a fall of about 8 percentage points in the risk for those who are 
“somewhat hampered”. An increase of 20 per cent would have further, 
substantial effects. These results are discussed further in Chapter 12. 
 
Many people with a disability are not in receipt of disability-related 
income maintenance schemes, and for the most part these schemes are 
designed with an income maintenance function in mind, that is they are 
intended to substitute for income from work, rather than to meet the 
additional costs associated with disability. (Disablement Benefit is an 
exception in that it is intended to compensate for loss of physical and 
mental faculty and can be paid regardless of the labour force status of the 
claimant.) 41 The Report of the Working Group on the Review of the 
Illness and Disability Payment Schemes took the view that needs arising 
from the additional costs of disability should be addressed separately to 
income maintenance needs, echoing the Report of the Commission on the 
Status of People with Disabilities (1996). A Working Group under the 
partnership process spent some time considering such a costs of disability 
payment, and at present there is a commitment in the Disability Sectoral 
Plans and in the partnership agreement Towards 2016 to consider this as 
Independent Needs Assessment of those with disabilities is rolled out.42  
 
The core difficulties in framing such a scheme are the accurate 
identification of the costs involved, which vary very widely across 
individuals, and the design of an administrative mechanism that would 
allow varying levels of support to be delivered. A report by Indecon for the 
NDA (2004) examined the costs associated with disability in Ireland and 
reviewed international evidence. Because of gaps in data on disability and 
the wide variation in the needs of different individuals, this did not 
establish a definitive figure of the average cost of disability, but did show 
that there were extra costs of living related to disability over and above 
those which are currently met by state services or supports, for example, 
extra costs for heating or transport. It quotes studies elsewhere estimating 
the extra cost of living for people with a high level of disability at €40 a 
week or more.   
 
Here we have only quite crude information on the severity of the impact 
of disability available in the Living in Ireland Surveys, namely whether the 
person reports that they are hampered severely, to some extent or not at all. 
As a preliminary and necessarily very tentative exercise, we look at a 
scheme that pays those reporting severe limitations €20 per week, those 
reporting some limitations €10 per week, and nothing to those who report 
a disability but say it does not hamper them. The additional costs associated 
with disability might not in fact be closely linked to the degree of 
 
 
41 See Report of the Working Group on the Review of the Illness and Disability Payment 
Schemes (2003)  para. 2.14-2.16 on this distinction. 
42 The reference in Towards 2016 states that “…issues around cost of disability will be 
considered following the development of a needs assessment system provided for under 
Part 2 of the Disability Act, 2005”. 
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hampering involved, but this may serve to illustrate the very broad impact 
such a scheme might have. 
 
Table 8.8 shows the estimated impact of such a scheme on measured 
risk of poverty. The €20 per week supplement for those who are severely 
hampered by a disability leads to a 5 percentage point fall in the “at risk of 
poverty” measure from 40 per cent to about 35 per cent. The €10 per week 
supplement for those “somewhat hampered” by a disability leads to a 
smaller, but significant, fall of about 3 percentage points. 
Table 8.8: Estimated Impact of a “Tailored” Disability Supplement 
   
Category Baseline Poverty Risk Poverty Risk with a 
Supplement 
Persons with a chronic 
illness/disability, somewhat 
hampered 33.8 30.6 
Persons with a chronic 
illness/disability, severely 
hampered 40.4 34.9 
All persons 16.9 16.0 
   
 
Finally, we return to the issue of employment and on the impact that 
increasing the employment rate of people with a disability would have on 
poverty risk. Here, we simply explore the potential impact of an increase in 
employment for people with a disability. This is intended to give an idea of 
how much can be expected from this source in terms of reduction in 
poverty risk. Currently, the employment rate for people with a disability 
stands at about 33 per cent. The employment rate for persons without a 
disability is about twice that level. What would be the impact of a 
substantial rise in the employment rate for people with a disability? We 
consider the impact of a 10 percentage point rise in the employment rate, 
assuming that the risks of poverty remain the same for individuals in the 
same employment and disability classification. Thus, the risk is reduced 
from about 50 per cent to about 12 per cent for a person with a disability 
moving from unemployment or non-employment into employment. On 
this strict assumption, we find that the risk of poverty for people with a 
disability would fall from an overall level of about 37 per cent, to around 34 
per cent. While this is a significant fall, and there are gains beyond the 
income gains taken into account in this calculation, this result does point to 
the fact that employment is not likely to provide a complete solution to the 
heightened poverty risks facing people with a disability. 
 
 People with a disability are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social 
exclusion. The information relating to disability obtained in general 
household surveys is limited but does allow their income and deprivation 
levels to be analysed. In the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey, 22 per cent of 
respondents reporting a chronic illness or disability, and 38 per cent of 
these adults were in households “at risk of poverty”, more than twice the 
figure for other adults. Similarly, the consistent poverty rate for those 
reporting a chronic illness or disability was twice the rate for those not 
doing so. The percentage “at risk of poverty” rose sharply for long-term ill 
or disabled adults between 1995 and 2001, linked to the extent to which 
people with illness or disability and the households in which they live rely 
8.6 
Conclusions 
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on social welfare payments as a source of income. The factors 
underpinning this heightened poverty risk and consistent poverty are 
complex, with disability having its effects through a variety of channels, 
starting with its potential effects on educational attainment and its direct 
and indirect impact on the individual’s working career and perhaps also 
that of others in the household. 
 
In analysing possible policy responses we looked first at the impact of 
an increase in the level of support provided by the most directly relevant 
social welfare schemes. We found that a 10 per cent rise in those welfare 
payment rates would reduce the risk of poverty for those who are 
hampered by a chronic illness or disability by 8-10 percentage points. The 
impact of introducing a scheme aimed at covering some of the costs 
associated with disability was also examined, specifically a scheme paying 
€20 per week to those reporting that they were severely limited by a 
chronic illness or disability and €10 per week to those reporting some 
degree of limitation. This was associated with a fall of 5 and 3 percentage 
points respectively in the risk of poverty for these groups. Finally, the 
potential impact of an increase in employment for persons with a disability 
was explored: a 10 percentage point rise in their employment rate was seen 
to be associated with a fall of about 3 percentage points in their overall risk 
of income poverty.  
 
9. UNEMPLOYED 
PERSONS 
In this chapter we focus on risks of poverty and social exclusion facing 
unemployed persons, and policies aimed at providing adequate income 
support to those without jobs, while encouraging movement from 
unemployment into employment. Section 2 sets the context, outlining the 
major changes in the extent and composition of unemployment since the 
early 1990s. Section 3 puts Irish experience into an international context. 
While Ireland is seen as a model country in terms of its achievements in 
reducing unemployment from very high to very low levels, the risk of 
income poverty facing the unemployed is still high when compared to a 
number of other countries. Here again, there may be lessons to learn from 
“best practice” at European level. Section 4 summarises key findings of 
recent research regarding welfare payments, poverty and work incentives in 
Ireland. The main conclusions are drawn together in Section 5. 
9.1 
Introduction 
 
 Unemployment was, for many years, the most serious problem  in the 
Irish economy and the single greatest cause of poverty. Figure 9.1 charts 
the dramatic fall in Irish unemployment over the late 1990s –  the 
unemployment rates are measured according to the main international 
standard (the ILO convention), so that only those available for work, and 
actively seeking work, are counted. In 1993, the overall unemployment rate 
was close to 16 per cent. By the year 2000 it was just over 4 per cent. The 
fall in long-term unemployment was even sharper, from around 9 per cent 
to about 1½ per cent. 
9.2 
Trends in 
Unemployment 
and Risks of 
Poverty 
Figure 9.1: Unemployment and Long-term Unemployment Rates,  
1988-2006 
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Falling unemployment brings major economic and social benefits. It 
raises household incomes, and leads to increased tax revenue and reduced 
expenditure on unemployment compensation. Increased participation in 
employment also brings personal and wider social benefits. But the fall in 
the rate of unemployment does not eliminate all the disadvantages 
associated with it. What about the risks of poverty  facing the smaller 
population group now unemployed? Table 9.1 sets out the evolution of 
these risks, based on data from the Irish element of the European 
Community Household Panel, and the EU-SILC database. Because these 
European databases focus particularly on income and employment status 
over a 12 month period, unemployment is here defined in terms of being 
“mainly unemployed” during the previous year. 
 
During the late 1990s, when the unemployment rate fell sharply, there 
was an increase in the “at risk of poverty” rate faced by those who were 
unemployed, from around 40 per cent to 50 per cent or higher. This would 
be consistent with a selection effect, whereby unemployed persons in the 
worst off households were less likely than others to find jobs. The risk of 
poverty in the most recent years is estimated at between 42 per cent and 47 
per cent. These risks are more than twice as high as those for the overall 
population. 
Table 9.1: “At Risk of Poverty” Measure for Persons Mainly Unemployed 
in Preceding Year 
  
Year “At Risk of Poverty” Rate 
1995 37 
1996 40 
1997 44 
1998 46 
1999 55 
2000 48 
2001 54 
2002 n.a. 
2003 42 
2004 44 
2005 47 
  
Source: CHP (1995-2001) and EU-SILC (2003-2005) from Eurostat website 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
CSO analysis of SILC 2005 (Central Statistics Office, 2006) shows that 
the “at risk of poverty” rate for persons unemployed at the time of 
interview (using a “principal economic status” measure) was, at about 40 
per cent,  somewhat lower than the risks quoted from European sources 
above. This is likely to reflect the fact that the European measures are 
based on the dominant economic status over the preceding year. The 
“current status” measure includes more persons who are unemployed on a 
short-term basis. The income measure used in both cases is, however, an 
annual one. 
 
The CSO analysis also identifies the proportion of unemployed persons 
(again, using a Principal Economic Status definition) who are in consistent 
poverty i.e., falling below the income cut-off at 60 per cent of median 
income per adult equivalent and identified as deprived, lacking one or more 
of a set of 11 basic deprivation indicators. About half  of those falling 
  UNEMPLOYED PERSONS  105 
below the income cut-off are also found to be deprived, so the consistent 
poverty rate for unemployed persons is close to 22 per cent – about three 
times the rate for the total population. The consistent poverty rate for  
unemployed men, at 25 per cent, was about twice that for unemployed 
women. 
 
Callan et al. (2006) focus particularly on “at risk of poverty” rates and 
consistent poverty faced by the long-term unemployed. While savings, 
borrowing and assistance from relatives may help to tide over a short spell 
of unemployment, a longer spell, with low income over a sustained period, 
can be expected to raise the risk of deprivation and exclusion from 
ordinary living patterns. Callan et al., find that in 2004, the risk of consistent 
poverty was about 27 per cent for the long-term unemployed, as against 19 
per cent for all unemployed persons, and an overall rate of about 7 per 
cent. This suggests that consistent poverty for short-term unemployed is 
about double, and for long-term unemployed about three times the overall 
rate. The consistent poverty rate for the unemployed rose from 19 per cent 
to 21½  per cent in 2005. 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the scope for policy action to 
reduce risks of poverty for unemployed persons should be explored. In the 
next section we turn to international evidence, with a view to identifying 
best practice as a guide to policy improvements.  
 
 As noted earlier, Ireland is now counted as a country with one of the 
lowest rates of unemployment. But Ireland’s “at risk of poverty” rate for 
the unemployed is 47 per cent, which puts it among the four highest in the 
EU15, exceeded only by the UK. The best performing countries in this 
respect are Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, each of which has an 
“at risk of poverty” rate of 27 per cent, some 20 percentage points below 
the Irish rate. Does higher unemployment compensation necessarily lead to 
a higher rate of unemployment? Here the evidence is again quite clear. The 
three countries with the lowest risk of poverty for unemployed persons 
(Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) have unemployment rates of 3, 4 
and 5 per cent respectively. There is no close connection between the level 
of poverty risk faced by unemployed persons and the rate of 
unemployment. In particular, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have 
managed to combine a low rate of unemployment with a low risk of 
poverty for those who are unemployed. This contrasts with the current 
Irish combination of low unemployment with a high “at risk of poverty” 
rate. In the next section, we consider further how poverty risks for 
unemployed persons might be reduced, while maintaining a low rate of 
unemployment. 
9.3 
Evidence of 
International 
“Best 
Practice” 
 
 Given the configuration of high poverty risk for the unemployed, and a 
low rate of unemployment, it seems natural to investigate the possibility of 
an increase in unemployment compensation as a means of reducing 
poverty risk. We will address this issue empirically in Chapter 12, in the 
context of overall  welfare packages. Here we focus on a question of 
particular concern in terms of policy towards the unemployed. While 
raising unemployment compensation payments will reduce the risk of 
poverty for those who are unemployed, will it also have the effect of 
9.4 
Welfare 
Payments, 
Poverty and 
Work 
Incentives 
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reducing financial incentives to work, and thereby lead to changes in 
behaviour which will raise the rate of unemployment? 
Table 9.2: Persons Mainly Unemployed in Previous Year: Population Incidence 
and Risk of Poverty 
 
Country Risk of Poverty (60% Median 
Income) for Persons Mainly 
Unemployed in the Previous 
Year 
Unemployment Rate, Defined as 
Persons Mainly Unemployed in 
Previous Year as a Proportion of All 
Persons (Aged 18-64 Years) 
Sweden 26 3 
Denmark 27 4 
Netherlands 27 5 
Portugal 28 5 
France 29 6 
Belgium 31 9 
Greece 33 5 
Finland 35 6 
Spain 35 7 
Germany 43 6 
Italy 44 6 
Austria 47 2 
Ireland 47 4 
Luxembourg 47 2 
UK 51 2 
New member states 
(average) 
47 8 
 
Source: EU SILC, 2005 (Eurostat website http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal) 
 
This issue has been investigated in some depth in Callan et al. (2006). 
The approach taken there is to tackle this issue in two stages. The first 
stage is to identify the changes in financial incentives. For the unemployed, 
replacement rates are the preferred measure. These measure the balance 
between out-of-work and in-work incomes at family level, and take account 
of out-of-work benefits, and the full or partial withdrawal of these or other 
benefits if an individual were to take up a job. In order to estimate in-work 
incomes for unemployed persons, it is necessary to “predict” the gross 
wage that would be received in employment. In this report we focus on a 
profile of replacement rates for the unemployed, at wages that reflect the 
individual’s age, sex, marital status and educational qualifications. There is a 
well-established correlation between these variables and potential earnings, 
as is confirmed by the wage equations reported in Callan et al. (2006). The 
wage equations  predict hourly earnings on the basis of information about 
the individual’s age, sex, marital status and level of education.43 Key 
features include the fact that the average predicted wage for the 
unemployed is below the average industrial wage; but that rather than 
assign a uniform wage to all individuals, variation in individual 
circumstances (education, age etc.) are allowed to play a role in influencing 
the wage. Taxes and welfare entitlements are then calculated on the basis of 
the predicted wage. 
 
 
43 Estimation was by ordinary least squares. Investigation of sample selection effects 
would be of interest, though in earlier years the impact was limited. 
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The replacement rate is then calculated as: 
incomedisposablefamilyworkIn
incomedisposablefamilyworkofOutRR *100=  
For example, an individual might find that his or her income when 
unemployed is €150 per week, but that on taking up a job that disposable 
income would rise to €300 per week. The replacement rate in this situation 
would be 50 per cent. The same basic information can also be used to 
construct an “average tax rate” on taking up a job (Pearson and 
Whitehouse, 1997). But as Adams et al. (2006) indicate, “In general, the 
replacement rate better captures the strength of the incentive to work at 
all”. In Chapter 12, we will use this approach to identify the impact of 
increased welfare payment rates on the financial incentive to work facing 
unemployed persons. 
 
There is, however, a second stage in the assessment of the impact of 
increased welfare payments on behaviour, and hence on unemployment 
outcomes. Much of the literature tends to treat unemployment 
compensation as an unconditional payment, equivalent to a payment in 
respect of “not working” or leisure. In reality, however, unemployment 
compensation payments have conditions attached, which vary across 
countries, and which also vary in the degree to which they are enforced. 
This aspect of unemployment compensation schemes has come under 
increasing attention in recent years (e.g., OECD, 2003a) and has significant 
implications for the likely impact of increased payments. 
 
Evidence on the extent to which replacement rates influence the 
duration of unemployment spells, and thereby the level of unemployment, 
is mixed. Both in Ireland and elsewhere, some time-series studies indicate 
quite a strong association between the level of replacement rates and the 
level of unemployment. As against this, there is evidence from three 
sources indicating that high replacement rates are compatible with low 
unemployment. First, during recent years in Ireland replacement rates have 
risen quite markedly, but unemployment has remained low. Second, studies 
at household level in Ireland (Layte and Callan, 2001) and elsewhere have 
found that while the impact of replacement rates on unemployment is 
statistically identifiable and significant, it is also rather small, and accounts 
for rather small proportions of the large movements in unemployment 
actually observed during the 1980s and 1990s. Third, the policy and labour 
market regime in Denmark and some other Scandinavian countries clearly 
demonstrates that high replacement rates, providing effective income 
support to the unemployed, can coexist with low unemployment rates 
(OECD, 2006). 
 
A key element in achieving this combination is a strong policy on 
activation – an area in which Irish policy has developed significantly over 
recent years.  
 
At a wider level, there have been studies of participation decisions by 
Callan and van Soest (1996) and more recently by Callan, van Soest and 
Walsh (2007). These go beyond the decisions of unemployed persons to 
look at labour supply choices of husbands and wives. The results point to a 
higher responsiveness of married women’s labour supply to net rewards 
from employment. “Standard” tax cuts have rather limited impact, but a 
structural reform along the lines of the “individualisation” of the standard 
 
108 TACKLING LOW INCOME AND DEPRIVATION: DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE POLICIES 
rate band has a greater impact – though still small in relation to trend 
growth in married women’s labour supply. 
 
OECD (2003a) notes that Ireland was the country with the highest ratio 
of beneficiary to labour force survey unemployment by 1995. It dates the 
start of significant activation policies in Ireland to 1996. By the year 2000, 
20 to 54 year olds crossing a 9-month benefit receipt threshold entered 
processes set out under Ireland’s Employment Action Plan, part of the 
European Employment Strategy. These included attendance at an 
interview. Overall outcomes included a sharp fall in the total number of 
unemployment compensation recipients, and an even greater fall in labour 
force survey unemployment. 
 
In a later cross-country empirical analysis, OECD (2006) finds that 
“…in countries with a strong emphasis on activation policies, like 
Denmark and the Netherlands, unemployment benefits have a statistically 
insignificant effect on unemployment” (OECD, 2006, p. 217) The same 
OECD analysis finds that the impact of an increase in the replacement rate 
in Ireland has an impact which is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
and less than that in Denmark or Sweden. This suggests that activation 
policy in Ireland is already very effective in counterbalancing the potential 
negative effects on work incentives of increased unemployment 
compensation payments. 
 
 The rapid fall in the Irish unemployment rate, and its positive economic 
and social effects, have been well documented. There remains, however, a 
high “at risk of poverty” rate and high consistent poverty rates for those 
who are unemployed. The “at risk of poverty” rate for those who are 
unemployed is towards the high end of the international spectrum and 
exceeded in the EU 15 only by the UK. 
9.5 
Conclusions 
 
International best practice confirms that is possible to attain both low 
unemployment and a low “at risk of poverty” rate for the unemployed. In 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands the risk of poverty facing the 
unemployed is about half of that in Ireland and the UK, but the 
unemployment rate remains low. Strong activation policies are the key to 
achieving this combination. OECD analysis suggests that Irish activation 
policy has become very effective, and may now be able to offset the 
potential negative incentive impact of higher unemployment compensation. 
It should be remembered, however, that the Irish labour market has been 
exceptionally strong over this period. A key test will be whether the system 
is robust with respect to a slowdown in growth. In this respect it is of 
interest to look at unemployment rates for Scandinavian countries in a 
longer-term perspective, and compare them with the evolution of 
unemployment rates in the UK and the US, countries with very different 
welfare regimes. Experience since 1970 indicates that unemployment rates 
in Denmark and Norway have been as low as, or lower than, in the US and 
the UK, Shocks in the early 1990s, on the other hand, led to sharp and 
sustained increases in unemployment in Sweden, and to a greater extent in 
Finland. Unemployment rates have fallen back in these countries, but 
rather slowly. At present, therefore, unemployment rates in Norway and 
Denmark are below 4 per cent, and closer to 5 per cent in the UK and US. 
Rates in Sweden and Finland are between 7 and 8 per cent. 
10. IN-WORK POVERTY 
AND THE WORKING 
POOR 
 Over the decade from the mid-1990s, unprecedented levels of economic 
growth in Ireland have been associated with very rapid increases in 
employment, while unemployment has fallen dramatically. The number of 
women in the paid labour force has risen sharply, and substantial numbers 
of migrants have been attracted to Ireland to work. While incomes from 
employment have been rising on average at a rapid rate, concern about the 
numbers of “working poor” are being voiced more frequently – a concern 
that is also receiving increasing attention at EU level. In this chapter we 
first discuss what in-work poverty means and how it may be measured. We 
then use data for Ireland from EU-SILC to assess the extent of “in-work 
poverty”, and combine this with data from the European Community 
Household Panel to look at trends over time. We then look in some depth 
at what types of individual and household are most likely to be measured as 
“working poor”. Next, we tease out the implications for designing effective 
policies to combat in-work poverty. A number of specific approaches to 
improving the situation of the working poor are then analysed in detail. 
Finally, the conclusions are summarised. 
10.1  
Introduction 
 
 In defining and measuring in-work poverty, as for poverty more broadly, 
exclusion due to lack of resources is the core concept one is seeking to 
capture. Before getting into the details of how that might best be done, it is 
worth noting that there are differences between the situations of someone 
in work versus unemployed or inactive that are clearly relevant to their 
experience of, or exposure to, exclusion. On the one hand, not being able 
to obtain employment is itself a form of exclusion –  that can be very 
important in its own right and also have a major impact not only on 
someone’s financial situation but also on their social connectedness. On 
the other, the financial and time costs associated with working and getting 
to and from work can affect ability to participate in other dimensions of 
life, and poor working conditions may themselves be a significant source of 
stress impacting on quality of life. It is not easy to take these factors into 
account empirically, but it is important to keep them in mind particularly in 
comparing in-work poverty with, for example, the situation of the 
unemployed.  
10.2  
Measuring 
the Working 
Poor 
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 We begin by looking at the extent of in-work poverty risk in Ireland 
compared to other countries in Western Europe. This entails looking at the 
percentage of working individuals who are in households falling below 60 
per cent of median equivalised income – “at risk of poverty”. Table 10.1 
shows figures on in-work poverty risk for Ireland and other countries in 
the “old” EU-15, from two EU sources.44 The first, for 2004, is taken from 
the 2006 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion prepared 
by the EU Commission and Eurostat, mostly using data emerging from the 
new EU-SILC. (Figures for 2005 from EU-SILC have now been produced 
by Eurostat for some but not all these countries.) The second, for 2001, is 
taken from analysis by Bardone and Guio (2005) carried out for Eurostat 
using the last wave of the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHP). In both cases, an annual income measure is employed, and the 
employment status of the individual is measured on the basis of their 
“most frequent activity status” in the year; to be counted as working, 
someone must have reported being in work as their status for more than 
half the months of the year. This is the way in which in-work poverty is 
now measured in the context of the EU’s Social Inclusion Process, 
providing an obvious point of departure.  
10.3 
A 
Comparative 
Perspective 
on In-Work 
Poverty Risk 
in Ireland  
Table 10.1: In-Work Poverty Risk in Ireland and Other EU-15 Countries, 
2004 and 2001 
   
 2004 EU-SILC 2001 ECHP 
 Percentage of those in Work Below 60 Per Cent Median 
Equivalised Income 
Belgium 4 4 
Denmark 5 3 
Germany 9 4 
Greece 13 13 
Spain 11 10 
France 5 8 
Ireland 7 7 
Italy 10 10 
Luxembourg 8 8 
Netherlands 6 8 
Portugal 7 6 
Austria 13 12 
Finland 4 6 
Sweden 6 3 
United Kingdom 7 7 
   
EU-15 average 7.7 7.3 
   
Source:  2004: Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2006, Annex 1 
Methodological Notes and Statistical Tables, Table 5; 2001: Statistics in Focus, 
Population and Social Conditions, 5/2005, In-Work Poverty, Table 1. 
 
We see from Table 10.1 that in the Irish case 7 per cent of adults in 
work were in households below the 60 per cent of median income  
 
44 While the New Member States are also of interest, of course, the EU-15 represents the 
most direct frame of reference from a comparative perspective and available data also 
allow trends over time to be examined more easily for them.  
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threshold, in both the 2004 and 2001 data. Compared with the other 
countries covered,  this is marginally below the average –  with Greece, 
Spain, Italy and Austria having much higher figures, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden having lower ones, and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the UK having intermediate levels like Ireland. The switch 
from ECHP to EU-SILC as data source produces quite different figures 
for 2004 versus 2001 in Germany, and the figures for France are also rather 
different, but for Ireland the two sources present a consistent picture: the 
percentage of individuals at work who are in households “at risk of 
poverty” is close to the EU-15 average. 
 
To put this in context, it is interesting to compare the level of in-work 
poverty to the overall percentage of adults who fall below the 60 per cent 
relative income threshold, Table 10.2 shows that in 2004 Ireland in fact has 
a rather lower level of in-work poverty than would be expected from its 
overall adult at-risk figure, because the latter is particularly high. Over 20 
per cent of Irish adults were below the 60 per cent threshold in 2004, 
higher than any other country from the EU-15 (and also highest in the EU-
25 according to the figures presented in the Joint Report.) This is strongly 
influenced by the particularly high “at risk of poverty” rate facing older 
people in Ireland.  So the in-work “at risk of poverty” rate in Ireland is only 
one-third of the corresponding figure for the adult population as a whole, 
compared with 50 per cent on average for the EU-15 countries. Only in 
Belgium, France and Finland is the ratio of the in-work risk to the overall 
risk about that low. By contrast, countries such as Spain, Portugal and 
Greece have overall poverty risk levels that are similar to Ireland but much 
higher figures for in-work poverty risk.  
Table 10.2: In-Work Poverty Risk Versus Overall Poverty Risk in Ireland 
and Other EU-15 Countries, 2004 
    
 In-Work 
Poverty Risk 
Overall Adult Poverty 
Risk 
In-Work/Total 
Poverty Risk 
 Percentage Below 60 Per Cent Median 
Equivalised Income 
 
Belgium 4 14 0.29 
Denmark 5 11 0.45 
Germany 9 15 0.60 
Greece 13 20 0.65 
Spain 11 19 0.58 
France 5 13 0.38 
Ireland 7 21 0.33 
Italy 10 18 0.56 
Luxembourg 8 10 0.80 
Netherlands 6 11 0.54 
Austria 7 12 0.58 
Portugal 13 20 0.65 
Finland 4 11 0.36 
Sweden 6 11 0.54 
United Kingdom 7 17 0.41 
    
EU-15 average 
 (unweighted) 
7.7 14.9 0.49 
    
Source: Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2006, Annex 1 Methodological 
Notes and Statistical Tables, Table 5. 
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One relevant factor is the size of the self-employed population and of 
the agricultural sector in particular. In-work poverty for employees versus 
the self-employed are in many ways distinct phenomena – apart altogether 
from issues of income measurement for the latter –  and, therefore,  it is 
important to look at the two groups separately. While the figures available 
from EU-SILC for 2004 at this stage do not allow this, Table 10.3 presents 
the at-risk rates for the two groups separately taken from the Bardone and 
Guio (2005) analysis of 2001 ECHP data for Eurostat.  
Table 10.3: In-Work Poverty Risk for Employees Versus Self-Employed in 
Ireland and Other EU-15 Countries, 2001 
   
 Employees Self-employed 
 Percentage Below 60 Per Cent Median Equivalised Income 
Belgium 3 10 
Denmark 1 15 
Germany 4 5 
Greece 5 25 
Spain 7 20 
France 6 25 
Ireland 6 16 
Italy 7 18 
Luxembourg 8 2 
Netherlands - - 
Austria 3 24 
Portugal 7 28 
Finland 4 17 
Sweden 2 22 
United Kingdom 5 14 
   
Source:  Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions, 5/2005, In-Work Poverty,  
Table 1. 
 
We see that in Ireland, as in most of the other countries, the percentage 
below 60 per cent of median income is very much higher for the self-
employed than for employees; there is also considerably more variation 
across countries in the rate for the self-employed. For 10 out of the 15 
countries, the “at risk of poverty” rate for employees is in the range 4 per 
cent – 8 per cent, and the figure for Ireland, at 6 per cent, is right in the 
middle of that range. For the self-employed, the Irish figure is much higher 
at 16 per cent, but this is again in the intermediate range compared with the 
corresponding figures for the self-employed in the other EU-15 countries. 
So the percentage of employees and the percentage of self-employed in 
households below 60 per cent of median income in Ireland is 
unremarkable, neither particularly high nor particularly low, compared with 
other EU-15 countries. 
 
As in other countries, the size of the in-work population in Ireland 
means that even with a relatively low “at risk of poverty” rate that group 
will represent a substantial proportion of all adults below the income 
threshold. Table 10.4 shows that in the Irish case, 17 per cent of adults 
below the 60 per cent threshold in 2004 were in work. This is a particularly 
low figure compared with other EU-15 countries, only Belgium having a 
lower figure, whereas one-quarter or even one-third of adults below the 
income threshold are in work in the other Western European member 
states. This reflects the fact that a particularly high proportion of adults not 
in work – notably the retired and the inactive – are below the threshold in 
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Ireland, and this is what underlies Ireland’s particularly high overall “at risk 
of poverty” rate. 
Table 10.4: The Share of In-Work Poverty in Overall Poverty in Ireland and 
Other EU-15 Countries, 2001 
  
 Adults in Work and Below 60 Per Cent of Median 
Equivalised Income as Percentage of all Adults Below that 
Income Threshold 
  
Belgium 14 
Denmark 26 
Germany - 
Greece 32 
Spain 26 
France 21 
Ireland 17 
Italy 25 
Luxembourg 44 
Netherlands 33 
Austria 34 
Portugal 36 
Finland 21 
Sweden 31 
United Kingdom 26 
  
Source:  Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2006, Annex 1 Methodological 
Notes and Statistical Tables, Table 5. 
 
 Having seen how in-work poverty risk in Ireland compares with other 
EU-15 countries, we now look at how it has been changing over time in 
the Irish case. Over the ten years from 1994, based on data from the 
ECHP and EU-SILC, in-work poverty risk rose significantly. In the first, 
1994 wave of the ECHP 5 per cent of those in work were also in 
households below 60 per cent of median income. As we saw in the 
previous section, by 2004 the corresponding figure was 7 per cent. For 
employees the percentage in households below the 60 per cent income 
threshold rose even more sharply, from 2 per cent to over 5 per cent. This 
occurred against a background of extremely rapid economic growth – with 
Ireland having the highest GDP growth in the OECD over the period –  
and employment rising sharply over the period, so this higher risk is being 
applied to a larger proportion of the working-age population. There were 
also very substantial increases in earnings and household incomes. In that 
context, why did in-work poverty risk rise? 
10.4  
Trends Over 
Time in In-
Work Poverty 
Risk 
 
The answer lies in the pattern of increases in household incomes and 
the nature of relative income lines. There was a dramatic shift in the type of 
households below the 60 per cent of median relative income threshold over 
the period. In 1994, over 40 per cent had an unemployed “reference 
person”, whereas this was 7 per cent by 2001 and had fallen further by 
2004. Conversely households with a head/reference person who was 
ill/disabled, working in the home, or retired accounted for far more of 
those below the threshold in 2004 than they had in 1994, reaching almost 
two-thirds of those affected. The sharp decline in unemployment and the 
failure of vulnerable groups such as the ill/disabled, the retired and those in 
home duties to keep pace with the advances made by those in employment 
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were the main factors at work. Despite their relatively low probability of 
being below the income threshold, households where the head/reference 
person is in work also comprised a higher proportion of those below the 
income threshold by the end of the period, consistent with the rise in 
poverty risk for working individuals.  
 
This reflects the fact that while incomes increased in real terms 
throughout, some working households saw more rapid increases than 
others. Households where the numbers at work rose saw particularly 
marked income increases –  with the proportion of married women in work 
rising very rapidly over the period. This in turn contributed to the very 
rapid increase in average or median incomes: from 1994 to 2004, median 
income and thus the median-based poverty thresholds more than doubled 
in nominal terms. Households with only one earner, even if that earner saw 
their earnings rise quite considerably over the period, could well fail to keep 
pace with the poverty threshold, and some thus saw their overall household 
incomes slip below that threshold. This is a key factor in the growth in in-
work poverty measured vis-à-vis relative income thresholds.  
 
The picture would of course be very different indeed if instead of 
income thresholds linked to average income one used a standard held 
constant in purchasing power terms. This can be illustrated by taking the 60 
per cent of median threshold in 1994 and indexing it to changes in the 
Consumer Price Index rather than average incomes. Using such a “constant 
in real terms” line, the overall percentage falling below that threshold 
would have fallen from about 16 per cent in 1994 to about 2 per cent in 
2001, and even lower by 2004. This reflects the scale of real income growth 
throughout the distribution seen over this remarkable period in Ireland. On 
that basis in-work poverty, like overall poverty for the sample as a whole, 
would have virtually disappeared by 2004.  
 
 While those in work living in households below the 60 per cent relative 
income threshold are “at risk of poverty”, we know from a range of Irish 
and international studies that it is hazardous to draw strong conclusions on 
the basis of current income alone about living standards, and in particular 
about whether a household is unable to reach an acceptable standard of 
living due to lack of resources. Using non-monetary deprivation indicators 
allows us to focus on those who are both below “at risk of poverty” 
thresholds and reporting specific types of deprivation –  the “consistently 
poor” (Nolan and Whelan, 1996). Using the original set of basic 
deprivation indicators employed in measuring “consistent poverty”, about 
7 per cent of the overall EU-SILC sample were in “consistent poverty”, in 
this sense (that is, below 60 per cent of median income and reporting basic 
deprivation) in 2004. Looking at those in work, then, we find that only 2 
per cent were “consistently poor” (whereas 7 per cent were below 60 per 
cent of median income). So only one-quarter of the “working poor”, 
measured in income terms alone, are in consistent poverty. Similarly, only 
1.5 per cent of all employees were in consistent poverty, which means that 
just over one-quarter of employees below the income threshold were in 
consistent poverty. With the revised and expanded set of basic deprivation 
indicators now being employed to measure basic deprivation (and a 
threshold of two or more on that index), only 1.4 per cent of those in work 
and 1.2 per cent of employees are in households in consistent poverty.  
10.5 
Alternative 
Perspectives 
on Poverty 
for the 
Working 
Poor 
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This is not to say that the majority of the “working poor” defined in 
income terms are indistinguishable from others at work in terms of their 
living standards. This is brought out if we construct a deprivation index 
using a broader range of consumer durables and regular consumption 
items. This shows 38 per cent of those at work and below the 60 per cent 
income threshold are deprived of two or more of the items involved, 
compared with 19 per cent for all those at work. Similarly, as Figure 10.1 
illustrates, those working and below the income threshold demonstrate 
higher levels of subjectively-assessed economic strain than others at work. 
Compared with all those at work, about twice as high a proportion of the 
working poor said that they had recent experience of arrears on 
mortgage/rent or utility bills, could not meet unexpected expenses, or 
experienced debt problems to meet ordinary living expenses.  
Figure 10.1: Subjectively-Assessed Economic Strain for All At Work 
Versus Working Poor, Ireland 2004  
0.0 10.0 20.0
Arrears 
Debt problems
Unexpected expenses
unaffordable
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It is also of interest to look at another measure recently developed in the 
ESRI which relates to ‘economic vulnerability’ (Whelan and Maître, 2006, 
Whelan, Maître and Nolan, 2007). This is captured by combining 
information about whether a household is below “at risk of poverty” 
thresholds, experiencing enforced basic deprivation, and reporting 
difficulty in making ends meet. The statistical methodology latent class 
analysis is applied to identify an underlying patterns of connection between 
these variables (see Whelan and Maître, 2006 for details). This identifies 
one-fifth of the total population as economically vulnerable, using data 
from the 2004 EU-SILC survey. When this approach is applied to the 
situation of those at work we find that about 10 per cent would be 
categorised as “economically vulnerable”, however, only about half the 
“working poor” defined in purely income terms are identified by this 
approach as “economically vulnerable”.  
 
These results suggest that many of those who are at work and in 
households falling below the 60 per cent of median income threshold are 
indeed disadvantaged, across a wide range of indicators. However, a 
substantial proportion does not appear to be particularly disadvantaged in 
these terms. This is more likely to be true of the self-employed than of 
employees, due both to the extent to which the incomes of the self-
employed fluctuate over time and the difficulties faced in trying to capture 
their situation in surveys. For that reason, when we come to the 
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implications for policy and alternative strategies we concentrate for the 
most part on employees. 
 
 Having examined the extent of in-work poverty in Ireland in comparative 
perspective, we now go on to analyse the nature of that phenomenon in 
more depth using micro-data from the 2004 EU-SILC. (The overall extent 
of in-work poverty in the 2005 survey seems similar, but significant work is 
required with the micro-data before they will be ready for in-depth analysis 
on this topic.) As we have seen, if the working poor are defined as those at 
work and living in a household with total (equivalised) income below 60 
per cent of median income, then the results from the 2004 EU-SILC 
survey indicate that 7 per cent of those at work are in that position. 
Applying that percentage to the total at work shown by the 2006 Census of 
Population of just below two million, this would suggest that 130,000 
persons were working poor in that sense.   
10.6  
A Detailed 
Picture of In-
Work Poverty 
in Ireland: 
The 
Individual 
 
We have also seen that the self-employed face a much higher probability 
of being below the income threshold, in Ireland as in most other countries. 
However, employees make up over four-fifths of the working population, 
so despite their low risk almost two-thirds of the working poor are 
employees – about 85,000 persons. The remainder of the working poor are 
self-employed, more than half working in agriculture. Farmers face a 
particularly high probability of being counted as working poor: they 
comprise less than 7 per cent of those at work in EU-SILC 2004 but 
almost 20 per cent of the working poor, or 25,000 persons. Survey-based 
measurement of farm income poses particular problems and these incomes 
can also fluctuate substantially from year to year; among other issues, 
income in kind in terms of home production is in principle included in the 
measure (and is very much less important now than it would have been in 
the past), but may not be fully captured. Self-employed other than farmers 
comprise about 11 per cent of those at work but 15 per cent of the working 
poor, or about 20,000 persons.  
 
As discussed earlier, being “in work” can be measured in different ways, 
focusing on the person’s status at the time of the interview or throughout 
the year; however, this turns out to make little difference to the pattern of 
poverty risk or the individuals in the sample identified as the working poor. 
Concentrating on employees, if we use the “main activity status” of 
individuals (based on the activity status in each month recorded in the 
survey) to identify those who were employees for over half the year (the 
approach adopted in the figures produced by Eurostat and reported in the 
previous section), then 6 per cent were below the income threshold. If we 
look at those who give their current principal economic status in the survey 
as employee, then 5.3 per cent are in households below the 60 per cent of 
median income threshold. Most of those who are currently employed were 
also in work for most of the previous year, although the “at risk of 
poverty” rate is higher for the small minority who were not. 
 
We now examine the profile of those who are measured as “working 
poor”, focusing first on their own individual characteristics and then on 
those of their household. Figure 10.2 shows the age composition of all 
those who are at work and below the 60 per cent threshold. We see that, 
compared with all those at work, the working poor are more concentrated 
in the older age ranges – over 60 per cent are aged 40 years or more, 
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compared with 52 per cent of the workforce as a whole. This reflects the 
older age profile of the self-employed (including farmers), though, with 
working poor employees are not very different in age terms from all 
employees. 
Figure 10.2: Age Profile of Working Poor Versus All At Work, Ireland 2004 
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The working poor are also slightly more likely to be male: 61 per cent of 
the working poor are men, compared with 57 per cent of all those at work. 
However, among employees the opposite is true: 49 per cent of working 
poor employees are men, compared with 52 per cent of all employees. 
(Since men make up a clear majority of the work-force, they still face a 
higher probability of in-work poverty.) For both men and women 
employees, the likelihood of being working poor is lowest in the 25 to 34 
year age group; for men it is highest in the 45 to 54 year group, while for 
women it is highest in the 55 to 64 year range.  
 
As far as educational attainment is concerned, Figure 10.3 shows that 
the working poor have substantially lower levels of educational attainment 
than all those at work; almost one-third have no education beyond primary 
level (compared with 13 per cent of all those at work), and only 41 per cent 
have attained at least the upper secondary completion qualification, 
compared with 67 per cent of all those at work. Working poor employees 
have slightly higher levels of attainment than self-employed working poor, 
but still have a significantly disadvantaged profile compared with others at 
work. 
 
This age, gender and educational profile is reflected in the earnings of 
the employee, one factor in understanding why they are “working poor”. 
The number of hours worked is a significant influence on earnings 
particularly among employees, and part-time employees face a much higher 
poverty risk than full-time ones. (About 4 per cent of full-time male 
employees, 3 per cent of full-time female employees, and 10 per cent of 
female part-time employees are in households below the 60 per cent 
threshold; part-time men face an even higher poverty risk than part-time 
women, with almost one in five below the threshold, but there are far 
fewer of them.) The risk of poverty is also clearly related to the position of 
the employee in the weekly earnings distribution. Even when working full-
time, the risk of poverty is 12 per cent for employees in the bottom quintile 
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of the earnings distribution; this falls to 8 per cent for the second quintile 
and is only about 1-2 per cent in the rest of the earnings distribution.  
Figure 10.3: Educational Attainment of Working Poor Versus All At Work, 
Ireland 2004 
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As well as the overall earnings distribution, we can look at the situation 
of employees falling below conventional low pay thresholds. In the 2004 
sample, about 23 per cent of Irish employees had weekly gross earnings 
below two-thirds of median earnings – a widely used measure of low pay. 
With about 1,616,000 employees in the state in the 2006 Census, this would 
correspond to about 370,000 employees. Of these low-paid individuals, 
though, only 13 per cent were in households “at risk of poverty” – about 
48,000 persons. So most low paid employees are not working poor in that 
sense. On the other hand, 60 per cent of working poor employees are 
themselves low paid, in terms of their own weekly earnings. This 
asymmetric relationship between low pay and household poverty is consistent 
with earlier Irish studies (for example, Nolan, 1998), and with the pattern 
found in other Western European countries; for example, Nolan and Marx 
(2000) note that for full-time employees across the ECHP generally about 60 
per cent of the low paid are in the top 60 per cent of the income 
distribution. This reflects the fact that employees, whether low paid or not, 
are mostly to be found in households not in poverty or towards the bottom 
of the income distribution. Such households generally do not contain an 
employee, but where they do contain an employee most often that employee 
is low paid. The features that distinguish the minority of the low paid who are 
in households “at risk of poverty” then relate to the household context in 
which poverty is occurring, as we explore in the next section.  
 
 We now turn from the individual characteristics of the working poor to 
the type of households they live in –  with those household characteristics 
likely to be critical in understanding why they are indeed below the “at risk 
of poverty” threshold. We show in Table 10.5 the composition of the 
households involved, for all working poor and for working poor employees 
(who it will be recalled are estimated to number about 130,000 and 85,000 
persons respectively). We see that the working poor are predominantly in 
households with children – only one-third are in households with no 
children. Only 7 per cent are lone parents with children, so about 60 per 
cent are in households with two or more adults and children. The largest 
proportion – 29 per cent – are in households with three or more adults 
plus children – in many cases these comprise a couple with their offspring, 
10.7  
A Detailed 
Picture of In-
Work Poverty 
in Ireland: 
The 
Household 
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some of whom are still children but others are aged 18 years or over. The 
corresponding profile for working poor employees shows that these are 
even more likely to be in households with children. About 9 per cent are in 
households comprising just one adult with a child or children, but 63 per 
cent are in households with two or more adults and children. Strikingly, 
only 2 per cent are living alone. (This profile of course reflects both the 
distribution of all employees by household composition type and the risk 
faced by each type of being below the income threshold; for example, 
single adult employees with children face a much higher probability of 
being below the income threshold than others, but comprise only a small 
proportion of all employees.) 
Table 10.5: Household Composition for the Working Poor and for 
Working Poor Employees, Ireland, 2004  
   
 Working Poor Working Poor 
Employees 
 Percentage of those Below 60 Per Cent Median 
Equivalised Income 
1 adult 8.3 2.3 
2 adults 16.0 15.5 
3+ adults 10.4 11.7 
1 adult with children 6.7 9.0 
2 adults, 1 child 6.2 3.9 
2 adults, 2 children 8.9 9.5 
2 adults, 3 children 7.8 6.6 
2 adults, 4+ children 6.5 7.3 
3 adults+ with 
children 
29.3 34.0 
 
Total 
 
100 
 
100 
   
 
As well as household size and composition, the other key feature of the 
household in this context is the number of people with an income and the 
source of that income. What is distinctive about the households of the 
working poor is how few of their working-age adult members are actually 
in work. This is illustrated in Figure 10.4, which shows that for all those at 
work, the average number of working-age adults in the household is 2.6. 
For the working poor, the corresponding figure is only slightly lower, at 
2.3. However, for all those at work the average number of persons in the 
household in work is 2, whereas the corresponding figure for the 
households of the working poor is only 1.3. The gap is even greater when 
we focus on those in full-time work, where the figures are 1.6 versus 0.8 
respectively for the households of those at work versus the working poor. 
 
Focusing on employees, Figure 10.5 shows that for all employees there 
are 2.7 persons in the household of working age on average, of whom 2.1 
are in work and 1.7 are in full-time work. For working poor employees, on 
the other hand, there are almost as many working-age adults at 2.5 per 
household on average, but only 1.4 are in work and only 0.8 in full-time 
work.  
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Figure 10.4: Numbers in the Household in Work for the Working Poor 
Versus All At Work, Ireland 2004 
 
Figure 10.5: Numbers in the Household in Work for Working Poor 
Employees Versus All Employees, Ireland 2004 
 
Table 10.6: Poverty Risk by Household Composition and Number At 
Work, Ireland 2004 
  
 Percentage Below 60 Per Cent of Median 
Equivalised Income 
2 adults no children  
1 at work 10.2 
2 at work 2.4 
2 adults with children  
1 at work 15.1 
2 at work 1.4 
3 adults no children  
1 at work 11.3 
2 at work 2.1 
3+ at work 0 
3 adults no children  
1 at work 32.6 
2 at work 5.9 
3+ at work 7.9 
  
 
The central role played by the number of persons in the household at 
work is brought out in Table 10.6, which shows for employees in 2 and 3-
adult households how the percentage falling below the 60 per cent 
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threshold varies depending on the presence or absence of children and the 
number of adults in work. We see that the risk of poverty is relatively high 
for employees where only one adult is in work, whether there are children 
or not, but that the risk is very low indeed where 2 or more are at work 
except in households of 3 or more adults with children. 
 
The salience of numbers at work in the household is also reflected in the 
sources of income received, and Figure 10.6 shows that the households of 
the working poor are quite heavily reliant on social welfare transfers 
compared with others at work. For 28 per cent of the working poor, at 
least half of all the income coming into the household was from social 
welfare (compared with a figure of only 7 per cent for all those at work).  
Figure 10.6: Social Welfare Transfers as a Percentage of Total Household 
Income, Working Poor Versus All At Work 
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 We now turn to policy, and the implications of the patterns and trends 
we have described for reducing poverty in general and in-work poverty in 
particular. The central plank of the government’s strategy for combating 
poverty since the late 1980s has been precisely to get more people into 
work, and this has been an unprecedented success in terms of the scale of 
employment growth and reduction in unemployment achieved. Generating 
more jobs has also been assigned a central role at EU level in lifting people 
out of poverty. In the Irish case that strategy has certainly been a 
resounding success in terms of improving living standards and reducing 
deprivation. While those who remain outside the workforce have lagged 
behind in income terms, even they have seen significant improvements in 
living standards. However, some people in work still fall below “at risk of 
poverty” thresholds, and while only a minority of these are in consistent 
poverty it seems reasonable to take the broader group as a focus (though 
not the exclusive focus) of policy concern. 
10.8  
Policy 
Towards the 
Working 
Poor  
 
It might come as a surprise to see that risk of poverty for those in work 
has actually increased over the period from the mid-1990s when a National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced in 2001. This NMW is at a 
relatively high level, in absolute and relative terms, compared with other 
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EU countries.45 This should not be so much of a surprise, though, in the 
light of the very limited overlap between low pay and household poverty 
that has been known for some time from previous studies of Ireland and 
other OECD countries (see for example, Nolan and Marx, 2000). These 
studies have demonstrated that policies aimed at improving the earnings of 
the low paid as a group, including minimum wages, (directly) benefit only a 
minority of poor households, with most of the benefits going to non-poor 
households simply because that is where most of the low paid are to be 
found. This is not in itself an argument against a minimum wage, of course, 
since other aims may be to the fore such as preventing exploitation of 
workers and promotion of greater equality in earnings between men and 
women. It is also important to note that despite the very large spill-over of its 
effects to “non-poor” households, a substantial proportion of the working 
poor may still benefit. 
 
In order to explore this policy option, we simulated a 10 per cent 
increase in the National Minimum Wage using the SWITCH model. The 
overall effects on the risk of poverty were very small.  Greater effects were 
found on the poverty risk when focusing on in-work poverty and on 
poverty among employees, as the self-employed would gain no direct  
benefit from a rise in the minimum wage. The risk of in-work poverty 
would fall from about 5.5 per cent to 4 per cent. The “at risk of poverty” 
rate for employees is estimated to fall from 2.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent. 
While an increase in the national minimum wage benefits those at the 
bottom of the individual earnings distribution, it is spread further up the 
household income distribution. One side-effect of this is a small rise in the 
median wage, which acts to reduce the impact on overall poverty.  
 
As far as the tax system is concerned, those on the Minimum Wage have 
now been lifted out of the income tax net and their social security 
contributions have been reduced by a variety of changes in the PRSI 
structure. To have any significant impact on the working poor, it is likely 
that further tax reductions would have to be targeted at those in low-
income households rather than on the basis of low individual earnings. 
This is difficult to achieve, given the moves towards greater 
individualisation of the income tax structure. One approach might be to 
allow tax relief for those with child dependants below an income threshold. 
As with other measures targeted via income level, the potential for 
disincentive effects and poverty traps is significant. 
 
The alternative to tax reductions for the working poor is direct cash 
transfers, and the Family Income Supplement for those in work with 
children but on low household income has served as the principal policy 
instrument in this respect for many years. It faces the problem of non-take-
up of benefits, as is commonly found with such schemes elsewhere, and the 
potential for serious disincentive effects and poverty traps as the payment 
is withdrawn is also a major concern. Those without children are also not 
currently catered for. The option of a new “second tier” child income 
 
45 At almost €1,300 per month the Irish minimum is currently higher in absolute terms 
than those operating in any other EU Member State except Luxembourg; when adjusted 
for Purchasing Power Parities, it is in a group of 6 Member States with relatively high 
minima (see Regnard, 2006). As about 50 per cent of average gross earnings (in industry), 
the Irish minimum is among the highest in the EU relative to earnings.   
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support, payable as a supplement on top of child benefit, has been under 
consideration in policy debate – and was explored in Chapter 6 in the 
context of strategies against child poverty; we will return in Chapter 12 to 
the impact on the working poor of a package incorporating such an 
approach. 
 
Concern about disincentives focuses attention on the broader range of 
policies aimed at helping families with children, in particular universal cash 
transfers. In the Irish case universal Child Benefit has been very 
substantially increased in recent years, at significant exchequer cost, and the 
system of cash support for children is now among the more generous in 
the EU. Simulation of the impact of the increases to date using SWITCH 
suggest that they may indeed have had a substantial impact in reducing 
overall child poverty rates measured vis-à-vis “at risk of poverty” 
thresholds (Callan et al., 2006).  
 
  Defining “working poor” as persons in work living in households that 
are “at risk of poverty”, we have seen that 7% of Irish adults in work are in 
that situation, close to the EU-15 average. The corresponding figure is 6% 
for employees but 16 per cent for the self-employed, neither being 
particularly high or low compared with other EU-15 countries. This means 
that 17 per cent of adults “at risk of poverty” in Ireland 9below 60% of 
median household income) are in work. Over the ten years from 1994, in-
work poverty risk rose from 5 per cent to 7 per cent. However, only a 
relatively small minority of the “working poor”, measured in income terms 
alone, are in consistent poverty. Working poor employees tend to have 
relatively low levels of educational attainment, are often low paid, and are 
also predominantly in households with children.  
10.9 
Conclusions 
 
Focusing on policy options aimed at the working poor, we simulated a 
10 per cent increase in the National Minimum Wage using the SWITCH 
tax-benefit model, and found that the overall risk of in-work poverty would 
fall from about 5½ per cent to 4 per cent, while for employees it would fall 
from 2½  per cent to 1½  per cent. Other policies focus on assisting low-
earning households with children. The option of a means-tested “second 
tier” child income support supplement has already been explored in 
Chapter 6. Universal Child Benefit has been very substantially increased in 
recent years, and simulation of the impact of these increases on suggest 
that they may have had a significant impact in reducing poverty for 
households with children. 
 
As in measuring poverty more generally, the most common way of 
measuring the extent of in-work poverty relies on income, and on whether 
the disposable income of a household (adjusted for household size and 
composition) falls below a specified income threshold (see for example, the 
comparative studies by Forster and Pearson, 2002 and Fritzell and 
Ritakallio, 2004). As discussed in earlier chapters, a threshold of 60 per cent 
of median equivalised household income is widely used, including in the 
EU’s Social Inclusion indicators, and comparative figures across countries 
are often produced on this basis. The fact that the EU’s social inclusion 
indicators label people below such income thresholds as “at risk of 
poverty” rather than poor is a recognition of the fact that they may not all 
be suffering exclusion in terms of ordinary living standards. Non-monetary 
indicators of deprivation can be used to hone in on those who are both on 
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low income and experiencing serious deprivation or exclusion, and we will 
be using this approach to elaborate on the extent of in-work poverty in 
Ireland, though for comparative purposes we have to rely on measures 
based purely on income.  
 
Poverty or “poverty risk” status measured in this way is a feature of the 
household – which assumes everyone in a particular household has a 
common standard of living – but “working”, by contrast, refers to an 
individual. One way to define and measure “in-work poverty” or “the 
working poor” is then to focus on individuals who are themselves in work 
and who live in a poor household (or household “at risk of poverty”). A 
different approach is to focus on households where the “household head” 
or potential “main earner” is in work, but despite this the household is in 
poverty – and all those living in such households, including children and 
other dependents, are in some sense affected by in-work poverty. That 
reflects an important element in underlying policy concerns, and we will 
present some figures for Ireland on this basis; however, the more 
straightforward analytical approach on which we concentrate most of our 
attention is to focus on individuals who are themselves at work and are also 
poor (or “at risk of poverty”), and then look at the role they play in their 
household and the position of other household members. 
 
Significant issues arise both in relation to how income is measured and 
what “in work” means. For both, there is the question of timing: some 
studies focus on the individual’s current labour market status and their 
household income in the last week or month, while others take a longer 
time period, often an annual perspective. The latter then faces the obvious 
problem that someone’s labour force status may well change over the 
course of a year, so that they may have been in work for some but not all 
of it. Do we then confine our attention to those who worked for most or 
all of the year, or include anyone who has been in work at any point? In 
presenting comparative data we are constrained by available figures to 
employing the annual time horizon, but for Ireland we can use the micro-
data to also hone in on those who are in work at the time of interview and 
their current income at that point. There is also a question as to how the 
“working” element of “working poor” is defined and measured. While both 
employees and the self-employed are of course conventionally measured as 
being “in work”, in practice much of the focus in studying in-work poverty 
has been on employees –  reflecting both the fact that incomes of the self-
employed are difficult to measure accurately and the different policy issues 
raised by this group, in particular farmers.  
11. THE SPATIAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
POVERTY AND 
DEPRIVATION 
 
 Space or location can impact on outcomes in a variety of complex forms. 
These include regional development patterns and policies, planning 
policies, transport policies, the development of urban systems and rural 
development strategies.46 Our relatively specific set of concerns in this 
chapter focus on the spatial distribution of poverty and material 
deprivation and the ensuing policy implications.  
11.1 
Introduction 
 
Initially we will deal with spatial distribution as such. Our focus, 
depending on the degree of disaggregation possible with the relevant data 
sources, will be on local authority areas and planning regions. In so doing, 
rather than assuming that spatial variation involves a homogeneous pattern, 
we will use a range of indicators. As will become clear, conclusions 
regarding the value of spatial interventions do not follow automatically 
from the facts of spatial distribution. However, knowledge of such 
variation allows discussion of such options and choices between them to 
proceed on an informed basis. Our analysis will be extended beyond 
location as such by using information relating to population density, 
housing tenure and the manner in which they interact. In using such 
information we seek to address, in what is necessarily an indirect manner, 
issues relating to the extent to which poverty is concentrated in certain 
‘blackspots’ and the policy implications that follow, issues relating to such 
concentration have been of long-standing concern.47  
 
Previous work on the spatial distribution of poverty and social exclusion 
has drawn on a variety of data sources including The Census of Population 
(2000), the Living in Ireland Survey (LIS, 2000) and the National Survey of 
Housing Quality (2002). In this chapter we seek to provide an overview of 
earlier results and where possible update such findings making use of the 
2005 wave of EU-SILC.  
 
46 For detailed discussion of a range of such issues see Bartley and Kitchin (2007). 
47 Watson et al. (2005), Nolan et al. (1998) and Nolan and Whelan (2000) and Haase (1999). 
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Previous work has addressed three key aspects of the spatial distribution 
of poverty and social exclusion: 
 
• The identification of patterns of concentration and the manner in 
which these have evolved over time. 
• The significance of such patterns in the context of overall levels of 
incidence. 
• Consideration of the processes underlying poverty clustering. 
 
These questions are directly relevant to government policy. The 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy and the more recent NAP inclusion (2007) 
have addressed a series of issues relating to the concentrated and 
cumulative nature of poverty and social exclusion. Such concerns have 
prompted a variety of area-based programmes. 
 
 Since the early 1990s there has been a growing emphasis on policy options 
involving spatial programmes aimed at tackling unemployment, poverty 
and social exclusion. Following a number of pilot schemes area-based 
programmes have become a significant part of government policy aimed at 
tackling poverty. As Walsh (1999, p. 279) notes, this is clearly evidenced in 
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy (1997), which exhibits an explicit 
spatial dimension in two of its five priority themes: disadvantaged urban 
areas and marginalised rural communities. In 1992 the Irish Government in 
collaboration with the European Commission established Area 
Development Management (ADM – now Pobal). Its primary objective was 
to promote social inclusion, reconciliation and equality and to counter 
disadvantage through local, social and economic development. As Haase et 
al. (1996) document, the initiative was representative of a concern to 
develop area-based programmes in response to emerging evidence relating 
to unemployment blackspots. The number and range of projects managed 
by Pobal has evolved considerably since 1992. Among its current 
programmes are the Local Development Social Inclusion Programme 
(LDSIP) and RAPID (Revitalising Areas by Planning Investment and 
Development) programmes. The former is a National Development 
Programme aimed specifically at addressing social inclusion issues at local 
level. The LDSIP provides funding to Partnership Community Groups and 
Employment Pacts that adopt a partnership approach to tackling local 
issues on the basis of comprehensive, integrated local action plans. The 
RAPID programme is intended as a response to the need for more and 
better-targeted investment in disadvantaged areas. The focus in terms of 
service delivery is on integrating services more efficiently and tailoring 
them to community needs. It is also intended to encourage investment in 
new facilities and services. Among the objectives identified as fundamental 
to the RAPID programme are the development of an integrated focus on 
social groups experiencing cumulative disadvantage, reduction in spatial 
concentration of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion, and the 
mobilisation of social capital and capacity for economic and social 
development. Other programmes include the Equal Opportunities 
Childcare Programme (EOCP) and the Millennium Partnership Fund for 
Disadvantage.  
11.2  
The Variety 
of Rationales 
for Area 
Intervention 
 
One of the important considerations, but by no means the only one, in 
allocation of funding under these programmes is the socio-demographic 
profile of the geographical areas. This can involve the use of indices of 
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deprivation, which rank district electoral divisions (DEDs) according to 
indicators such as unemployment, education, class composition and 
housing quality (Haase, 2006). 
 
This discussion of ADM/Pobal activities illustrates that although area 
interventions all appear to share the objective of targeting scare resources, 
the rationales or justifications associated with such interventions are 
variable and can take on a good deal of complexity. The most 
straightforward justification is based on the assumption that if poor 
households are highly concentrated in specific areas then it is possible to 
target resources on these areas in order to maximise the number of 
households reached. Increased polarisation, and its spatial manifestations, 
provides an important component of the rationale for spatial interventions. 
 
A recent review of area-based targeting by Tunstall and Lupton (2003) 
distinguishes between five different rationales.  
 
• The first focuses on ‘efficiency’ and completeness in reaching poor 
individuals and derives its logic from the concentration of 
deprivation and disadvantage. Thus, as Walsh (1999, p. 283) notes, 
developments within mainstream welfare policy have encouraged a 
greater local focus on the design and delivery of services. Spatial 
programmes seem to offer an attractive means of responding to 
social needs. Here, evidence relating to the distribution of 
unemployment, unskilled manual work, lack of educational 
qualifications and low income plays a crucial role. 
• The second rationale is based on the argument that concentrated 
poverty may have cumulative and qualitatively different effects on 
individuals, organisations and infrastructure than less concentrated 
poverty. Poverty “black spots” could result in a qualitatively 
different experience of poverty in terms of factors such as physical 
and mental health, degree of economic strain and alienation from 
social and political participation. This rationale could provide the 
justification for interventions offering support targeted not just at 
individuals but organisations and infrastructure. A crucial objective 
is to provide a focus for enhancing service provision in response to 
multiple deprivation.  
• The third justification relates to choice of areas as a form of 
rationing by taking advantage of the fact that targeting of areas may 
be a good deal simpler than targeting of individuals.  
• The fourth relates to the use of area-based initiatives as a form of 
piloting. Thus Walsh (1999, p. 288) notes that the Area Based 
Response to Long-Term Unemployment (ABR) and its linked 
programme, the Global Grant for Local Development (GGLD) 
initiatives operated on a pilot basis between 1991 and 1995 before 
being subsumed into the Local Development Programme. 
• The fifth rationale focuses on additional benefits deriving from area 
initiatives such as community involvement and the development of 
partnerships. This justification draws attention to the particular 
importance in deprived areas of co-ordination and more accurate 
identification of needs. This rationale stresses that involvement of 
local communities in the process of economic and social change 
has an intrinsic value. Loss of skills, self-confidence and motivation 
are seen as  crucial elements in the process of social exclusion. 
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A particular justification for targeted intervention does not necessarily 
involve a commitment to a specific understanding of the causal processes. 
However, some such set of assumptions underlies spatial interventions. It 
is possible though to see spatial concentration of deprivation as having no 
causal significance or distinctive consequences. Instead concentration could 
be seen to arise simply as a consequence of variations across other 
genuinely causal variables such as human capital. Alternatively location 
could be thought to play a potentially independent role in a number of 
ways. Thus, employers’ hiring behaviour could mean that merely residing at 
a particular address could increase one’s risk of unemployment and poverty 
at a given level of human capital. More broadly those coming from areas 
where the resource stock, in terms of access to training, education, financial 
institutions etc., is poorer, could be seen as being additionally 
disadvantaged. Much more controversially, at the centre of debates 
concerning the creation of a spatially concentrated underclass is the highly 
contested idea that persistent poverty is transmitted through a fundamental 
altering of norms and ‘tastes’ in relation to welfare dependency, 
employment commitment and non-marital fertility. 
 
 The initial findings we consider derive from analysis of the 2002 Census. 
Our focus is on variations in what are considered to be some of the 
underlying correlates of poverty and deprivation. These surrogate measures 
of deprivation include unemployment, age structure and social class. Here 
we focus on some of the key findings reported by Watson et al. (2005) 
distinguishing the local authority areas represented by the 34 counties and 
County Boroughs. Such distributions may mask substantial variation at for 
example a rural/urban district level of district electoral division level.  
11.3  
The Spatial 
Distribution 
of 
Deprivation 
Surrogates 
  
In pursuing analysis using census data a decision must be made whether 
to present such results separately for a number of dimensions or to 
calculate a composite measure of multiple deprivation. Units of analysis 
may not be ranked the same way in relation to different indicators. Do we 
simply assume that the different dimensions are non-comparable and 
indicators relating to them should be presented separately, or do we try to 
aggregate or arrive at an overall assessment across dimensions – and if so 
how is this best done? Arguments for aggregated versus disaggregated 
approaches occur across a variety of substantive contexts. One can contrast 
the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), constructed from indicators 
of life expectancy, education and standard of living with the Laeken indicators 
that are very deliberately presented individually with no attempt to produce an 
overall “score” across the dimensions. In the latter case Atkinson et al. (2006) 
argue that this should be avoided precisely because the whole thrust of the 
European social agenda is to emphasise the multidimensionality of social 
disadvantage.  
 
Here we concentrate on the latter approach. There are a number of 
reasons underlying this choice. The first relates to the limited number of 
indices available at appropriate levels of disaggregation. Haase (2005) bases 
his factor analysis which identifies three dimensions relating to Social Class, 
Disadvantage, Labour Market Deprivation and Demographic decline on 10 
indicators. However, these include both the percentage of the adult 
population with a primary school education and the percentage with a 
Third Level education and the percentage of persons in households headed 
by professional, managerial or technical employees and the percentage of 
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persons in households headed by semi-skilled manual and unskilled manual 
workers. In the absence of a clearly stated case as to why the measures 
employed are preferable to ones capturing average educational level and 
mean social status, a case can clearly be made that the analysis includes only 
eight independently measured variables.  
 
Additional concerns include the fact that there is no clear consensus on 
which indicators to include in such an index and the fact that crucial 
differences may be obscured by such aggregation. The most important 
factor underlying our decision, however, is the absence of any objective 
basis on which to assign weights to dimensions. While simply assigning 
equal weights to each indicator is transparently arbitrary, it emerges that 
apparently more sophisticated statistical approaches can be equally so. The 
most commonly used statistical technique for this purpose is factor 
analysis. This procedure can identify dimensions of socio-demographic 
characteristics that we have reason to expect to be associated with poverty 
and deprivation. However, as Nolan et al. (1998) observe, in the absence of 
direct measures of the latter, the weight derived for such an analysis can be 
informative only with regard to the relationship between the socio-
demographic variables but not concerning the association between such 
variables and deprivation and poverty.  
 
Furthermore, despite the claims by Haase (2006, p. 7) that his use of 
confirmatory factor analysis allows the dimensions of disadvantage to be 
first conceptualised using theory, it is difficult to see that considering lone 
parenthood as an element of labour market disadvantage or mean number 
of persons per room as an indicator of social class disadvantage 
substantially advances our understanding of the underlying phenomena 
being tapped by such concepts. The treatment of the percentage of low 
skilled persons to labour market disadvantage and the percentage of lone 
parents as an indicator of demographic decline is done on the basis of 
earlier exploratory analysis (Haase, 2006, p. 10). Therefore, it is difficult to 
see that distinguishing the three dimensions constitutes a significant 
conceptual advance on reliance on the original indicators. However, if this 
is thought to be the case, than it becomes difficult to see why they should 
be added together with equal weighting. The argument that this is justified 
by the fact that the correlation between labour market disadvantage and 
demographic decline is effectively zero seems counterintuitive and would 
seem rather to justify maintaining multidimensional profiles (Haase, 2006,  
p. 14). 
 
We have agued against combining what we consider to be distinct 
dimensions into a single index both because we believe it obscures the fact 
that different areas have distinctive problems and because it can create an 
air of spurious precision in relation to the distribution of deprivation and 
hinder rather than facilitate casual understanding. However, debates about 
the best way to identify deprived areas at a high level of disaggregation and 
the merits of particular forms of statistical analysis are probably largely 
beside the point from a practical policy point of view. Different procedures 
are likely to identify largely the same types of areas and deprivation 
measures are very seldom the sole factor taken into account in allocating 
funding between areas.  
 
Here, in what is intended to be a summary treatment, we will present 
the results relating to three key indicators; namely unemployment, 
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economic dependency and absence of educational qualifications as 
contained in the 2002 Census.48 In what follows we present figures and 
maps at the level of the 34 counties and County Boroughs in the Republic 
of Ireland. The maps presented are based on quintile distributions at 
county level. Each of the five categories contains approximately 7 counties. 
The numeric range for each category is different from one to the other. 
The legends distribute counties in 5 groups from the lowest to highest 
incidence of risk of the specific indicators under consideration, but they do 
not, however, purport to have an equal distribution in terms of average 
rates or levels. Hence, the maps provide a visual, graphic representation of 
a ranking of the county-level data from highest to lowest across the country 
in terms of the 5 categories. To properly interpret the maps the reader must 
take account of the difference between the highest figure in the top quintile 
and the lowest in the bottom quintile. The findings for the local authority 
areas can also be aggregated into a set of 8 Regional Authority categories as 
follows. 
 
• Border 
• Midlands 
• West 
• Dublin 
• Mid-East 
• Mid-West 
• South-East 
• South-West 
 
Drawing on the 2002 Census in Map 1 we focus on the unemployment 
rate. The national rate was 8.8 per cent. Rates were highest in the Border 
region (12 per cent) followed by the South-East (9.6 per cent) with Dublin 
and the West having the lowest level (5.2 per cent). Some of these regional 
trends are strongly influenced by individual counties. For example, the 
unemployment rates in Donegal and Louth are high compared to the 
national average with rates of 15.6 per cent and 13.2 per cent, respectively. 
The levels in the county boroughs of Limerick and Cork were also 
relatively high. In interpreting the low levels of unemployment in Border 
areas it is necessary to take into account the importance of farming in such 
areas and the likelihood that relatively high levels of under-employment are 
often associated with small-scale farming. 
 
In summary then unemployment rates were highest in parts of the 
Border region as well as the South-East. The level of unemployment in 
some Border and Western counties seemed to be lower than the national 
levels – for example, Cavan and Roscommon both had recorded 
unemployment rates below 8 per cent compared with a national figure of 
8.8 per cent. However, such counties are equally characterised by high 
levels of small-scale farming. One can surmise that this latter may reflect 
elderly age structures and may, at least to some degree, mask 
underemployment. 
 
 
 
 
48 For a more detailed treatment see Watson et al. (2005) on which this section draws 
substantially. 
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Map 1: Unemployment Rate by Local Authority Area (Source: Watson  
et al., 2005, p. 18) 
 
 
In Map 2 we display economic dependency rates by local authority area. 
The measure employed here is based on the ratio of those who are 
economically inactive to those who are economically active. The figures in 
Map 2, therefore, provide details on the extent to which those who are 
economically active in each region or county are economically “supporting” 
those who are inactive. At national level there were 1.39 inactive persons 
for every person who was “at work”. Levels of economic dependency were 
quite mixed across the country. The highest levels are found in the Border 
region (1.61) but this is largely driven by Donegal (1.84). This reflects the 
relatively elderly age structure of the county combined with its very high 
level of recorded unemployment. The South-East and West also have high 
levels of economic dependency (1.51 each). This is followed by the 
Midlands and the South-West with levels higher than the national average 
(1.49 and 1.46 respectively). This variability across the country and lack of a 
well defined regional pattern reflects the fact that economic dependency is 
substantially affected by a number of factors including regional age 
structure; unemployment rates and the agricultural activity. 
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Map 2: Economic Dependency Rates by Local Authority Area (Source: 
Watson et al., 2005, p. 29) 
 
Given the demonstrated relationship between poverty and disadvantage 
on the one hand and level of educational attainment on the other, it is 
clearly important to consider regional variations in the level of education as 
an aid to understanding the spatial patterning of disadvantage. The relevant 
figures are set out in Maps 3.1. to 3.4. 
 
It is clear that the Border and West regions stand out as having an above 
average percentage of persons with lower levels of attainment. The national 
figure of 22 per cent of persons who are recorded as having left education 
with no qualifications or primary level only compares with a figure of 29 
per cent in the Border counties and 26 per cent for the Western region. 
One can see that 34 per cent of persons in Donegal, 31 per cent in Cavan, 
30 per cent in Mayo and 29 per cent each in Leitrim and Monaghan have 
left full-time education with, at most, primary level education. Outside the 
counties in the Border and West regions only Longford, Offaly, Laois and 
Wexford (each with 26-30 per cent) have a particularly high percentage of 
persons with at most, primary level education (See Map 3.1). In contrast, 
the counties with the highest percentages of third level graduates are 
generally in Dublin and the Mid-East regions (Map 3.4). 
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Map 3.1: Per Cent of Persons Age 15+ Who Have 
Left School With No Education or 
Primary Education 
Map 3.2: Per Cent of Persons Age 15+ Who Have 
Left School With Lower Secondary 
Education 
 
 
Map 3.3: Per Cent of Persons Age 15+ Who 
Have Left School With Upper 
Secondary Education 
Map 3.4: Per Cent of Persons Age 15+ Who 
Have Left School With Third Level 
Education 
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In interpreting these figures it is important to remember that 
educational structures are to a large extent influenced by the age structures 
of a region. The areas identified above as having lower than average levels 
of attainment are generally regions of the country that have an over-
concentration of older people. Overall, therefore, Maps 3.1 to 3.4 (Source: 
Watson et al., 2005). confirm a relatively higher level of educational 
disadvantage (much of which is related to age structures) in the counties of 
the Border and Western regions. 
 
 
11.4 
Measurement 
of Poverty 
and 
Deprivation 
at the 
Household 
Level in EU-
SILC  
11.4.1 “AT RISK OF POVERTY” AND CONSISTENT POVERTY  
The remainder of our analysis is based on the EU-SILC 2005 survey. Our 
initial focus is on two poverty measures, namely, the ‘at-risk of poverty’ and 
the consistent poverty measures. The former is constructed by using the 
equivalised household disposable income. Disposable household income is 
divided by equivalised49 household size to produce equivalised income, 
which is then applied to each member of the household. The “at risk of 
poverty” rate is the share of persons with an equivalised income below a 
given percentage of the national median income. In this chapter we use the 
conventional 60 per cent median income as poverty threshold. 
 
The EU-SILC also allows us to identify individuals who are 
experiencing deprivation through a wide spectrum of items ranging from 
possession of consumer durables, quality of housing and neighbourhood 
environment to health status. Our second poverty indicator is the 
consistent poverty measure that is then constructed by identifying 
individuals who are “at risk of poverty” and who also are deprived of at 
least two out of the following items: 
 
• Without heating at some stage in the past year due to lack of 
money. 
• Unable to afford two pairs of strong shoes. 
• Unable to afford a roast joint (or its equivalent) once a week. 
• Unable to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or vegetarian 
equivalent) every second day. 
• Unable to afford new (not second-hand) clothes. 
• Unable to afford a warm waterproof coat. 
• Keep the home adequately warm. 
• Presents for family or friends at least once a year. 
• Replace any worn out furniture. 
• Have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month. 
• Have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight, for 
entertainment. 
11.4.2  VARIATION BY REGIONAL AUTHORITY 
In this section we examine the distribution of risk of poverty across 
Regional Authority. The risk of poverty, or poverty rate, is the percentage 
of households with equivalised income below the 60 per cent of median 
poverty line. The Regional Authorities are made up as follows: 
 
49 The equivalence scale employed attributes a weight of 1 to the first adult, 0.66 to each 
subsequent adult (aged 14+ living in the household) and 0.33 to each child aged less than 
14 years. 
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• Border: (Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, Sligo). 
• Dublin: (Dublin City, Fingal, Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, Dublin 
South). 
• Mid-East: (Kildare, Meath, Wicklow). 
• Midland (Laois, Longford, Offaly, Westmeath). 
• Mid-West: (Clare, Limerick, Tipperary North Riding). 
• South-East: (Carlow, Kilkenny, Tipperary South Riding, Waterford, 
Wexford). 
• South-West: (Cork, Kerry). 
• West (Galway, Mayo, Roscommon). 
 
In Table 11.1 we compare the distribution of households across 
Regional Authorities in EU-SILC. As can be seen the distributions are 
pretty well identical and enhance our confidence in analysis involving this 
variable with EU-SILC data.  
Table 11.1: The Distribution of Households Across Planning Regions in 
EU-SILC 2005 and the Census 2006 
   
 EU-SILC 2005 Census 2006 
 % of Households % of Households 
Border 11.4 11.0 
Midland 5.8 5.9 
West 9.7 9.8 
Mid-West 8.4 8.5 
South-East 10.7 10.9 
South-West 14.7 14.6 
Mid-East 10.8 11.2 
Dublin 28.4 28.0 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   
 
In Table 11.2  we show the breakdown risk of poverty at 60 per cent of 
median household income and the corresponding figures for consistent 
poverty at that income level. Focusing on the former first, we find that the 
average “at risk of poverty” rate is 18.5 per cent. However, there is 
significant variation across regional authority. The highest rate is observed 
in the Border with a rate of 28.6 per cent. The West and Mid-West have 
levels a couple of percentage points below this followed by the Midlands 
and the South-East with rates, respectively, some 4 to 3 percentage points 
lower. The rates for the South-West and Mid-East are respectively 18 per 
cent and 15 per cent. Finally, the lowest “at risk of poverty” rate of 12 per 
cent is found in Dublin. Poverty rates in the most disadvantaged regions 
are approximately two and a half times that for Dublin. When we aggregate 
to the level of Regional Assembly and compare the Border, Midlands and 
West (BMW) assembly with the South and East we find a differential of 
just less than two to one with the respective figures being 27 per cent and 
17 per cent. 
 
While risk rates vary significantly across regions, it is important to keep 
in mind that, because the regions also vary substantially in terms of their 
population size, the numbers experiencing “at risk of poverty” are more 
evenly spread across areas than the rates of poverty. The largest number of 
poor households is located in Dublin where the figure is 17 per cent and 
the smallest numbers in the Midlands and Mid-east where the figures are 7 
per cent and 8 per cent. The remainder are spread fairly evenly across the 
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outstanding regions with the relevant percentages ranging from 12 per cent 
in the Mid-west to 16 per cent in the Border Region. At the levels of 
Regional Assembly over one-third of those “at risk of poverty” are found 
in the South and East and two-thirds in the BMW area. The findings 
reported are almost identical to those reported by Watson et al. (2005, 
p. 64) for a range of “at risk of poverty” lines based on data from the 
Living in Ireland Survey (LIS) conducted in 2000. 
Table 11.2: Risk of Household Poverty at 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
by Regional Authority 
   
 60 Per Cent “At Risk of 
Poverty” 
Consistent Poverty at 60 
Per Cent Income Line 
 % % 
Border 28.6 11.4 
West 26.9 5.7 
Mid-west 26.6 7.9 
Midland 23.6 9.2 
South-west 18.1 7.2 
South-east 22.3 5.3 
Mid-east 15.2 5.5 
Dublin 11.8 5.1 
Regional Assembly   
BMW 26.9 8.8 
South and East 16.9 5.9 
 
Total 18.5 7.0 
   
 
We now focus on spatial variation in levels of consistent poverty –  
where the household falls below 60 per cent of household equivalent 
income and experiences an enforced lack of two or more of the eleven 
items making up the revised basic deprivation index (Whelan, 2007). The 
overall rate of consistent poverty for households is 7 per cent. The highest 
level is once again observed in the Border region where 11 per cent fall 
below this threshold. In this case it is followed by the Midlands with a rate 
of 9 per cent, the Mid-west with a rate of 8 per cent, the South-west with 
one of 7 per cent. For the remaining regions very little variation is observed 
with the relevant figure lying between 5 and 6 per cent. At the level of 
Regional Assembly the consistent poverty rate for the BMW region is 9 per 
cent while that for the South and East is 6 per cent. This constitutes a 
disparity of 1.6 compared to one of 1.9 in relation to “at risk of poverty”. 
Not only are rates of consistent poverty considerably lower than those 
relating to “at risk of poverty” but they exhibit considerably less spatial 
variation. Once again composition figures offer a somewhat different 
perspective. Almost 30 per cent of the consistently poor are found in 
Dublin while the lowest number of just less than 6 per cent are found in 
the Midlands. After Dublin the highest level of 15 per cent is observed for 
the South-west. Figures for the remaining regions vary between 9 per cent 
and 11 per cent. At the Regional Assembly level the concentration of 
consistent poverty in the South and East area is almost identical to that for 
“at risk of poverty” with almost two out of three being found. Once again 
these results are almost identical to those reported by Watson et al. (2005, 
p. 64) based on the LIS 2000 Survey. 
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11.4.3 VARIATION BY POPULATION DENSITY OF AREA 
Earlier work has looked at variation in poverty risk and density not only by 
actual geographical location but also by type of area in the sense of the 
population density of the area where the household is located. Such 
analysis focuses on the possibility that it is not location as such but factors 
associated with population density, such as labour market opportunities 
distance from a range of facilities and resources that are crucial. In Table 
11.3 we break down the risk of poverty and consistent poverty of 
households by areas distinguished in terms of population density. The risk 
of poverty is greatest where population is least concentrated. In towns and 
suburbs the rate of poverty is 14 per cent. It rises to 19 per cent for towns 
with populations greater than 5,000. It then evens out at level in the mid-
twenties for the towns with a population of less than 5,000, mixed 
urban/rural and rural areas. “at risk of poverty” is thus associated with 
density of population. However, the major contrast is between cities and 
suburbs and large towns and the rest. There is no evidence that the most 
sparsely populated rural areas experience a distinctive level of disadvantage. 
In terms of incidence, those experiencing “at risk of poverty” are fairly 
evenly distributed across such areas with one in four being located in both 
cities and suburbs and rural areas. 
Table 11.3: Household Risk of Poverty at 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
and Consistent Poverty by Population Density 
   
 “At Risk of Poverty”  Consistent Poverty  
 % % 
Cities & suburbs 14.2 6.6 
Towns and environs with population 
=>5000 18.7 8.3 
Towns and environs with 
1000<=population<5000 25.3 7.6 
Mixed urban/rural areas 23.7 7.5 
Rural 23.4 4.4 
 
Total 18.5 7.0 
   
 
At this point we focus on the corresponding pattern of differentiation in 
relation to consistent poverty. Here we can see that in contrast to “at risk 
of poverty” the lowest level is actually found in rural areas where 4 per cent 
are consistently poor. The highest level of 8 per cent is observed for towns 
with population greater than 5,000. However, overall variation in consistent 
poverty by density of population is extremely modest. As a consequence 
the incidence of consistent poverty is distributed across such areas in a 
manner similar to the population as a whole.  
11.4.4  VARIATION BY HOUSING TENURE 
As a first step to providing a more detailed disaggregation that could reveal 
pockets of deprivation, previous research has broken down poverty risk by 
type of housing tenure. In Table 11.4 we show details of the distribution of 
“at risk of poverty” and consistent poverty by tenure. By far the most 
favourable situation is enjoyed by home owners with a mortgage whose “at 
risk of poverty” rate is 7 per cent this rises sharply to 19 per cent for 
outright home owners. This may seem paradoxical but it is consistent with 
earlier findings and reflects the fact that the latter group contains a large 
group of older people. Relatively modest differences are observed between 
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the latter group and private renters for whom the “at risk of poverty” rate 
is 22 per cent. However, for local authority purchasers it rises to 28 per 
cent and for their tenant counterparts it jumps sharply to 48.2 per cent. 
While such tenants experience a distinctively high risk of poverty, it is 
important to keep in mind that they make up only one in four of those “at 
risk of poverty” whereas those owning outright constitute one in two.  
 
For the consistent poverty measure the distribution is somewhat 
different. Here the main contrast is between homeowners overall with a 
poverty rates of 2 per cent – 4 per cent and the remaining forms of tenure. 
For private tenants and local authority purchasers the rate rises to 11 per 
cent and 13 per cent, respectively before more than doubling to 27 per cent 
for local authority tenants. While the consistent poverty rates are 
considerably lower than their “at risk of poverty” counterparts the 
differentials between forms of tenure are a good deal sharper. 
Table 11.4: Households “At Risk of Poverty” at 60 Per Cent of Median 
Income and Consistent Poverty by Housing Tenure 
   
 “At Risk of Poverty” Consistent Poverty  
 % % 
Owned with mortgage 6.5 2.0 
Owned outright 19.3 3.5 
Privately rented 22.2 10.7 
Local Authority Tenant Purchaser 27.7 12.6 
Local Authority rented 47.7 27.1 
 
Total 
18.5 7.0 
   
 
Thus the disparity in risk between owners with a mortgage and local 
authority tenants is approximately 7:1 in relation to “at risk of poverty” 
while for consistent poverty it is almost 14:1. This differential is reflected in 
the fact that in contrast with the situation relating to “at risk of poverty” 
local authority tenants make up four out of ten of the consistently poor, 
while one in four own their houses outright. 
11.4.5 VARIATION BY HOUSING TENURE AND POPULATION 
DENSITY 
In this section we look at the combined impact of housing tenure and 
density of population. To facilitate our analysis and to ensure minimally 
acceptable numbers in the cells of our table we combine the categories 
relating to “towns and environs” into one category. This also has the 
advantage of dividing the population into reasonably comparable sized 
blocks.  
 
In Table 11.5 we focus first on “at risk of poverty”. Here we see that the 
impact of population density within tenure categories is relatively modest 
and displays little in the way of systematic pattern. Within the non-owner 
tenures, city and suburb dwellers exhibit the lowest rates. Overall though 
one is struck by modest variation in risk by population density in 
comparison with that associated with tenure. 
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Table 11.5: Households “At Risk of Poverty” at 60 Per Cent of Median 
Income and by Housing Tenure and Density of Population 
      
 % % % % % 
 Owned with 
a Mortgage 
Owned 
Outright 
Privately 
Rented 
Local 
Authority 
Purchases 
Local 
Authority 
Cities & suburbs 5.3 10.8 18.3 18.3 41.0 
Towns and environs  7.9 7.9 24.9 35.0 50.7 
Mixed urban/rural 
areas 3.9 3.9 24.6 32.2 58.9 
 
Rural 9.6 9.6 31.3 30.5 44.8 
      
 
For consistent poverty, as can be seen from Table 11.6, we also observe 
extremely modest variation by density of population within tenure 
categories.  
Table 11.6: Household Consistent Poverty by Housing Tenure and 
Density of Population 
      
 % % % % % 
 Owned with 
Mortgage 
Owned 
Outright 
Privately 
Rented 
Local 
Authority 
Purchases 
Local 
Authority 
Tenant 
Cities & suburbs 2.2 2.7 9.2 12.1 24.9 
Towns and environs 
with Population 
 =>5000 2.5 2.2 11.4 18.0 31.3 
Mixed urban/rural  
 areas 1.6 5.4 14.6 14.2 24.5 
 
Rural 
 
1.1 
 
1.1 
 
10.8 
 
- 
 
25.1 
      
11.4.6  VARIATIONS IN DIMENSIONS OF DEPRIVATION  
So far we have concentrated our analysis at the household level on “at risk 
of poverty” and the consistent poverty index that incorporates the eleven-
item basic deprivation measure. Using the EU-SILC 2004 data. Whelan et 
al. (2007) identified five relatively distinct dimensions. 
 
• The basic deprivation index comprises eleven items including those 
relating to food; clothes; adequate heating; new furniture; being able 
to afford an afternoon or evening out; being able to entertain family 
and friends; roast joint or equivalent; and going without heating.  
• The second dimension relating to consumption deprivation 
comprises nineteen items that refer to a range of consumer 
durables such as a telephone; CD player; dishwasher; and PC. 
Deprivation of these items is considered to constitute a significantly 
less serious form of exclusion than the basic items.  
• The third dimension comprises four items relating to rather basic 
housing facilities. A bath or shower and an indoor toilet and hot 
water  weight particularly strongly on this dimension. 
• The fourth dimension relates to the quality of the neighbourhood 
environment. Here, the strongest loading relates to noise with 
pollution and crime, violence and vandalism loading slightly lower. 
Rather weaker weightings are found for housing deteriorating 
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elements such as leaking roof and damp and the rooms being too 
dark.  
• The final dimension relates to the health status of the household 
reference person. Each of the three indicators relating to this 
dimension namely self-assessed health status, indication of the 
existence of chronic illness or disability and restricted mobility load 
extremely high on this dimension.  
 
The fact that the various items are separable into distinct dimensions 
means that some types of deprivation cluster together but others do not – 
for example, a neighbourhood with crime or vandalism is often noisy and 
polluted, but the presence or absence of such characteristics does not tell 
us much about the likelihood of observing basic deprivation. Households 
with health and housing problems are not necessarily located in problem 
neighbourhoods. Many households lacking particular consumption items 
do not experience basic deprivation, although we expect that most of those 
exposed to the latter will experience the former. 
 
In Table 11.7 we show the distribution of these deprivation dimensions 
across Regional Authorities in terms of their mean scores. Focusing first on 
regional variation in basic deprivation, we find that the main contrast is 
between the Border and Midland Regions and all others with the former 
having deprivation scores of 0.88 and 0.82 compared to the overall average 
of 0.69. These two regions also have the highest consumer deprivation 
scores of close to 2 compared to an overall average of 1.47. Variation is 
also more systematic with deprivation scores falling to 1.16 for Dublin and 
1.31 for the Mid-east. For housing deprivation the sharpest contrast is also 
between these two regions and the remainder with values of 0.06 and 0.11 
being observed compared to an overall average 0.15. For neighbourhood 
environment deprivation the pattern is quite different with the highest 
value of 0.75 being observed in Dublin compared to an overall average of 
0.53. With regard to health, clearly associated with variation in age 
structures, the highest values are found in the three Western regions with 
values of 0.99, 0.93 and 0.84 compared to an overall average of 0.79. 
Table 11.7: Mean Deprivation by Planning Regions 
      
  
Basic 
Deprivation Consumer Housing Environment Health 
Border 0.88 1.88 0.16 0.46 0.78 
Midland 0.82 1.90 0.14 0.37 0.81 
West 0.56 1.48 0.23 0.42 0.99 
Mid-west 0.56 1.31 0.21 0.51 0.93 
South-east 0.68 1.55 0.18 0.45 0.78 
South-west 0.76 1.75 0.22 0.45 0.84 
Mid-east 0.65 1.31 0.11 0.39 0.72 
Dublin 0.66 1.16 0.06 0.75 0.70 
Regional Assembly      
BMW 0.75 1.74 0.18 0.43 0.86 
South & East 0.67 1.38 0.13 0.57 0.77 
 
Total 0.69 1.47 0.15 0.53 0.79 
      
 
If we focus on the Regional Assemblies, we see that the South and East 
enjoy advantages over the BMW area on four of the five dimensions with 
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neighbourhood environment being the exception. However, the advantage 
in relation to health is rather marginal. Overall regional variation accounts 
for modest variation in relation to deprivation dimensions and the impact is 
uneven across dimensions and regions. 
 
In Table 11.8 we show the impact of population density in relation to 
the range of deprivation dimensions. In the case of basic deprivation it is 
clear that there is no straightforward rural-urban contrast. In the context of 
an overall average of 0.69, the highest value of 0.86 is observed in towns 
and environs with populations of between 1,000 and 5,000 while the lowest 
of 0.46 is found in rural areas. A similar situation emerges in relation to 
consumption deprivation where values of 1.93 and 1.22 compare to an 
overall average of 1.47. In the case of housing we get an urban rural 
contrast with the value for cities and suburbs and towns with populations 
of greater than 5,000 exhibiting values approximately half those for the 
remaining categories. Similarly, an urban-rural pattern of differentiation 
emerges with neighbourhood-environment but in this case it is the urban 
dwellers that are disadvantaged with the highest deprivation with a steady 
decline in scores being observed from 0.72 for cities and suburbs to 0.26 
for rural areas. Finally, health deprivation is unaffected by population 
density.  
Table 11.8: Mean Deprivation by Population Density 
      
  
Basic 
Deprivation Consumer Housing Environment Health
Cities & suburbs 0.75 1.32 0.09 0.72 0.75 
Towns and environs with  
pop=>5000 0.75 1.63 0.11 0.63 0.77 
Towns and environs with 
1000<=pop<5000 0.86 1.93 0.17 0.47 0.79 
Mixed urban/rural areas 0.71 1.69 0.18 0.40 0.91 
Rural 0.46 1.22 0.24 0.26 0.78 
      
Total 0.69 1.47 0.15 0.53 0.79 
      
 
In Table 11.9 we look at the impact of housing tenure on the range of 
deprivation dimensions. In this case variation is a good deal more 
substantial. Basic deprivation varies from a low of 0.29 for mortgage 
holders to a level almost ten times higher for local authority tenants. The 
level of deprivation for the latter is almost twice as high for any of the 
remaining groups. In the intermediate range outright owners enjoy a 
significant advantage over private tenants and local authority purchasers. 
For consumption deprivation the differentials are not quite as sharp but the 
overall pattern is very similar. The deprivation levels for local authority 
tenants are seven times higher than for mortgage holders and four times 
that of outright owners. However, the distance between the former and 
private tenants and local authority purchasers is significantly less than in the 
case of basic deprivation. For housing deprivation the pattern is less clear-
cut. Local authority tenants once again experience the least favourable 
conditions with a deprivation level of 0.32 that is ten times higher than for 
mortgage holders. However, local authority purchasers experience a more 
favourable outcome in this case while for outright owners the opposite is 
true. This pattern is likely to be related to the short and long-term 
distribution of responsibility for housing maintenance costs.  
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Table 11.9: Mean Deprivation by Tenure 
      
  
Basic 
Deprivation
Consumer 
Durables Housing Environment Health 
Owned with mortgage 0.29 0.57 0.03 0.45 0.36 
Owned outright 0.40 1.04 0.17 0.43 0.98 
Privately rented 1.30 2.83 0.19 0.66 0.58 
LAT Purchaser 1.03 2.34 0.08 0.59 0.84 
Local Authority rented 2.25 3.92 0.32 1.04 1.23 
      
Total 0.69 1.47 0.15 0.53 0.79 
      
 
Focusing on neighbourhood environment the deprivation level for local 
authority tenants is over twice that for both types of private homeowners. 
While private renters and local authority purchasers occupy an intermediate 
position. With health a slightly different pattern emerges. Once again local 
authority tenants and mortgage holders are found at the opposite ends of 
the spectrum with the deprivation levels of the former being four times 
higher. However, clearly influenced by the age profiles, the next highest 
level of deprivation is observed for outright owners with local authority 
purchasers having only a slightly lower level. 
 
Taking an overview, variation across the five deprivation dimensions by 
regional authority is relatively modest. The major contrasts are between the 
Border, Midland and South-West regions and the remainder in relation to 
basic and consumption deprivation; between Dublin and the Mid-East and 
the rest with regard to housing; and between Dublin and the rest in the 
case of neighbourhood environment. There is no systematic pattern in the 
case of health. Similarly, population density contributes very little to 
understanding of these forms of deprivation, although those in rural areas 
do exhibit slightly higher levels of deprivation in relation to basic, 
consumer and housing deprivation. It is housing tenure that proves to be 
the most powerful differentiating factor. Local authority tenants are 
substantially differentiated in terms of all five dimensions. For other 
dimensions, the pattern varies depending to some degree on the extent to 
which age is a relevant factor. With local authority owners and private 
tenants being disadvantaged in relation to basic and consumption 
deprivation and outright owners with regard to health. It is important to 
keep in mind that the overlap between dimensions is modest and that as 
Whelan et al. (2007) have shown the numbers simultaneously experiencing 
multiple deprivation is extremely low. 
11.4.7  GROSS AND NET EFFECTS OF REGIONAL AUTHORITY 
In addition to documenting variation in poverty rates by location, density 
of population and tenure, we also need to get some sense of how the 
magnitude of such variation compares with the scale of variation within 
areas and tenure type. Following on from this we seek to assess the extent 
to which such variation is causal in nature. To what extent could the 
patterns we observe arise solely because poverty and location/density are 
jointly associated with other factors that are the true determinants of 
poverty?  
 
The fact that a specific type of area or form of housing tenure has a 
relatively high poverty rate does not in itself indicate anything about the 
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impact of location or tenure per se on poverty: such effects could be entirely 
attributable to the socio-economic composition of the households 
involved. Households renting Local Authority housing could be at a high 
risk of poverty because applicants for such housing tend to be drawn from 
the most vulnerable sectors of the population: the unemployed, lone 
parents, the elderly and those unable to work. Cross-tabulations can only 
take us so far in understanding variations in poverty risk by area/tenure 
type at a point in time or the changes in this pattern observed over time. 
We, therefore, need to systematically examine the extent to which the 
observed variation in risk of poverty by area and housing tenure may be 
attributable to differences in the measured characteristics of those located 
in different areas or tenure groups, using logistic regressions. This 
procedure allows one to assess the effect of any particular factor on the 
odds of being poor while holding constant the influence of other factors. 
 
In the analysis that follows we proceed to compare net effects in 
relation to “at risk of poverty” and consistent poverty. By net effects we 
mean those that persist after we control for a range of socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household reference person (HRP). The HRP is 
defined as the person who is responsible for the accommodation. Where 
that responsibility is equally shared the oldest person is chosen. In assessing 
the net effect of regional authority, the set of HRP characteristics for which 
we control comprises labour force status, education, social class, marital 
status, age group and housing tenure.  
 
In Table 11.10 we show the gross and net odds ratios, derived from a 
logistic regression of being poor at 50 per cent and 60 per cent of median 
income and for the modified consistent poverty measure broken down by 
Regional Authority with Dublin taken as a reference point. The gross odds 
ratios summarise the differences between groups before taking account of 
the socio-demographic controls, whereas the net ratios refer to the 
remaining differences once the effects of the socio-demographic variables 
have been statistically controlled. The coefficients we report are odds ratio. 
The notion of odds on is familiar in gambling terminology where instead of 
saying that one team has a probability of 0.2 of winning a game and the 
other one of 0.8, we can say that the odds on the first team winning are 1:4 
or 4:1 against or 0.25 (0.2/0.8) and that of the other 4:1 or 4:1 to one on 
(0.8/0.2). We focus first on the gross effects. These are, effectively a way of 
summarising the results we reported elsewhere in percentage terms. These 
results confirm the extent of variation across regions in terms of “at risk of 
poverty”, with the differences being statistically significant for the Border 
Region, the Midlands the Mid-west and the South-west. The disparity in “at 
risk of poverty” rates is greatest between the Border Region and Dublin, 
with the odds on poverty being three times higher in the former. For the 
Western regions figures are 2.7/2.8. When we control for the socio-
demographic characteristics of the household reference person, the range 
of differentials is slightly narrowed with the West and the Border region 
now having odds-ratios with the range of differentials for the three areas 
referred to above being reduced to between 2.5/2.4. 
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Table 11.10: Gross and Net Odds Ratios of “At Risk of Poverty” at 60 Per 
Cent of Median Income and Consistent Poverty by Regional 
Authority 
   
 60 Per Cent  Income 
Line 
Consistent Poverty 
Region Gross Net Gross Net 
Border 3.01 2.54 2.40 2.12 
Midland 2.31 1.59 1.89 1.39 
West 2.76 2.42 1.13 1.11 
Mid-West 2.72 2.45 1.59 1.49 
South-East 2.15 1.40 1.04 0.60 
South-West 1.66 1.18 1.44 1.12 
Mid-East 1.34 1.40 1.07 0.98 
Dublin 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Nagelkerke R2 50  0.04 0.34 0.02 0.35 
Percentage unique to region  0.02  0.01 
Percentage common  0.02  0.02 
Percentage unique to socio-
demographic influences 
  
0.30 
  
0.32 
     
 
An explanation of this finding is provided when we examine the level of 
variance explained with and without the inclusion of socio-demographic 
controls. In order to assess the impact of variables such as region, we 
distinguish between the variance that is unique to each influence and that 
which is shared between them. We identify these components by varying 
the order of entry of each type of variable. Thus the variance that is unique 
to the variable region is that which is added after socio-demographic 
variables have been taken into account and vice versa. The shared 
component is that which cannot be uniquely allocated to either variable. 
Unlike ordinary least squares regression there is no universally accepted 
measure of explained variance for logistic regression. We have reported the 
Nagelkerke R2, however, our conclusions relating the relative importance of 
the types of effects we are considering would not be substantially affected 
by opting for another measure. From Table 11.10, we see that, when we 
enter regional effects on their own, the proportion of variance explained is 
4 per cent. When we add the socio-demographic variables this increases to 
34 per cent. Entering the latter on their own gives a figure of 32 per cent. 
Thus, while statistically significant variation in “at risk of poverty” by 
regional authority are observed, the vast majority of variation is within 
rather than between regions. Controlling for the effects of household 
characteristics reduces but does not eliminate regional effects with the 
proportion of variance declining from 4 per cent to 2 per cent. Other 
factors associated with being in such regions are clearly playing a role. 
However, the independent impact of such characteristics is rather modest. 
Furthermore, regional variation plays little role in explaining the impact of 
socio-demographic influences with a rather modest decline in the 
proportion of variance explained from 34 per cent to 32 per cent being 
observed when one controls for such factors. 
 
 
50 Nagelkerke R2 is a modification of Coz and Snell’s R2. The latter is an attempt to imitate 
the interpretation of the multiple R2 in OLS. However, its maximum can be, and usually is 
less than one. Nagelkerke R2 involves a modification of the Cox and Snell coefficient to 
ensure that it can vary from 0 to 1. 
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A similar situation is observed when we focus on consistent poverty. 
Consideration of the gross effects reveals statistically significant odds for 
the Border, Midland’s and Mid-West regions of, respectively, 2.4, 1.9 and 
1.6 in relation to the comparison with Dublin. Controlling for socio-
demographic influences reduces these values to, respectively, 2.1, 1.4 and 
1.1. Regional location on its own explains only 2 per cent of the variance. 
This is reduced to 1 per cent after controls are introduced. When we add 
the impact of household characteristics the proportion of variance 
explained rises to 35 per cent with the unique component attributable to 
such influences being 33 per cent. Not surprisingly, given these findings, 
controlling for the impact of regional authority has no impact on the value 
of the socio-demographic influences. The impact of such factors cannot in 
any way be attributed to the geographical location of households. 
11.4.8  GROSS AND NET EFFECTS OF DENSITY OF POPULATION 
AND HOUSING TENURE  
In this section we consider the gross and net effects of the combined 
impact of housing tenure and population density. In pursuing this 
approach, we follow Nolan et al. (1998), Nolan and Whelan (2000) in 
seeking to adopt an indirect approach to capturing contextual or 
neighbourhood effects and the cumulative or vicious circle processes 
underlying them. As has generally been the case in Ireland, the data 
available to us do not allow us to identify spatial units or neighbourhoods 
of a kind that would enable us to conduct a multilevel analysis to test 
whether the impact of household characteristics vary depending upon the 
particular context in which they are located. Absence of spatial 
concentration is not inconsistent with the emergence of pockets of 
deprivation and associated cultural and social division that display a 
distinctive quality. Of course, what we are particularly anxious to establish 
is whether there is evidence for vicious circle processes whereby negative 
household characteristics have their impact exacerbated by occurring in one 
neighbourhood context rather than another. A particularly striking example 
of such phenomena is the urban underclass processes addressed by Wilson 
(1987, 1991, 1996). Crucial to his analysis is a focus on the unintended 
consequences of the uneven impact of social change. He is particularly 
concerned with the consequences of structural exchange in which 
economic disadvantage is reinforced by social context as reflected in 
increasing fatalism and detachment from mainstream values. 
 
In the absence of data appropriate for multilevel modelling, in our 
earlier work we have sought to establish whether households who might 
most plausibly be expected to experience such processes, such as local 
authority households in urban centres, exhibit distinctive levels of poverty 
risk when we control for household characteristics that might be expected 
to have independent impact on such outcomes. 
 
It is for this reason that in the analysis which follows, our urban-rural 
contrast, distinguishes between those in towns and suburbs and all others. 
In Table 11.11 we summarise the results of  a  set of logistic regressions in 
which “at risk of poverty” at the 60 per cent income line is the dependent 
variable and urban-rural location and housing tenure are the independent 
variables. The gross coefficients represent the impact of these variables 
before controlling for other socio-demographic factors. In exploring 
whether the evidence supports the existence of some sort of vicious circle 
process, our particular focus will be on the extent to which we can identify 
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evidence for particular kinds of interaction effects. Specifically, we might 
expect to find evidence that an interaction exists between urban location 
and being a local authority tenant such that the differential risk of poverty 
between the latter and other forms of household tenure is significantly 
greater in urban rather than rural areas. In fact, we could find no evidence 
for any form of interaction between location and tenure. The gross 
coefficients reported in Table 11.11 are simply the additive outcome of the 
higher risk levels experienced by households with particular forms of 
tenure multiplied by the higher risk of poverty for rural residents. The 
figures in the first column, which relate to urban residents, show the 
former effects with mortgage holders as the reference category. Thus the 
odds of being “at risk of poverty” at the 60 per cent income line are 3.5 
times higher for outright owners than for mortgage holders. This rises to 
4.1 for private tenants and to 5.6 for local authority purchasers. The highest 
differential of 13.1 relates to local authority tenants. The figures in the 
second column are arrived at by multiplying those in the first column by 
the constant of 1.89. This is the coefficient capturing the higher risk of 
poverty to which rural dwellers on average are exposed. Consequently, the 
differentials between forms of tenure are identical irrespective of location 
and there is no support for the existence of any form of urban underclass 
effect.  
 
In Columns 3 and 4 we report the corresponding odds ratios having 
controlled for a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics. Once 
again we could find no evidence for any form of interaction between 
urban-rural location and type of housing tenure. The coefficients in column 
3 represent the net effects for tenure. Those relating to all forms of tenure, 
other than being a local authority tenant are at least halved. In the latter 
case the reduction is of the order of three quarters. The odds ratios relating 
to the rural effects are arrived at by multiplying their urban counterparts by 
1.7 which is the coefficient representing the net increases in the odds of 
poverty associated with being in a rural location. The reduction in the 
overall rural coefficient leads to a larger proportionate reduction in the net 
rural coefficients. However, crucially from our point of view the relativities 
between categories of housing tenure remain constant across the urban-
rural divide with no support being offered for any cumulative 
“neighbourhood effect”.  
Table 11.11: Gross and Net Odds Ratios for “At Risk of Poverty” at 60 Per 
Cent of Median Income 
   
 Gross Net 
 Odds Ratios Odds Ratios 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Owned with mortgage 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.7 
Owned outright 3.5 6.5 1.6 2.7 
Privately rented 4.1 7.8 1.4 2.3 
Local Authority 
Purchasers 5.6 10.6 2.8 4.7 
Local Authority rented 13.1 24.8 3.1 5.2 
     
 
In Table 11.12 we repeat the above analysis for consistent poverty. 
Once again no evidence is found for any significant form of interaction 
between urban-rural location and housing tenure. In column 1 we show the 
gross coefficients for the latter. With the exception of outright ownership, 
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they are slightly higher than in the case of “at risk of poverty”. For private 
renters the odds on consistent poverty is six times higher than for 
mortgage holders and for local authority purchasers it rises to seven. For 
local authority tenants it climbs to over eighteen to one. The gross 
coefficients in column 2 are derived by multiplying those in the first 
column by 1.23, in order to capture the increased consistent poverty risk 
across all forms of housing tenure of being a rural dweller. As before the 
differentials between forms of tenure remain constant irrespective of 
location. 
Table 11.12: Gross and Net Odds Ratios for Consistent Poverty at 60 Per 
Cent of Median Income 
   
 Gross Net 
 Odds Ratios Odds Ratios 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Owned with mortgage 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Owned outright 1.8 2.2 1.0 1.0 
Privately rented 6.0 7.4 2.2 2.3 
Local Authority 
Purchasers 
7.0 8.6 2.9 3.1 
Local Authority rented 18.4 22.6 2.8 3.9 
     
 
In columns 3 and 4 we report the corresponding net coefficients. The 
coefficient for outright owners becomes indistinguishable from that for 
mortgage holders. For private tenants and local authority purchasers the 
magnitude of the coefficients are reduced by approximately 60 per cent and 
that for local authority tenants by 85 per cent. The rural gross coefficients 
are calculated by multiplying the corresponding urban figures by 1.04, 
which is the negligible impact on consistent poverty of being a rural rather 
than an urban resident. 
 
Overall findings from analyses of the “at risk of poverty” measure and 
consistent poverty lead to the same conclusion. In neither case is there any 
evidence of the type of statistically significant interaction effects that would 
be expected if there were neighbourhood effects, associated with 
combinations of particular forms of housing tenure and urban location, 
generating vicious circle processes.  
 
 From the analysis based on the Census data measures of deprivation such 
as age structure, economic status and activity, levels of farming and social 
class, we saw that the Border regions contained counties with the highest 
percentages of population unemployed while Western areas, which were 
disadvantaged in other respects, showed lower rates because of higher 
levels of farming. The Border and Western regions also exhibited, high 
levels of economic dependency and lower levels of educational attainment. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Dublin and the Mid-East emerged as 
highly favoured regions. 
11.5 
Conclusions 
 
Extending our analysis using the data from EU-SILC 2005 we found 
clear variation across Regional Authority levels in the “at risk of poverty” 
rates, with the Border, the West, the Mid-West and the Midland all having 
rates of poverty twice the level for Dublin. Regional variation for 
consistent poverty was a good deal more modest although the Border area 
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continues to be characterised by a distinctively high rate. Extending our 
analysis to look at variation in a range of deprivation dimensions we found 
regional variation to be modest and uneven across dimensions. Focusing 
explicitly on “at risk of poverty” and consistent poverty we found that the 
bulk of the variation in such outcomes is within rather than between 
regions.  
 
A somewhat similar picture emerges when we distinguish between levels 
of population density. The more populated areas display lower levels of “at 
risk of poverty” but little variation is observed for consistent poverty. 
Overall both those “at risk of poverty” and in consistent poverty are 
distributed across such types of areas in a fairly similar manner to the 
population as a whole. 
 
In relation to the impact of geographical location, we found that such 
effects were not in any sense statistically spurious. Even after controlling 
for a variety of household factors the magnitude of such effects remains 
largely unaffected. The crucial point that needs to be made in relation to 
geographical effects is not that the differences we observe are in any sense 
misleading but that they are extremely modest when placed in the context 
of overall variation in risk between households. Furthermore, the regional 
and local authority spatial units that we have employed in our analysis do 
not in any way constitute homogeneous blocks in relation to risk of poverty 
and deprivation. Finally, as we have observed, different dimensions of 
deprivation have rather different spatial distributions.  
 
A more fine-grained analysis of spatial location, than it was possible for 
us to undertake on this occasion, can be provided by going to the level of 
DED. However, while such an analysis would inevitably reveal a more 
marked pattern of spatial differentiation, the regional and local authority 
patterns that we have documented will also break up yielding a more 
scattered overall picture of spatial differentiation. Thus, using 1996 SAPS 
data, Nolan and Fahey (2002, pp. 240-241) concluded that the national 
picture is something akin to a partially patterned mosaic: the DEDs with 
the highest unemployment rates are far worse off than those with the 
lowest unemployment rates and there is some tendency towards a 
clustering of the worst with the worst and the best with the best. However, 
the clustering effect is relatively modest when placed in the context of 
overall variation, so that the effect is not of sharply delineated blackspots in 
which the bulk of the poor or unemployed are concentrated. The most 
reasonable conclusion remains that while some geographical concentration 
of disadvantage exists, poverty and deprivation are spatially pervasive and 
affect almost all parts of the country at all levels of geographical 
disaggregation. Our current analysis confirms earlier findings (Nolan, 
Whelan and Williams, 1994, 1999; Fahey and Williams, 2000) that from a 
pure targeting perspective, a focus on geographical location offers the 
crudest basis for reaching ‘at risk populations’. As Nolan et al. (1999) 
concluded, area based strategies cannot be the panacea for spatially 
pervasive problems.  
 
The majority of people do not reside in clearly identifiable ‘poor’ areas 
and area-based initiatives should not, therefore,  be the main policy 
instrument for combating poverty and deprivation. Poverty remains a 
spatially diffuse phenomenon and policies to tackle it must continue to 
prioritise structural causes over a focus on spatial outcomes. Area 
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programmes cannot be justified on a targeting basis, though a variety of 
other rationales are available. Hasse (2007, p. 264) suggests that our earlier 
research supporting these conclusions treats space as an optional extra and 
fails to grasp the unique contribution of geography to the creation and 
perpetuation of cumulative disadvantage and deprivation (Nolan et al., 
1998, 2002 and Watson et al., 2000). It is true we are strongly committed to 
the view that discussions of poverty in Ireland have paid disproportionate 
attention to spatial and community issues in comparison with that devoted 
to vulnerable social groups. However, we have also recognised that recent 
interventions have involved more complex justifications that have 
encompassed factors such as enhanced neighbourhood infrastructures, as 
improved service delivery and mobilisation of community resources 
involving a somewhat broader quality of life perspective. Thus as Pringle 
and Walsh (1999,  p. 339) observe, policies aimed at promoting social 
inclusion involve more than simply providing resources and have the 
objective of creating mechanisms whereby the disadvantaged can 
participate more actively in all aspects of life, including decision making.  
 
Where we do differ profoundly from Haase is in his conclusions 
regarding the importance of neighbourhood effects, both generally and 
specifically in the Irish case, and the extent to which such effects provide a 
justification for area based interventions. As we noted earlier, the possibility 
that individual or household neighbourhood characteristics may interact 
with attributes of neighbourhood to produce vicious circle processes of 
cumulative disadvantage constitutes a fascinating area of social enquiry. It is 
one that for a number of reasons has been explored in most depth in the 
United States. In the first place, associated with the scale of ethnic 
differentiation, the degree of spatial concentration of poverty and 
deprivation is exceptional. Thus, Wacquant (1993) on the basis of a 
comparative study of two neighbourhoods in Chicago and the peripheral of 
Paris concludes that there is no European counterpart to the African-
American experience of long-term negative discrimination and restriction 
of opportunity. As a consequence, conceptual and methodological 
developments relating to the study of urban disadvantage took place at a 
rate that far outstripped their European counterparts. Finally, the 
availability of Census Bureau data relating to administratively defined 
census tracts and block groups offered substantial possibilities in terms of 
the analysis of overlapping and nested ecological structures. The US 
research environment thus offers possibilities for the scientific study of 
neighbourhood effects that go so far beyond what is possible in the Irish 
case that it would be difficult to exaggerate the gap. Yet as Sampson et al. 
(2002, p. 443) observed, at the outset of the 1990s Jencks and Mayer (1990) 
offered a highly influential assessment of the “…so called neighbourhood 
effects literature that was ultimately pessimistic”. Such pessimism was, in 
part, based on the fact that the data sources on which such analysis was 
typically based related the composition of statistical areas rather than to the 
unfolding of dynamic processes. As Sampson et al. (2002, p. 445) note, the 
study of neighbourhood effects is plagued by thorny methodological 
problems that include the trick issues of what constitutes a neighbourhood 
and the degree to which the relevant geographical area may vary depending 
on the outcome of interest. However, the most fundamental problem 
relates to selection bias i.e., the fact that people are distributed between 
neighbourhoods on the basis of a range of causal factors many of which are 
unmeasured.  
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Jencks and Mayer’s pessimism was related to the fact that very few 
studies succeeded in isolating and measuring the social processes or 
mechanisms that could count for such effects. While a great deal of 
subsequent work in the US has attempted to rectify these deficiencies and 
progress has been made, Sampson et al. (2202, pp. 473-474) conclude that 
we continue to know relatively little about key processes or whether they 
are responsive to neighbourhood policy interventions. Even experimental 
evidence must be assessed with a good deal of caution. Conclusions 
regarding such effects must be qualified by a range of caveats relating to 
intervening mechanism, identification of appropriate spatial units and the 
role of selection effects (Jargowski, 1996; Brooks-Gunn et al., 1997). 
 
Given the outcome of such research in the United States, Friedrich’s 
(1998,  p. 93) conclusion based on a review of European research that 
“…the most general evidence presented on neighbourhood effects 
indicates low or negligible effects”. In the Irish case in the absence of the 
kind of evidence that would allow genuine multi-level modelling of 
neighbourhood effects we have approached the issue indirectly by asking 
whether there is evidence that local authority tenants in urban centres are 
more likely to experience poverty and deprivation on a scale over and 
above what we would expect on the basis of the households in which they 
are located. The evidence for such effects has always been weak. In our 
most recent analysis based on the EU-SILC 2005 data, we find that 
housing tenure and most particularly being a local authority tenant is a far 
more powerful predictor of poverty and deprivation than geographical 
location. However, the largest part of that effect can be accounted for by 
household characteristics and it is difficult to exclude the possibility that 
the reminder may be a consequence of unmeasured selection effects. More 
importantly from the point of view of the current issue we found no 
interaction between forms of housing tenure and urban-rural location. 
Whatever are the residual effects of being a local authority tenant it appears 
that they operate in a generally similar fashion in urban and rural areas. 
Thus, while urban local authority residents experience distinctive 
environments in terms of the quality of their neighbourhood, in relation to 
the causal determination of poverty and deprivation, the evidence runs 
directly contrary to the urban underclass hypothesis.  
 
The available evidence supports the view put forward by Fahey and 
Williams (2000,  p. 241) that if neighbourhoods matter, it is perhaps in a 
more complex and fine-grained way that can be easily captured by statistical 
analysis. They suggest an understanding of neighbourhood that views 
deprived areas not as large uniform social environments but as complex 
composites of micro areas, each having its own character and 
neighbourhood quality. Additionally, as the US evidence suggests the 
spatial or neighbourhood level that matters, and the neighbourhood 
resources and facilities that are critical in mediating such effects, may 
depend on the particular issue with which one is concerned or the stage of 
the life cycle on which one focuses. Thus the neighbourhood 
characteristics and the relevant level of aggregation that has consequences 
for the quality of schooling available to very young children may be rather 
different from those that affect teenagers risk of being involved in crime or 
the availability of social support for older people. 
  
In relation to such issues a stronger focus on ‘place’ or neighbourhood 
deprivation or poverty as opposed to ‘people’ deprivation or poverty can 
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be justified without the need to posit neighbourhood vicious circle effects. 
As Fahey (1999) stressed, characteristics of neighbourhood can continue to 
have consequences as the individuals affected by them change. Thus the 
selection effects related to social housing contribute to a residualisation 
process whereby the upwardly mobile are replaced by more disadvantaged 
groups. Similarly, mobility within the local authority sector may be 
influenced by perceptions of quality of neighbourhood environment at a 
quite micro-level. As Fahey (1999) stresses such problems require 
responses focused not at the level of the characteristics of residents but at 
the level of public management of housing and neighbourhoods. 
 
The additional analysis that we have reported in this chapter reinforces 
the earlier conclusion by Watson et al. (2005) that, in evaluating the 
potential of area based initiatives, it is necessary to strike a balance between 
a perspective that sees them as serving little purpose until structural 
problems are resolved and one that encourages unrealistic expectations of 
the extent to which they can contribute to resolving the problems faced by 
disadvantaged communities.  
12. DEVELOPING 
POLICY OPTIONS 
In this chapter we draw on the preceding analyses to develop a number of 
broad policy packages. We then examine their cost and “cash” or “first 
round” impact on the risk of poverty and the overall distribution of 
income, using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model. We also use 
SWITCH to examine the first-round impact on financial incentives to 
work, as measured by replacement rates and effective marginal tax rates. 
Changes in financial incentives, along with other aspects of the packages 
(e.g., increased activation) will shape the behavioural responses which will 
contribute to the overall impact of the packages. 
12.1 
Introduction 
 
Section 12.2 describes the packages which will be analysed and outlines 
the microsimulation framework used to compare them with existing policy 
and with each other. Section 12.3 identifies the costs associated with each 
package, and some issues involved in financing them. Section 12.4 turns to 
the direct impact of the packages on the “at risk of poverty” measure, 
focusing in particular on the extent to which the impact could close the gap 
between poverty risks in Ireland and those of the best-performing 
countries in the EU on this criterion. Section 12.5 examines the impact of 
the policy packages on financial incentives to work, as measured by 
replacement rates and marginal effective tax rates. The main conclusions 
are drawn together in Section 12.6. 
 
 Twin themes run through this analysis: 12.2  
Reform 
Packages 
and the 
Analytic 
Framework 
 
• making most effective use of a given set of resources in tackling 
poverty; and 
• identifying the potential impact of increased resources in 
minimising risks of poverty. 
 
We look at these issues by examining potential large-scale reforms set in 
the context of the 2007 tax/welfare system, socio-demographic structure 
and income distribution. In reality, any reform would, of course, need to be 
phased in over time. But it is not the case that the “fruits of growth” would 
necessarily ease the way in achieving lower risks of poverty. Rising incomes 
mean a rising average standard of living, and the income levels required to 
participate in society would also rise. Thus, a “snapshot analysis” of the 
type undertaken is of considerable value in identifying future goals, towards 
which a path can then be plotted. 
 
In our analysis of broad policy options, we look at two options which 
simply increase resources, without any structural reforms: 
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• a 10 per cent increase in welfare payments across the board, 
• a 20 per cent increase in welfare payments across the board. 
 
We then construct two packages embodying structural reforms aimed at 
achieving a greater anti-poverty impact than simply expanding the current 
system. Each of these options incorporates two key structural features: 
 
1. A second-tier child income support, modelled as an income-
tested Child Benefit Supplement, is put in place – the role of FIS 
is reduced, but not abolished, in the light of the findings of 
Chapter 6. 
2. Payment rates are “levelled up” to a uniform figure. 
 
The first element has been discussed in earlier chapters, so we focus 
now on the third element – harmonisation of payment rates at a higher 
level. The highest rate of payment in the system is currently for Carer’s 
Allowance (€218, when the carer is aged 66 years or over and caring for 
one person). However, this is a payment received by very few people.51 The 
State Contributory Pension, with a personal rate of €209.30, is a better 
indicator of the maximum payment rate for a scheme with large-scale 
participation. This stands at a small premium (just under 5 per cent) in 
relation to the payment rate for the State Non-contributory Pension (and 
the Carer’s Allowance for carers aged under 66 years). Harmonisation of 
these rates can be seen as a move towards a uniform payment rate for 
pensions.52 The National Pensions Board (1993) Final Report concluded 
that rates of payment should be the same for the (state) contributory and 
non-contributory pensions. It was argued that the fact that the contributory 
pension is not subject to a means-test could seen as sufficient 
compensation for contributions paid. 
 
The main differentiation in the system, however, is between rates of 
payment for pensions and the rates paid in respect of schemes dealing with 
other contingencies. The personal rate for the State Contributory Pension 
is some 12½ per cent (€23.50 per week) higher than payment rates for 
schemes in respect of illness, disability, jobseekers, lone parenthood and 
the safety-net scheme, Supplementary Welfare Allowance. The State 
Contributory Pension rate is also about 10 per cent higher than that for 
recipients of invalidity pensions, and widow’s/widower’s contributory 
pensions. There is little differentiation between payment rates for 
contributory and means-tested schemes for contingencies arising during the 
working age years.53 
 
It is not at all clear that this pattern of differentiation in payment rates 
contributes to effective targeting of resources where need is greatest. The 
major differentiation involves higher rates for pensions than for other 
51 In 2005 there were fewer than 3,000 people potentially receiving this rate. 
52 This could be part of a broader move toward a universal, residence-based pension – but 
could also be effected without such a move. Our analysis does not depend on a particular 
view being taken of the arguments for and against a  universal, residence based pension.  
53 There are, however, significant differences in entitlements arising from payments with 
the same maximum rate, depending on whether or not means-testing applies. 
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welfare payments. But pensioners benefit from two sources of non-cash 
benefits to a greater extent than other groups: 
 
1. Pensioners are more likely than others to own their homes 
outright, conferring on them an income advantage in that they do 
not have to pay rent or mortgages. 
2. Some of the main non-cash resources provided by the welfare 
system (e.g., the Household Benefits package) are also focused 
particularly on pensioners. 
 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 7, given current levels of income 
support for  older persons, increased support in the form of cash may not 
be the most effective way of improving the position of older persons. For 
example, the organisation and provision of home help services may be 
critical for the welfare of an elderly person, but difficult to achieve through 
a market system. Provision of such services, which are more closely related 
to increased needs, may also provide improved targeting of resources to 
older persons in greater need. As against this, it could be argued that a 
lower payment to people of working age is necessary in order to maintain 
an adequate incentive to work; while this may be seen as less of an obstacle 
to the provision of an increased level of support to older persons.  
 
As noted in earlier chapters, it could also be argued that special 
payments are needed to offset the costs associated with having a disability, 
or that childcare costs, not taken into account in standard analyses of risks 
of poverty, impose a particular burden on lone parents. Given all these 
uncertainties, it is certainly worthwhile to explore options which 
incorporate a standard welfare payment rate across all contingencies, and 
applies to both contributory and non-contributory schemes. A “what if” 
analysis on this basis will provide important evidence for the policy debate. 
 
We examine these options at two levels of payment. In setting these 
levels, we draw on the target for the level of State Pensions set in the 
Programme for Government. The commitment in that document is to 
“…increase the basic state pension by around 50 per cent to at least €300 
per week by 2012.” (Agreed Programme for Government, p. 51). The 
target is set in nominal terms. The impact of reaching a nominal level of 
€300 per week will depend on the evolution of prices and wages over the 
next 5 years. If wage growth were very rapid, the target would be easier to 
reach – but reaching it would have less impact on risks of poverty. We can 
translate the €300 target into 2007 terms, given an average rate of wage 
growth over the 2007-2012 period. Wage growth of 5 per cent per annum 
would imply that the target of €300 in 2012 equated to a value of about 
€235 per week in 2007 terms. Wage growth of half a percentage point 
higher per annum would mean that the €300 target equated to about €230 
per week in 2007, while slower wage growth (4.5 per cent) would mean that 
the target equated to €240 per week. 
 
Given that we are examining an option which involves payment of this 
level not just for pensions, but for all welfare payments, we take a 
conservative view and look at the implications of “levelling up” welfare 
payments to values of: 
 
• €220 per week – this rate is about 5 per cent higher than the 2007 
State Contributory Pension, but close to 19 per cent higher than the 
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most common personal rate of payment for persons of working 
age. 
 
• €230 per week – this represents an increase of just under 10 per 
cent in the State Contributory Pension rate, and is almost 24 per 
cent higher than the most common non-pension personal rates of 
payment. 
 
All personal rates of payment are increased to these levels, eliminating 
differentiation between the rates. 
 
The rate of payment for Child Benefit Supplement needs to be 
sufficient to ensure that the total child income support package (Child 
Benefit and the Child Benefit Supplement) represents 33 per cent of the 
main payment rate. Given that Child Benefit is unchanged at about €37 per 
week, Child Benefit Supplement would need to be about €36 per week if 
the main payment rate were €220, and close to €40 per week if the  main 
payment rate were €230. Our analysis is based on a rate of €40 per week in 
both cases. 
 
Thus the four packages considered are: 
(a) A 10 per cent increase in all social welfare payment rates. 
(b) A 20 per cent increase in all social welfare payment rates. 
(c) All personal payment rates increased to a uniform level of €220 
per week, with a Child Benefit Supplement (as per Chapter 6) 
of €40 per week. 
(d) All personal payment rates increased to a uniform level of €230 
per week, with a Child Benefit Supplement of €40 per week. 
 
Before simulating these packages, we must first establish a baseline 
simulation against which changes can be measured.54 This involves using 
the SWITCH model to simulate the system as of 2007.55 As results based 
on survey data for 2007 will not be available until late 2008, we use two 
points of comparison in order to assess the suitability of the SWITCH 
baseline for this purpose. First (Table 12.1), we consider results of a 
simulation of the year 2000, and compare this with the results of direct 
analyses of the 2000 Living in Ireland Survey (which provides the data for 
SWITCH). Second (Table 12.2), we consider how a SWITCH simulation 
for the year 2005 compares with the results of direct analyses of the CSO’s 
EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). 
 
In Table 12.1, the overall risk of poverty in the SWITCH simulation is 
just almost identical to the directly calculated rate, at just under 21 per cent. 
The structure of poverty risks as between children and older people, the 
unemployed and the “working poor” and people with a disability is also 
closely reflected in the simulated results. 
54 A similar process is undertaken for the ESRI’s macromodel in establishing a baseline for 
its analyses. 
55 The analysis as carried out during 2007. Given the structural nature of the issues being 
addressed, analysis based on 2008 policies would arrive at similar results.  
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Table 12.1: Comparison of SWITCH Simulation and Living in Ireland 
Survey, 2000 
 
 
Living in Ireland 
2000 
SWITCH 
2000 
All persons 20.9 20.8 
Children 23.7 21.9 
Older people 38.4 41.0 
Lone parents and children 32.9 35.0 
People with a disability, somewhat hampered 36.1 39.4 
People with a disability, severely hampered 41.1 46.1 
Unemployed persons 52.3 51.9 
“Working poor” 7.1 6.3 
   
 
There are more significant differences in Table 12.2. Here the 
comparison is between risks of poverty as calculated from EU-SILC 2005 
and as estimated by SWITCH, based on data drawn from the Living in 
Ireland Survey of 2000, but uprated and adjusted for key changes in 
demographics and socio-economic structure between 2000 and 2005. 
These comparisons are influenced also by differences in the way in which 
data were gathered by SILC as against Living in Ireland, and by differences 
in the definition of income used in the measurement of poverty risk. The 
overall poverty risk, and the risks for children, the unemployed and the 
“working poor” are again quite close. We consider each of the other three 
groups (People with a disability, lone parents and older people) in turn. 
Table 12.2: Comparison of SWITCH Simulation and EU-SILC, 2005 
   
 EU-SILC 2005 SWITCH 2005 
Total 18.5 19.2 
Children 21.2 21.8 
Older people 20.1 41.5 
Lone parents 40.7 27.1 
People with a disability:  
 Limited activity/somewhat hampered 23.0 37.9 
People with a disability:  
 Strongly limited/severely hampered 32.7 40.9 
Unemployed persons 40.6 46.0 
"Working poor" 7.0 5.8 
   
 
Unlike the QNHS and Living in Ireland Survey, which ask about 
longstanding/chronic health problems/illness or disability, EU-SILC asks 
whether the respondent suffers from any chronic (long-standing) illness or 
condition (health problem) –  the term “disability” is not included. The 
survey then asks “in the last 6 months have you been limited in activities 
people usually do, because of a health problem?”, where respondents can 
reply that they were strongly limited, limited, or not limited. About 16 per 
cent of working-age respondents report being limited or strongly limited in 
their activities in EU-SILC 2004. This contrasts with less than 12 per cent 
reporting themselves as somewhat or severely hampered in the Living in 
Ireland Survey. It seems likely, therefore, that the group identified within 
the Living in Ireland Survey are more severely affected by disability, and as 
a result are at greater risk of poverty, as found in Table 12.2. 
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Turning to lone parents, the group identified by the CSO analysis of 
SILC consists of lone parent households, whereas the SWITCH analysis 
includes all lone parents. Whelan et al. (2005) find that lone parent 
households are at higher risk of poverty than all lone parents, which 
includes also those who live with their own adult children, their own 
parents, or other adults. 
 
The sharpest difference is that between the estimates of poverty risk for 
older people. The most likely explanation for this difference is that the 
CSO analysis of SILC (Central Statistics Office, 2006) includes a number of 
non-cash benefits in its definition of disposable income – principally those 
covered by the Household Benefits Package (free electricity or gas, free 
telephone allowance and a free television licence). These are not included 
in the measure of cash disposable income used in the Living in Ireland 
Survey. The main argument for their inclusion is that these resources 
contribute to well-being in the same way as income. As against this, the 
inclusion of non-cash resources only for older persons may distort the 
overall picture of the income distribution and the “at risk of poverty” rate. 
For example, for the working age population, income is defined as 
including superannuation contributions paid by employees; but does not 
include superannuation paid by an employer, or the equivalent 
accumulation of entitlements arising from employment in the public 
service. Including non-cash benefits for one population group and not 
others may therefore distort the picture. The results reported here are 
based on the cash measure of disposable income which has underpinned 
the measures of risk of poverty in the Living in Ireland study; but the issues 
involved will also be examined in future research. 
 
Overall, these results indicate that the risks of poverty simulated by 
SWITCH offer a useful base for the analysis of policy issues. It must be 
borne in mind, however, that the SWITCH poverty measures are based on 
cash incomes, while the SILC measures include a particular subset of non- 
cash incomes which go, in the main, to older people. Figure 12.1 shows the 
risks of poverty at 60 per cent of median income based on Living in Ireland 
(2000-2001) and SILC (2003-2006). Alongside these, we show the 
estimated risk of poverty based on SWITCH simulations. While, as we have 
 
Figure 12.1: Estimates of Overall Risk of Poverty at 60 Per Cent of Median 
Income, 2000-2007 
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seen, simulated poverty risks tend to be slightly lower than those based on 
recorded data, the SWITCH estimates suggest a significant reduction in 
poverty risk between 2000 and 2007. The overall risk in 2007 is estimated 
at 15.7 per cent, and the impacts of policy changes are calculated in relation 
to that figure. 
 
 The direct costs of the four packages, in advance of any behavioural 
responses to changed incentives, are set out in Table 12.3. In that table, the 
term “gross costs” refers to increases in welfare expenditures. Net costs 
take into account increased tax revenues arising from that expenditure, and 
more significantly, increased revenues arising from the standardisation of 
tax relief on pension contributions in Packages (C) and (D). 
12.3 
Costs 
Table 12.3: Net and Gross Costs of Alternative Packages in 2007 Terms 
 
Package (A) (B) (C) (D) 
 10 Per Cent 
Rise 
20 Per Cent 
Rise 
Uniform €220, Child     
Benefit Supplement 
Uniform €230 p.w., 
Child Benefit 
Supplement 
 €m Per Annum 
Gross cost 1,441 2,869 1,554 1,968 
Net cost 1,336 2,690 1,480 1,863 
     
 
Looking first at gross costs we see that a 10 per cent rise in all welfare 
payment rates would cost in the order of €1,340 million per annum, and a 
20 per cent rise would cost about twice that. The gross cost of “levelling 
up” to a new uniform personal rate of payment of €220 would fall by about 
€140 million more than the cost of a 10 per cent rise in all rates. The cost 
of a further increase to €230 would be about €380 million per annum, 
making a total cost of about €1,860 million.  
 
The differing levels of resources involved in these four packages mean 
that financing requirements and implications would also be quite  different. 
We return to this issue in Section 12.6. 
 
 In evaluating changes in the risk of poverty brought about these packages, 
it is helpful to bear in mind that the implicit reference point of a zero 
poverty risk may not be the most appropriate. This can clearly be seen in 
the construction of the UK child poverty target (Department of Work and 
Pensions, 2003), which contains two elements: a material deprivation child 
poverty rate that “approached zero” and an “at risk of poverty” measure 
which is to be “among the best in Europe”. Expanding on this, the 
Department of Work and Pensions document states that:  
12.4  
Impact on 
“at Risk of 
Poverty” 
Rates 
 
Possible ways to define being ‘amongst the best in Europe’ could 
include: having a relative child poverty rate no higher than the 
average of the best three countries in Europe; having a relative 
child poverty rate no higher than the average of the best four 
countries in Europe; and, having a relative child poverty rate that 
was within 2 percentage points of the average of the best three 
countries in Europe.  (Department of Work and Pensions, 2003, 
p.20.) 
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Applying these criteria to the overall risk of poverty would mean that 
the target risk of poverty at 60 per cent of median income would be 
between 11 and 13 per cent. We have seen  that simulation estimates have a 
tendency to be slightly lower than the poverty risks calculated directly from 
recorded income, because the simulations are based on full take-up of 
benefit. For this reason we will focus on a reference point of 11 to 12 per 
cent in considering policy impact on the risk of poverty. 
 
A second point to note is SWITCH simulations based on uprated Living 
in Ireland data yield poverty thresholds which are in excess of those 
calculated from the EU-SILC. This arises because there is, in effect, a 
difference between the levels of median equivalised income calculated from 
the Living in Ireland Surveys of 2000/2001 and the EU-SILC series 
starting in 2003. The SWITCH simulations arrive at an “at risk of poverty” 
rate which is very close to that found in EU-SILC for 2004/5, but with a 
higher level of median equivalised income. In order to check the results for 
sensitivity to this feature, we have re-estimated the policy impacts reported 
here using an income growth factor which is scaled to arrive at the same 
poverty threshold as the EU-SILC. Some of these results are reported 
below, but in general, the differences between these two sets of results in 
terms of policy impact are rather slight. 
 
The nature of the packages examined means that they are focused on 
the lower half of the income distribution. Median income rises slightly 
(about 2 per cent)  under packages (A), (C) or (D). Package (B) has a 
greater impact on the median, at around 4 per cent of the initial median 
value. 
Table 12.4: Estimated Direct Impact of Policy Packages on the “At Risk of 
Poverty” Measure 
 
 Baseline (A) (B) (C) (D) 
  
10 Per 
Cent Rise
20 Per Cent 
Rise 
Level up to 
€220 p.w. 
Level up to 
€230 p.w.
“At risk of poverty”, 
head count % % % % % 
50 per cent  median 6.2 5.4 3.8 3.6 3.4 
60 per cent median 15.9 13.5 10.6 12.7 11.9 
70 per cent median 24.5 23.4 21.2 23.0 22.3 
Indices of poverty  
at 60 per cent  of 
median income      
Head count 100 85 67 80 75 
Poverty gap ratio 100 80 66 65 59 
      
 
Table 12.5 shows the estimated impact of the different policy packages 
on the “at risk of poverty” measure. A 10 per cent rise in all welfare rates 
(which would bring the maximum rate for pensioners to about €230 per 
week) would see the overall “at risk of poverty” rate  at the 60 per cent of 
median income cut off fall from about 16 per cent to just under 13 per 
cent. A 20 per cent rise in all welfare rates, bringing pension rates to around 
€250 per week, would see the risk decline further, to just under 11 per cent. 
But Package (D), a restructuring of payments, bringing all payments up to 
the €230 level, combined with a Child Benefit Supplement would see the 
risk decline to around 12 per cent – at a similar cost to Package (A), the 10 
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per cent rise in all welfare payments with unchanged structure and 
substantially lower than the cost of Package (B), the 20 per cent rise in all 
welfare payments. This “at risk of poverty” rate is similar to the best-
performing countries in the EU. Package (D) performs better than the 10 
per cent rise in rates (Package (A)) at higher and lower income cut-offs; and 
performs about as well in poverty reduction at these alternative cut-offs as 
the 20 per cent rise in rates (Package (B)). 
 
Given the well known limitations of the head count measure of poverty, 
an alternative perspective is given in the lower panel of the table, which 
shows the extent to which a poverty index (defined as 100 in the baseline 
situation) is reduced by each policy. The head count index is reduced by 
about one-third by  a 20 per cent rise in rates, or by about 25 per cent by a  
levelling up package with a new rate of €230 per week (Package (D)). But 
the poverty gap ratio, which takes into account not just the extent but also 
the depth of income poverty, falls substantially more under Package D than 
under Package B. Levelling up the rates to €230 per week leads to a 
reduction in the poverty gap ratio of about 40 per cent, as compared with 
about 34 per cent under the 20 per cent rise in rates. 
 
How are these results affected if SWITCH simulations are adjusted to 
match the median incomes calculated from EU-SILC, instead of matching 
the “at risk of poverty” rate? Table 12.5 below shows the impact of the 
packages on the headline “at risk of poverty” rate at 60 per cent of median 
equivalised income. 
Table 12.5: Impact on “At Risk of Poverty” Rate: Sensitivity Analysis 
(Poverty Risk at 60 Per Cent of Median Income Per Adult 
Equivalent) 
     
 Package A Package B Package C Package D 
SWITCH poverty risk 
aligned with EU-SILC 
results -2.4 -5.3 -3.2 -4 
SWITCH median income 
aligned with EU-SILC 
results -1.2 -2.2 -3.4 -3.9 
     
 
Moving to a scenario in which the median income is aligned with SILC 
leads to a reduction in the poverty impact of the 10 per cent and 20 per 
cent welfare increases, but to an increase in the poverty reduction impact of 
the restructuring packages. The restructuring packages would now 
dominate the simple welfare increases in having a greater poverty reduction 
impact at a lower cost. 
 
How do these results translate into changes in the “at risk of poverty” 
rate for vulnerable groups. With some exceptions, the patterns reflect the 
changes in risk at aggregate level. Older people, people with a disability and 
unemployed persons have the highest risks in the baseline scenario – these 
risks are close to 40 per cent. A 10 per cent rise in welfare payments sees 
these risks fall to 25 to 30 per cent. Package D, levelling up payments to 
€230, complemented by a Child Benefit Supplement, sees the risks fall to 
about 20 per cent – similar to what obtains under a 20 per cent rise in 
welfare payment rates. Lone parents have an initial risk which is about 20 
per cent, closer to the average risk of around 15 per cent. Under Package D 
this risk falls by about 6 percentage points – compared to a fall in the 
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overall poverty risk of about 5 percentage points. The risk for children in 
the baseline scenario is close to the average risk – and remains so, at about 
10 per cent, under Package D (levelling up to €230 per week accompanied 
by the introduction of a Child Benefit Supplement). The overall pattern, 
therefore, is one in which the highest risks are reduced most by these 
packages, while groups with a risk close to average see their risk fall in line 
with the average risk. 
 
The broader distributional implications of Package D are illustrated in 
Table 12.6. Gainers are concentrated in the lower deciles, where most tax 
units (except in the bottom decile) gain from the package. Losers, by 
contrast, are found almost exclusively in the top half of the distribution, 
and particularly in the top two deciles. 
Table 12.6: Gainers and Losers by Decile of Income Per Adult Equivalent 
  
 Number of Tax Units (Thousands) Gaining or Losing  
 Loss > €0.50 p.w. No Change Gain > €0.50 p.w. 
Bottom 0 137 92 
2nd 0 19 224 
3rd 0 29 188 
4th 8 77 145 
5th 14 136 80 
6th 22 155 53 
7th 47 156 26 
8th 91 122 17 
9th 134 80 13 
Top 157 60 16 
All 473 974 854 
    
 
Average gains and losses for those affected are substantial. Average 
gains are between €35 and €50 per week for those in the bottom half of the 
income distribution. Average losses for those who lose, range from €60 to 
over €80 per week for those in the top two deciles. 
 
 What are the implications of these packages for financial incentives to 
work? In order to examine this question we look at the impact of the 
packages on the distribution of replacement rates, measuring the balance 
between income in work and out of work. For simplicity, we focus on the 
estimated baseline distribution, and the distribution of replacement rates 
under Package D, which involves a uniform welfare payment rate of €230  
per week. 
12.5 
Impact on 
Financial 
Incentives to 
Work 
 
Table 12.7 presents the distribution of estimated replacement rates for 
unemployed persons in receipt of Unemployment Assistance or 
Unemployment Benefit. The methods and definitions used are identical to 
those in Callan et al. (2006). A key point is that the replacement rates 
reported here include simulations of the value of Rent and Mortgage 
Supplement for persons who are unemployed. The estimates are 
constructed “as if” the value of this supplement was identically zero for all 
persons in employment. Ignoring the existence of Rent and Mortgage 
Supplement would tend to underestimate the replacement rate for those 
benefiting from it. The treatment here errs on the other side, as there are 
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provisions for long-term unemployed persons to retain the supplement for 
a period; and a Rental Accommodation Scheme has been introduced with 
the aim of providing a more secure housing solution for those who 
previously have received Rent and Mortgage Supplement over the 
longterm. Perhaps the best interpretation of these figures is that they 
represent a “telescoping” of the path of benefits over time, looking towards 
a longer-term balance between in-work and out-of-work income. 
Table 12.7: Distribution of Replacement Rates for Unemployed Persons in 
Receipt of UA or UB  
 
Replacement Rate 
Category 
(Per Cent) 
Baseline 2007 Welfare Package with Rates Levelled 
up to €230 (Package D) 
   < 10 1.0 0.4 
   < 20 4.4 0.7 
   < 30 1.7 1.8 
   < 40 4.7 4.2 
   < 50 11.2 5.2 
   < 60 48.1 9.4 
   < 70 3.3 48.8 
   < 80 5.7 4.6 
   < 90 5.6 4.1 
 < 100 7.9 6.2 
Over 100 6.3 14.7 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   
 
One clear feature is that the modal replacement rate category, containing 
about half of all unemployed persons,  is between 50 and 60 per cent for 
the baseline scenario (2007). The modal category for Package D (€230 per 
week welfare payment) is between 60 and 70 per cent. 
 
Particular attention has been given to replacement rates above 70 per 
cent and above 90 per cent. The 2007 baseline estimates suggest that about 
25 per cent of the unemployed have replacement rates above 70 per cent, 
and just under 15 per cent have replacement rates above 90 per cent. Under 
Package D, with a welfare payment rate of €230 per week, these 
proportions rise by about 5 percentage points, to 21 per cent and 30 per 
cent respectively. 
 
In considering the possible impact of such changes in replacement rates, 
it may be helpful to distinguish two views. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that  such increases in replacement rates represent a sharp 
deterioration in the financial incentive to work. While analysis based on 
marginal changes in financial incentives may suggest rather limited 
behavioural responses (see, for example, Layte and Callan, 2000) a “step 
change” in incentives might be sufficient to induce larger scale responses. 
An alternative view, on the other hand, is that Scandinavian experience 
indicates that raising replacement rates is a necessary part of providing an 
adequate floor to incomes and reducing poverty. The key, in this view, 
would be that activation measures are sufficient to ensure that 
unemployment compensation does not act as a passive income support 
measure, but is conditional on fulfilling a contract which involves job-
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seeking and undertaking training and re-skilling to participate in the labour 
market.56 
 
What about the impact on effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs), which 
have a greater influence on decisions regarding work hours and work effort 
for those in employment? The standardisation of tax relief on pension 
contributions brings more income within the scope of the taxation system. 
Given the progression in tax rates, this will tend to increase the average tax 
rate. Our simulations suggest that the average tax rate would rise by about 
3 percentage points, from 36 per cent under the baseline scenario to 
around 39 per cent under Package D. 
 
 The packages explored involve substantial additional resources of 
between €1,340 million and €2,700 million per annum. The restructuring 
packages offer greater returns in terms of reduction in the “at risk of 
poverty” rate, at a somewhat lower cost. For example, Package (D), with a 
cost of €1,863 million per annum, achieves a greater reduction in the 
poverty gap (a measure taking account not only of the extent of poverty 
but also its depth) than a 20 per cent rise in all welfare rates – a pacakage 
which costs almost  €900 million more. 
12.6 
Financing 
Issues 
 
Clearly the amount of resources involved is substantial. But it is not, 
perhaps, as large as might have been expected. Countries which have the 
lowest rates of “at risk of poverty” in the EU typically have very much 
larger welfare states than Ireland, and matching their performance might 
have been expected to involve a very substantial rise in social expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP. But the exploration of options undertaken here 
suggests that a restructuring of welfare expenditure, rather than simply 
scaling up the existing system, could provide a more efficient way of 
achieving similar results. 
 
Options for financing increased expenditure on welfare could include 
increases in income tax or PRSI; increases in indirect taxes; or reductions in 
other government expenditure. Here, however, we focus on another 
reform option, a change in the tax treatment of superannuation 
contributions, whether by employee, employer, self-employed or the 
“implicit” contributions of government as employer in the public service 
pension scheme. The details of this approach are set out in Chapter 7. Here 
we simply report on how the application of standardised relief would fit 
into the overall package, and particularly its financing. 
 
Table 12.8 shows that the standardisation of income tax relief on all 
superannuation contributions would be more than sufficient (in the 
absence of behavioural responses, as discussed in Chapter 7) to finance 
Package C. The net cost of package D would be reduced to around €350 
million per annum. This is modest in relation to the size of even a single 
year’s budgetary package. 
 
 
 
 
56 Similar issues arise with respect to lone parents and people with disabilities, as examined 
in Chapters 5 and 8. 
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Table 12.8: Cost of Restructuring Packages – With and Without Reform of 
Tax Treatment of Pensions  
 (Poverty Risk at 60 Per Cent of Median Income Per Adult 
Equivalent) 
   
 Package C Package D 
 €m per annum €m per annum 
Net cost without reform of tax 
treatment of pensions 1,480 1,863 
Net cost with reform of tax 
treatment of pensions -37 346 
   
 
 As recently as three years ago, available evidence suggested that the risk 
of poverty in Ireland (at the 60 per cent of median income cut-off) was 
close to 20 per cent, while the best rates achieved in Europe were close to 
10 per cent. CSO estimates based on the 2006 Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), along with microsimulation estimates for 
2007 suggest that the Irish rate has declined somewhat. Recent EU-SILC 
figures for the EU countries with lowest risks of poverty show slightly 
higher rates, so that the gap is narrowing from both sides. Current Irish “at 
risk of poverty” rates are estimated at around 15 to 16 per cent. The lowest 
European rates are now between 10 and 12 per cent. How can this gap be 
bridged? 
12.7 
Conclusions 
 
We have examined the scope for bridging this gap with two simple rate- 
increasing welfare packages (10 per cent and 20 per cent) and with two 
packages incorporating structural changes as well as increased welfare 
payment rates. Package C involves a uniform welfare payment rate across 
all schemes of €220 per week, and Package D a uniform payment rate of 
€230 per week. Each of these packages also includes a Child Benefit 
Supplement of €40 per week, along the lines described in Chapter 6.  
 
While these packages involve substantial resources, they are within the 
scope of a multi-year budgetary package. “Standard” financing options 
would include increased income tax or PRSI, increased indirect taxes, or 
reductions in (the growth of) other government expenditures. We also 
explored a further option: reform of the tax treatment of superannuation 
contributions, restricting tax relief on such contributions to the standard 
rate of tax. The net revenue from standardisation could be of the order of 
€1,500 million per annum. Standard rate taxpayers would be unaffected by 
the change, while top rate taxpayers would see their tax liabilities rise. This 
could be seen as rebalancing state support for pensions in favour of greater 
universal support, and less support towards the higher end of the income 
distribution. Standard rate taxpayers would gain from the increased 
universal support, and would be unaffected by the standardisation of relief 
on superannuation contributions. However, the broad packages do not 
depend on this particular financing option being chosen. 
 
The reforming packages examined seem to have considerable scope for 
reducing the risk of poverty. The direct impact suggests a fall in the risk of 
poverty from almost 16 per cent to as low as 12 per cent – close to the 
lowest in the EU. The reduction in risk would be greatest for the high risk 
groups (older people, people with a disability and unemployed persons) for 
whom risks would fall from about 40 per cent to close to 20 per cent. 
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There would be significant increases in replacement rates, with the modal 
rate rising from between 50 and 60 per cent to between 60 and 70 per cent. 
The rise in high or very high replacement rates (defined as above 70 per 
cent and above 90 per cent) would be more modest. A key feature if this 
policy package were to attain its poverty-reduction potential is that it would 
need to be complemented by further measures encouraging activation of 
welfare recipients – including unemployed persons, lone parents and 
people with a disability. Long-term issues regarding improved health, 
increased life expectancy and the labour market participation of older 
persons also arise. Our analysis has focused on the impact of policy on the 
“at risk of poverty” measure. Given the focus of Irish policy on consistent 
poverty, one would also wish to know how consistent poverty would be 
affected by such policy packages. This question is not directly answerable 
but research to establish  bounds on the likely change is currently under 
way. 
13. KEY FINDINGS 
13.1  
Setting the 
Context 
13.1.1 EVOLUTION OF IRELAND’S SOCIAL PROTECTION 
SPENDING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
We saw at the outset that Ireland currently has a particularly low level of 
social protection spending as a proportion of national income (and this 
remains the case with a more appropriate measure of national income than 
the commonly-employed GDP). However, this does not reflect a 
generalised shortfall compared with the EU average across different areas 
of social protection spending: instead, it is mostly concentrated in the area 
of old age pensions. This is partly a reflection of the population structure, 
but that does not account for the bulk of the gap between Ireland’s state 
spending in this area and other member states. While there is very wide 
variation in pension systems, Ireland’s spending by the state in this area 
also falls well short of the UK, which has a broadly similar structure.  
 
We also saw that Ireland’s level of social protection per head of 
population in real terms (adjusted for differences in purchasing power) 
ranks in the middle of the EU-25. This has to be seen in the light of the 
fact that the countries towards the top of the ranking by social protection 
spending are also among the richer in terms of average income, while those 
towards the bottom in social protection spending are very far below the 
EU average income. Ireland appears right at the top of the ranking by 
GDP per head, second only to Luxembourg; if we use a more appropriate 
measure of national income, Ireland would move down in terms of average 
income per head, to a level similar to Belgium or the UK, but still much 
higher (about 6th or 7th) than its ranking by social protection spending. 
 
We saw that Ireland’s social protection spending as a proportion of 
national income fell sharply from the mid-1990s as the rate of economic 
growth reached unprecedented levels, faster than any other OECD 
country. From 2000 onwards, though, social protection spending has risen 
as a percentage of GDP. Finally, social protection expenditure in real terms 
rose more rapidly between 1990 and 2004 in Ireland than any other EU-15 
country, at twice the rate that was more typical for those countries. These 
aggregates serve to bring out the complex mix that must be taken into 
account in seeking to understand and assess the evolution of social 
protection expenditure in what was a most unusual macroeconomic 
context, and serve as background to the analysis of policy options at the 
level of contingencies and schemes.   
13.1.2  CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF POVERTY RISK AND 
WELFARE REGIME 
The proportion of persons “at risk of poverty” in Ireland is among the 
highest in the EU. Simulation approaches demonstrate that differences in 
the age profile, the pattern of labour force participation, and household 
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composition do not play the major role in observed cross-country variation 
in the percentage “at risk of poverty”. Differences in tax and welfare rates 
and structures are more important. 
 
Sapir (2005) identifies the Scandinavian model as one which attains both 
efficiency (high employment rates) and equity (low risks of poverty). 
Successful anti-poverty policy requires both enhanced education and 
employment opportunities and improved income supports – neither is 
enough on its own. Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have 
sustained both high employment and a comprehensive welfare system 
ensuring that those without income from employment have an adequate 
income. Over the last decade Ireland has successfully made the transition 
to high employment and low unemployment rates. The experience of other 
EU countries suggests that achieving low “at risk of poverty” rates would 
in addition require a more comprehensive safety net and higher rates of 
welfare payment relative to average incomes.  
13.1.3   DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Ireland has seen major changes not only in its economic fortunes but also 
in its demographic and socio-economic profile over recent years, as a result 
of dramatic developments in migration but also more subtle longer-term 
trends. We saw that Ireland is distinctive in having substantially more 
children and fewer older people in the population than many other EU 
countries, with the share of the proportion of working age close to the EU 
average. This age structure has not shifted over the past twenty years in 
terms of the proportion aged 65 years or over, Ireland has not yet 
experienced the “greying” of the population seen in some other rich 
countries. However, there has been a marked decline in the share of the 
population made up by children: the share of the population aged 0-14 
years  peaked in the 1960s, declined slowly until the mid-1980s, and fell 
sharply from then until 2002, with the recent Census showing it was stable 
since then.  
 
Childbearing has declined among those aged in the teens and early 20s 
on the one side and aged over 40 on the other, and has become 
increasingly concentrated among women aged in their 30s. There has also 
been a marked fall in the number of children per family, with the numbers 
in households with three or more children now much lower than it was – 
although from a comparative perspective Ireland still has a very high 
proportion. A rapid increase in the share of fertility occurring outside of 
marriage began in the 1980s and continued unabated through the 1990s, 
approaching one-third of births in 2000. The incidence of lone parenthood 
has risen sharply over the past 25 years or so, associated with not only this 
rise in non-marital childbearing (which includes cohabiting as well as lone 
parents) but also an increase in marital breakdown. Ireland has a high 
proportion of lone parent households compared with other EU countries, 
though less than the UK. 
 
Turning to older people, 11 per cent of the population was aged 65 
years or over in 2006, no higher than in the early 1960s, whereas in the EU-
15 that percentage rose from 12 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 2004.  
There is a growing tendency for older people to live apart from their 
children or other relatives, in Ireland as in other rich countries, but it is also 
now more likely that they have been married at some point in their lives 
rather than remaining permanently single.  
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Ireland’s economic boom has also had a pronounced impact on 
migration flows in and out of the country, with the net inflow of 
immigrants increasing from 8,000 a year in 1996 to 53,000 a year in 2005. 
The composition of migratory flows to Ireland has also become 
increasingly diverse, with fewer coming from the UK and the US and many 
more from the rest of the EU and the rest of the world, and with a 
relatively young age profile. 
 
 
13.2 
Vulnerable 
Groups 
13.2.1  LONE PARENTS 
European and worldwide comparisons show that Scandinavian countries 
have the lowest risks of income poverty for lone parents. This is achieved 
by a system of activation which promotes employment for all, and supports 
for employment including a comprehensive childcare system, as well as 
education and training. The UK has reduced risks of poverty for lone 
parents substantially, but they still remain at the high end of the EU scale.  
 
The structure of income supports and activation for lone parents 
proposed in the Government’s discussion document (Department of Social 
and Family Affairs, 2006) is in line with best international practice as 
exemplified by Norway and the Netherlands. Much depends, of course, on 
the implementation of the approach. The proposals note that 
“Introduction of an activation requirement is predicated on childcare 
supports being available”. This is a critical issue. While childcare structures 
and policy have been developing in recent years, they are still far from the 
fully developed systems found in Scandinavia. There must be a linkage 
between childcare provision and activation provisions, so that what is 
sought in terms of activation is in line with the possibilities afforded by the 
childcare structures. 
 
Another key decision in the design of the system is whether activation 
or a work-test is to be voluntary or compulsory. In the Scandinavian 
countries activation is typically compulsory, not just for lone parents but 
for all social assistance beneficiaries. This is in the context of an excellent 
and fully fledged childcare system, making it possible for families, including 
lone parent families, to combine work and care. This context does not (yet) 
exist in Ireland. In the UK (where the childcare system is perhaps more 
developed than in Ireland, though less so than in Scandinavia) the New 
Deal for Lone Parents operates on the basis of voluntary participation. 
Again, this contrast suggests that the extent of compulsion needs to be 
linked to the extent of childcare provision. 
 
The government’s proposals suggest that payment of a Parental 
Allowance would be conditional on what the UK terms “work-focused 
interviews” when the youngest child reached the age of 5 years, and would 
cease when the child reached the age of 7 or 8 years. This contrasts with 
the current situation, in which payment of One-parent Family Payment 
continues until the child reaches the age of 18 years, but can continue 
beyond that if the child is in full-time education. While the proposals leave 
some room for debate as to the precise age cut offs involved, it is clear 
from international comparisons that the current situation is a highly 
unusual one. 
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13.2.2   CHILDREN 
There are strong links between child poverty and the overall “at risk of 
poverty” rate. Countries with the best record on the reduction of child 
poverty – the Scandinavian countries – also tend to have the lowest rates of 
overall poverty. The “best practice” approach to improving EU 
performance in this area suggests close attention should be given to the 
policies and structures of the best-performing countries. The logic of the 
approach is, therefore, that other countries should compare their 
approaches with those of the Scandinavian countries – which are the best 
performers in this regard not only in Europe but in global terms. 
 
By contrast, much of the debate on child poverty has focused on 
restructuring income-tested income support for families with children, with 
attention centering on recent initiatives in English-speaking countries. 
While some reductions in poverty have been achieved by these initiatives, it 
is clear that rates of child poverty in the English speaking countries remain 
above those in most European countries, and well above Scandinavian 
levels. 
 
This approach is associated with a tendency to view child poverty as a 
problem to be dealt with, in the main, through child income support. The 
problem with this is that children are not poor on their own – they have a 
parent or parents living in poverty with them. So avoidance of poverty 
requires that parents have adequate incomes too. Tackling child poverty 
requires a strategy that takes a broad view of welfare income supports, and 
“activist” measures to increase participation in employment. Solutions lie 
not with welfare alone, or employment alone, but a combination of both. 
13.2.3   OLDER PEOPLE 
The “at risk of poverty” rate for older people has varied substantially over 
time in Ireland. The risk of poverty (at 60 per cent of median income) rose 
from low levels in 1994 to over 40 per cent around the year 2000. The Irish 
rate was second highest (to Cyprus)  in the EU-25 around the year 2003, 
and more than double the EU average. The lowest risk of poverty for older 
people in Western Europe was in the Netherlands, a country with a strong 
basic pension and mandatory occupational pensions. Despite the high risk 
of income poverty, older people had lower than average risks of consistent 
poverty. Home ownership, drawing on financial assets and family support 
contribute to explaining this difference. Recent increases in payment rates 
for  State Pensions have contributed to a strong reduction in the risk of 
poverty for pensioners. Recent CSO estimates, based on the Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC), indicate that older persons now 
have a lower than average “at risk of poverty” rate. 
 
The potential of a non-means-tested “Living Alone Supplement” to 
target vulnerable older people was examined. While the impact on the 
headcount of poverty risk at the 60 per cent line is limited, there is a more 
substantial  impact on the broader poverty gap measure of poverty. The 
results are sufficient to indicate that a Living Alone Supplement could have 
a significant impact on poverty risk. Balancing this benefit with the cost 
requires further fine tuning of the analysis, and of possible income or 
means-testing aspects of the proposal. 
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A restructuring of state supports for public and private pensions, 
limiting tax relief on pension contributions to the standard rate of tax, 
offers scope for very substantial reductions in poverty for older people. In 
fact, standardisation could create more than sufficient resources to increase 
the state pensions by €50 per week, which would virtually eliminate the risk 
of poverty for older people. There are also alternative uses of the resources, 
examined in Chapter 12, which also allow for a broad reduction in risks of 
poverty. 
13.2.4   PEOPLE WITH A DISABILITY 
People with a disability are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social 
exclusion. The information relating to disability obtained in general 
household surveys is limited but does allow their income and deprivation 
levels to be analysed. In the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey, 22 per cent of 
respondents reporting a chronic illness or disability, and 38 per cent of 
these adults were in households “at risk of poverty”, more than twice the 
figure for other adults. Similarly, the consistent poverty rate for those 
reporting a chronic illness or disability was twice the rate for those not 
doing so. The percentage “at risk of poverty” rose sharply for long-term ill 
or disabled adults between 1995 and 2001, linked to the extent to which 
people with illness or disability and the households in which they live rely 
on social welfare payments as a source of income. 
 
The factors underpinning this heightened poverty risk and consistent 
poverty are complex, with disability having its effects through a variety of 
channels, starting with its potential effects on educational attainment and 
its direct and indirect impact on the individual’s working career and 
perhaps also that of others in the household. When one controls 
statistically for other factors, those reporting a longstanding/chronic illness 
or disability that hampers them in their daily activities or restricts the kind 
of work they can do have a significantly reduced probability of participating 
in the paid labour force. Those reporting a chronic illness or disability who 
are “at risk of poverty” are also mostly in households where no-one else is 
at work. The extent of dependence on social welfare payments is a key 
factor: people who were ill or disabled and “at risk of poverty” had only 10 
per cent of their household income coming from work, with most from 
social welfare payments. So what distinguishes people with a long-term 
illness or disability in households below the “at risk of poverty” income 
threshold is that their households have little engagement with paid work 
and are highly dependent on social welfare.  
13.2.5  UNEMPLOYED PERSONS 
The rapid fall in the Irish unemployment rate, and its positive economic 
and social effects, have been well documented. There remains, however, a 
high risk of income poverty and of consistent poverty for those who are 
unemployed. The “at risk of poverty” rate for those who are unemployed is 
towards the high end of the international spectrum, exceeded in the EU-15 
only by the UK. 
 
International best practice confirms that is possible to attain both low 
unemployment and a low risk of poverty for the unemployed. In Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands the risk of poverty facing the unemployed is 
about half of that in Ireland and the UK, but the unemployment rate 
remains low. Strong activation policies are the key to achieving this 
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combination. OECD analysis suggests that Irish activation policy has 
become very effective, and may now be able to offset the potential negative 
incentive impact of higher unemployment compensation. 
13.2.6  IN-WORK POVERTY AND THE WORKING POOR 
Over the decade from the mid-1990s, Ireland has seen very rapid increases 
in employment and in incomes from employment, but concern about the 
numbers of “working poor” are being voiced more frequently, in Ireland as 
at EU level. “The working poor” may be measured as individuals who are 
themselves in work and who live in a household that is poor or “at risk of 
poverty”. In the Irish case 7 per cent of adults in work are in households 
below the 60 per cent of median income threshold, a figure which is close to 
the EU-15 average. As elsewhere, the percentage below that threshold is very 
much higher for the self-employed than for employees; the figure is 6 per cent 
for employees but 16 per cent for the self-employed, neither being particularly 
high or low compared with other EU-15 countries. The size of the in-work 
population means that even with a relatively low “at risk of poverty” rate 17 
per cent of adults below the 60 per cent threshold are in work. 
 
Over the ten years from 1994, in-work poverty risk rose from 5 per cent 
to 7 per cent, while for employees the increase was significantly greater. 
This reflects the fact that households where the numbers at work rose saw 
particularly marked income increases – with the proportion of married 
women in work rising very rapidly over the period – so households with 
only one earner could well fail to keep pace with the poverty threshold. 
However, only a relatively small minority of the “working poor”, measured 
in income terms alone, are in consistent poverty.  
 
Compared with all those at work, working poor employees have 
substantially lower levels of educational attainment than all those at work, 
and are often low paid. Working poor employees are also predominantly in 
households with children: about 9 per cent are in households comprising 
just one adult with a child or children, but 63 per cent are in households 
with two or more adults and children. 
 
 Analysis of Census data shows that deprivation remains a spatially diffuse 
phenomenon. Significantly greater variation occurs within rather than 
between spatial units. The Border and Western Regions tend to be the 
most deprived but the situation varies depending on the particular aspect of 
deprivation on which one focuses. Generally, spatial variations in risk of 
deprivation are counterbalanced by a more even incidence of poverty as 
high risk areas tend to have a lower share of the population. Analysis at the 
household level using EU-SILC 2005 looking at both ‘at risk of  poverty’ 
measures and at consistent poverty broadly confirms this picture. Focusing 
on areas defined in terms of population density confirms that both types of 
poverty were distributed across areas in a fairly similar manner to the 
population as a whole. Given the diffuse nature of poverty, area 
programmes cannot be justified on a targeting basis alone. 
13.3  
Spatial Issues 
 
Poverty and deprivation are much more sharply differentiated by 
housing tenure. In particular, local authority tenants display distinctive 
levels of disadvantage in relation to both “at risk of poverty” rates and 
consistent poverty. This is also true of a range of deprivation dimensions. 
However, with the exception of neighbourhood problems relating to such 
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matters as crime and pollution there is no evidence that urban local 
authority tenants are less favourably situated than their rural counterparts. 
Thus, there is no evidence to support the view that  urban ‘underclass’ or 
vicious circle contextual effects play an important role in explaining the 
distribution of poverty and deprivation in Ireland. 
 
The fact that we have found no strong evidence of a causal role for 
spatial factors does not rule a potential valuable role for area-based 
interventions. Recent interventions have had more complex justifications 
than targeting, encompassing factors such as enhanced neighbourhood 
infrastructure, improved service delivery and mobilisation of community 
resources. They address ‘place poverty’ as well as ‘people poverty’. It is 
important, however,  not to encourage unrealistic expectations that such 
initiatives can provide solutions to problems that can be addressed only by 
national policies. 
 
 There remains a substantial gap between risks of poverty in Ireland and 
those in the EU countries with the best performance in this area. How can 
this gap be bridged? We have examined the scope for bridging this gap 
with two simple rate- increasing welfare packages (10 per cent and 20 per 
cent) and with two packages incorporating structural changes as well as 
increased welfare payment rates. Details of the packages and their “first 
round” impact on poverty risks are given in Chapter 12. Here we focus on 
the package which seems to offer greatest scope for bridging the gap, 
which involves: 
13.4  
Policy 
Packages 
 
• a uniform welfare payment rate across all schemes of €230 per 
week in 2007 terms. This is similar to the target set in the 
Programme for Government for older persons, but well above the 
target for general welfare rates (of €185.50 per week) set in the 
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (Ireland, 2007); 
• an income-tested Child Benefit Supplement; 
• a reorientation of the state’s total expenditure on pensions away 
from tax expenditures for private pensions and towards the state 
pension.  
 
The package is financed, in the main, by restricting tax relief on 
superannuation contributions to the standard rate of tax. The net revenue 
from standardisation is of the order of €1,500 million per annum. Standard 
rate taxpayers are unaffected by the change, while top rate taxpayers see 
their tax liabilities rise. This aspect of the package can be seen as 
rebalancing state support for pensions in favour of greater universal 
support, and less support towards the higher end of the income 
distribution. Standard rate taxpayers gain from the increased universal 
support, and are unaffected by the standardisation of relief on 
superannuation contributions. 
 
The direct impact of this package suggests a fall in the risk of poverty 
from almost 16 per cent to between 10 and 11 per cent. The reduction in 
risk is greatest for the high risk groups (older people, people with a 
disability and unemployed persons) for whom risks fall from about 40 per 
cent to close to 20 per cent. There are significant increases in replacement 
rates, with the modal rate rising from between 50 and 60 per cent to 
between 60 and 70 per cent. The rise in high or very high replacement rates 
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(defined as above 70 per cent and above 90 per cent) is, however, more 
modest. A key feature if this policy package were to attain its poverty-
reduction potential is that it would need to be complemented by further 
measures encouraging activation of welfare recipients – including not only 
unemployed persons but also lone parents and people with a disability. 
 
A key message from this work is that the balance between payment rates 
for pensions and for other welfare payments needs to be reconsidered. 
Recent results from the EU-SILC suggest that older people now have 
lower than average “at risk of poverty” rates, following increases in the 
State Pension in recent years. Older persons have had lower than average 
risks of consistent poverty for the past decade and more – partly reflecting 
their access to resources not included in cash income, such as the 
advantage of owning a house outright. Current policy includes a target of 
raising the State Pension to at least €300 by 2012; but the target for welfare 
payment rates for other welfare recipients is a more modest one. The goal 
in the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion is to “…maintain the 
relative value of the lowest social welfare rate at least at €185.50, in 2007 
terms”. Differing interpretations of this goal are possible. Perhaps the most 
generous would be that it involves indexation of the lowest rate in line with 
earnings. Assuming 5 per cent growth in earnings per year, this would see 
the rate rise to about €237 by 2012. This would represent 79 per cent of the 
State Pension target of €300 per week – a fall from the current ratio of 88 
per cent of the State Pension rate. 
 
Our analysis suggests that a package which raised the State Pension to 
the target level, with other payment rates increased to “close the gap” 
which currently exists between pension and non-pension rates would be a 
more effective way of reducing the “at risk of poverty” rate. One option 
which merits further consideration is the possibility of financing this 
package by a standardisation of tax reliefs for superannuation 
contributions. 
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